State v. Mattox

Decision Date16 March 2018
Docket NumberNo. 27518,27518
Parties STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee v. David G. MATTOX, Defendant–Appellant
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ALICE B. PETERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0093945, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422, Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee

THOMAS M. KOLLIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0066964, 3725 Pentagon Boulevard, Suite 270, Beavercreek, Ohio 45431, Attorney for DefendantAppellant

OPINION

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David G. Mattox, appeals from his convictions on a series of charges under R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), 2907.02(A)(1)(b), 2907.05(A)(4) and 2907.323(A)(1). Mattox argues that his convictions should be vacated because the trial court erred by refusing to suppress statements he made during interviews at the Miami Township Police Department; by overruling his motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 ; and by disregarding the manifest weight of the evidence in finding him guilty. Having reviewed the briefs and the record, we find that the trial court correctly deemed Mattox's statements to be admissible; that the court properly overruled his motion for acquittal; and that the convictions were justified by the evidence. Therefore, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 2013, a detective with the Miami Township Police Department asked Mattox to be interviewed in response to an allegation that he had sexually abused a minor. Mattox complied with the request, and on September 18, 2013, he participated in a roughly 30 to 40 minute interview with the detective at the department's offices. Tr. of Proceedings 9:3–9:18 and 23:2–23:5. The investigation came to a close without the filing of any charges because of a lack of evidence. Id. at 12:11–12:21.

{¶ 3} Prompted by new allegations, the department reopened the investigation in 2014, and the detective requested that Mattox return for another interview. Id. Mattox arrived at the department's offices for his second interview on December 8, 2014. Id. The reopened investigation resulted in charges, and on July 16, 2015, officers arrested Mattox. Id. at 15:10–15:21. Later that day, after Mattox executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights, the detective interviewed him for the third time. Id. at 16:22–18:20.

{¶ 4} A Montgomery County grand jury issued an indictment against Mattox on July 24, 2015 ("Indictment A"), charging him with seven counts of gross sexual imposition against a person less than 13 years of age, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) ; two counts of gross sexual imposition through the use of force or the threat of force, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) ; two counts of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) ; 13 counts of rape of a person less than 13 years of age, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) ; and one count of rape through the use of force or the threat of force, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).1 On July 31, 2015, the grand jury issued a second indictment ("Indictment B"), charging Mattox with 10 counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented materials or performances, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1). Mattox pleaded not guilty to both of the indictments.

{¶ 5} On August 19, 2015, Mattox moved to suppress the statements he made during his three interviews at the Miami Township Police Department. In his motion, Mattox argued that the statements should be suppressed because he did not waive his Miranda rights; because officers "questioned [him] multiple times without advising him" of his rights; and because he "did not fully understand all of the rights that were allegedly read to him." Def.'s Mot. to Suppress 3, Aug. 19, 2015. Following a hearing on October 2, 2015, the trial court overruled the motion. Decision & Entry Overruling Def.'s Mot. to Suppress 2–3, Oct. 14, 2015.

{¶ 6} Mattox executed a jury waiver on July 11, 2016, and his case proceeded to a bench trial beginning on January 31, 2017. At the conclusion of the trial on February 8, 2017, the court found Mattox guilty on seven counts of rape of a person less than 13 years of age under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (Counts 1–4, 7–8 and 22 of Indictment A); two counts of kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) (Counts 9–10 of Indictment A); two counts of gross sexual imposition against a person less than 13 years of age under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) (Counts 11–12 of Indictment A); and nine counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented materials or performances under R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) (Counts 2–10 of Indictment B).2 Tr. of Proceedings 913:3–918:17. The court filed a termination entry on March 27, 2017, and Mattox filed his notice of appeal to this court on March 30, 2017.

II. Analysis

{¶ 7} For his first assignment of error, Mattox contends that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT's MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

{¶ 8} Mattox argues that the trial court should have suppressed the statements he made during his interviews at the Miami Township Police Department in 2013 and 2014 because the detective who conducted the interviews failed to advise him of his Miranda rights.3 Appellant's Br. 5–7. With respect to his 2015 interview, Mattox concedes that he executed a written Miranda waiver but argues that the waiver was invalid because the detective failed to explain all of the charges against him and ignored what might have been a request to speak with an attorney. Id. at 7.

{¶ 9} Appellate "review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. As the trier of fact, a trial court "is in the best position to weigh * * * evidence * * * and evaluate [the credibility of] witness[es]," so an "appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Id. , citing State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982) ; State v. Graves , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-03-022, 2015-Ohio-3936, 2015 WL 5671910, ¶ 9, citing State v. Cruz , 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2013-10-008, 2014-Ohio-4280, 2014 WL 4802860, ¶ 12. Accepting the trial court's findings of fact as true, "the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the [trial court's legal] conclusion[s]," whether the "facts satisfy the applicable * * * standard." Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8, citing Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583, and State v. McNamara , 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997).

{¶ 10} Regarding Mattox's interviews in 2013 and 2014, the trial court determined that Miranda warnings were not required because Mattox was not in police custody in either instance. Decision & Entry Overruling Def.'s Mot. to Suppress 2–3. The "procedural safeguards prescribed by Miranda apply only when [a] person [is] subjected to [a] ‘custodial interrogation.’ " State v. Thomas , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20643, 2005-Ohio-3064, 2005 WL 1414441, ¶ 27, citing Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In this context, an interrogation would be "custodial" if the person were formally arrested or if the person's freedom of movement were restrained to the degree normally associated with a formal arrest. Id. , citing California v. Beheler , 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983).

{¶ 11} For purposes of determining whether an interview is custodial, the "subjective views" of the interviewer and the person being interviewed "are immaterial"; instead, the determination should focus on the essentially objective question of whether "a reasonable person in the [same] position" would feel "at liberty to terminate the interview and leave." State v. Ferguson , 2017-Ohio-7930, 98 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 70 (2d Dist.), citing Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994), and State v. Hatten , 186 Ohio App.3d 286, 2010-Ohio-499, 927 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.) ; State v. Magnone , 2016-Ohio-7100, 72 N.E.3d 212, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Hoffner , 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27, and State v. Earnest , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26646, 2015-Ohio-3913, 2015 WL 5642917, ¶ 22 ; State v. Chenoweth , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2010 CA 14, 2011-Ohio-1276, 2011 WL 944437, ¶ 8, citing Beheler , 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517. Among others, the factors a court should consider in applying this standard are: the location of the interview; the duration of the interview; whether the interviewee is physically restrained; whether the interviewee is threatened or tricked; and whether the interviewee is released at the end of the interview. See Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) ; see also , e.g. , Magnone , 2016-Ohio-7100, 72 N.E.3d 212, ¶ 23.

{¶ 12} Here, the trial court determined that a reasonable person in Mattox's position would have felt free to leave the interviews in 2013 and 2014. See Decision & Entry Overruling Def.'s Mot. to Suppress 2–3. Mattox maintains, to the contrary, that he was effectively in custody during both of the interviews, given that: (1) he "came to the police station at the request of a detective," rather than "show[ing] up * * * on his own accord"; (2) when he arrived, the detective escorted him from the lobby to the interview-room; (3) the detective at least partially obstructed his path out of the room; and (4) the detective informed him that he was a suspect. Appellant's Br. 6–7. As well, Mattox notes that the detective kept the door to the room closed during his interview in 2013. Id.

{¶ 13} We concur with the trial court's determination. Notwithstanding that the detective informed Mattox that he was a suspect and asked him to come to the Miami Township Police Department for the 2013 and 2014 interviews, Mattox "voluntarily appeared" there in response...

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    ...¶ 11; State v. Miller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25504, 2013-Ohio-5621, ¶ 48, citing McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11.State v. Mattox, 2018-Ohio-992, 108 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 23-24 (2d Dist.). {¶ 26} R.C. 2919.22 provides:(A) No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or ......
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