State v. Mattison

• Decision Date: 22 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 21438,21438
• Citation: 277 S.E.2d 598,276 S.C. 235
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Charles T. MATTISON, Appellant.

Page 598

277 S.E.2d 598

276 S.C. 235

The STATE, Respondent, v. Charles T. MATTISON, Appellant.

No. 21438.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 22, 1981.

Charles W. Wofford and Carl F. Muller, both of Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham, Greenville, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Russell D. Ghent, Columbia and Sol., William W. Wilkins, Greenville, for respondent.

LEWIS, Chief Justice:

Appellant was convicted of the murder of his estranged wife and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals, contending that he is entitled to a new trial because, allegedly, the trial judge erred (1) in the charge of the law of implied malice, (2) in excluding certain testimony concerning "voodoo", "roots", or witchcraft, (3) in failing to charge the law of involuntary manslaughter, and (4) in instructing as to the permissible verdicts. These questions will be discussed in the order stated.

Appellant first argues that the charge on implied malice created an irrebuttable presumption on the issue and thereby unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof. The trial judge twice instructed the jury on the issue of implied malice, the first in his main charge and the second during the deliberations of the jury, at their request. Both instructions were, in all material respects, in the following language:

... Malice may be express or it may be implied. It may be express, as for example, lying in wait for some one, or it may be manifested by implication from the facts and circumstances attending the transaction. For example, the law says that if one intentionally kills another with a deadly weapon, the implication of malice arises. In other words, the law implies malice from the use of a deadly weapon. Now, if facts are proved, sufficient to raise a presumption of malice to your satisfaction, such a presumption would be rebuttable and it is always for the jury to determine from all the evidence in the case whether or not malice has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Recently, in State v. Crocker, 272 S.C. 344, 251 S.E.2d 764, in upholding the constitutionality of the law in this State on implied malice, we pointed out that the implication arising from the doctrine of implied malice does not create a conclusive presumption, with a shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant; but, instead, "the resulting implication only permits rather than requires the jury to infer malice."

When the charge in this case is considered as a whole, we think the instructions on the law of implied malice made it clear that any presumption or inference of malice was rebuttable and whether malice had been proved was an issue of fact for the jury to determine under all of the evidence. The jury was explicitly instructed that the burden was upon the State to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not think that the instructions could have been reasonably interpreted by the jury to mean that the burden of proof shifted to the appellant to rebut any inference of malice that might arise from the use of a deadly weapon.

While we find no reversible error in the present instructions, we strongly suggest to the Trial Bench that a more appropriate instruction on implied malice would deal with the evidentiary nature of the presumption and that the implication does not require the jury to infer malice but only permits it. In other words, the presumption or inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon is simply an evidentiary fact to be taken into consideration by the jury, along with other evidence in the case, and to be given such weight as the jury determines it should receive. The inference of malice may be drawn from proof of the use of a deadly weapon if the jury concludes such is proper after considering all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. See: State v. DeWitt, 254 S.C. 527, 176 S.E.2d 143.

Next, appellant contends that the trial judge excluded certain testimony concerning "roots" or witchcraft and thereby prevented him from presenting his full defense.

Appellant sought to show that he was afraid of his wife at the time of the killing. He sought to introduce testimony to show that he had a fear that his wife was attempting to work "roots" on him. The record indicates that this is the use of evil spirits and witchcraft to cause great harm to the victim. It was sought to have the jury consider "evidence of the appellant's fear of 'roots' and its effect on him in evaluating the degree of the crime, if any, ... and the insanity issue."

Error is charged in the exclusion of some of the testimony offered to establish appellant's fear of his wife because of her alleged practice of "roots". Much of the testimony excluded concerned the statements of the appellant in which he told others of his belief and fear that his wife was practicing "roots". Error is also charged in the exclusion of statements allegedly made by the deceased to a...