State v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 30 October 1946
• Docket Number: 363
• Citation: 39 S.E.2d 819,226 N.C. 639
• Parties: STATE v. MATTHEWS et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

39 S.E.2d 819

226 N.C. 639

STATE v. MATTHEWS et al.

No. 363

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 30, 1946

The defendants were indicted for the murder of one John Addison. The jury returned verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. From judgment imposing sentence of death, the defendants appealed.

Harry M. McMullan, Atty. Gen., and T. W. Bruton, Hughes J. Rhodes and Ralph M. Moody, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

J Faison Thomson, of Goldsboro, and Walter T. Britt, of Clinton, for defendants.

DEVIN Justice.

The evidence offered at the trial showed that the murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and that both defendants were present and participated in the crime. The defendants made confessions at the time of their arrest giving the details of the slaying of deceased with a shotgun for the purpose and in the course of robbing him, and that this was pursuant to a concerted plan conceived and consummated by the defendants. They lured the deceased into the woods under pretext of selling him whisky, and there they told him to cross his arms behind him and shot him, killing him instantly.

Then they robbed his body. The confessions of the defendants were admitted without objection. Neither of them went on the stand.

The defendants were young. At the time of the crime defendant Matthews was 18 years of age and Williams 17. Evidence was offered in their behalf that the mentality of both was of a low order. A mental expert testified, after examining them at the time of the trial, that both were border-line cases, with mental age of nine years and six months. The father of defendant Matthews said he was 'frenzied minded,' and Williams' father said his son was 'frazzle minded.' In rebuttal the State offered several witnesses who had known defendants for some time and for whom in several instances the defendants had worked, that the mental capacity of the defendants was apparently normal for persons of their age, and that in the opinion of the witnesses they had sufficient mental capacity to know right from wrong.

The defendants noted exception to the testimony of several of these nonexpert witnesses on the ground that it was not competent for them to give in evidence their opinions as to the ability of the defendants to know right from wrong. It appears that in each instance no objection was made to the question or answer but only to the denial of a subsequent motion to strike the question and answer. The objection came too late. State v. Stancill, 178 N.C 683, 100 S.E. 241. But we think the evidence was competent. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a witness who has observed another and had reasonable opportunity of forming an opinion satisfactory to himself as to his mental condition, may express an opinion as to his sanity or his ability to understand the difference between right and wrong. State v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E.2d 232; State v. Hawkins, 214 N.C. 326, 333, 199 S.E. 284; State v. Nall, 211 N.C. 61, 188 S.E. 637; State v. Keaton, 205 N.C. 607, 172 S.E. 179; State v. Jones, 203 N.C. 374, 166 S.E. 163; State v. Hauser, 202 N.C. 738, 164 S.E. 114. 'His objections that nonexperts were allowed to express opinions upon his sanity, or ability to know the difference between right and wrong, are not well founded. ' State v. Stefanoff, 206 N.C. 443, 174 S.E. 411, 412.

Furthermore, there was no evidence in this case that either of the defendants was insane, or was unable to distinguish between right and wrong. The mental expert offered by the defendants gave it as his impression that they did know right from wrong. The defendants' evidence pointed to low mentality, but fell short of indicating mental irresponsibility or incapacity to commit crime. State v. Haywood, 61 N.C. 376. However, the rule which permits opinion evidence as to the sanity of a person charged with crime, when his mental responsibility is in issue, may not be extended to permit a witness to testify whether defendant had mental capacity to commit the particular act charged, or to render competent opinion evidence which invades the province of the jury as to defendant's capacity for a particular crime. State v. Hauser, 202 N.C. 738, 164 S.E. 114; State v. Journegan, 185 N.C. 700, 708, 117 S.E. 27; In re Will of Lomax, 224 N.C. 459, 31 S.E.2d 369, 155 A.L.R. 278.

Low mentality is not the test of responsibility for crime. State v. Jenkins, 208 N.C. 740, 182 S.E. 324. The test of responsibility is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time...