State v. McClain
| Decision Date | 15 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-1181A170,4-1181A170 |
| Citation | 442 N.E.2d 1131 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Calvin McCLAIN, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Charles E. Stewart, Jr., Deputy Pros. Atty., 31st Judicial Circuit, Crown Point, Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Charles H. Graddick, Gary, for appellee.
The jury acquitted Calvin McClain of the charge of Robbery, a class C felony. The State appeals a reserved question of law pursuant to Ind.Code 35-1-47-2 and presents this single issue. 1
"Whether the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant-Appellee's motion in limine and subsequently sustained the Defendant-Appellee's objection to the State's offer of proof of a confession made by the Defendant-Appellee in open court at his first judicial appearance."
We sustain the appeal, agreeing with the State the trial court erred in excluding McClain's confession as such confession was voluntary and not the result of a custodial interrogation.
On April 10, 1979 a male robbed the Mirovich Clothing Store in Lake County, Indiana. That same day the manager and saleslady picked McClain as the robber out of 30 photographs. The manager also gave a statement to the police. McClain was not arrested until nine months later. The day after his arrest, on January 29, 1980, without counsel McClain appeared for his first judicial appearance before Judge Letsinger where the following exchange occurred:
ANSWER [McCLAIN]: The reason why I did the robberies, I needed money, so therefore I can't hire an attorney because I don't have any money. Like some of that up there ain't true, your Honor, that Class B, I don't know what's happening with that, them other two, well what can I say."
(R. 189).
After a change of venue from the judge and during his robbery trial, Special Judge Richard Maroc granted McClain's motion in limine to exclude the admissions made to Judge Letsinger. The manager of Mirovich and three police officers testified for the State. However, McClain and his mother testified he was in the Hines V.A. Hospital at the time the robbery occurred. The jury found McClain not guilty.
It appears the trial court relied on a federal case, United States v. Dohm, (5th Cir.1980) 618 F.2d 1169 (en banc) to exclude McClain's admissions. In Dohm, the defendant made damaging statements at a pre-trial bail hearing before a magistrate which statements were admitted at trial. On appeal, the court considered the issue of "whether the government's use at trial of statements made by the accused at a pre-trial bail hearing constitutes a denial of the accused's fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination." Id. at 1170, and concluded "when proper warnings are given, testimony presented by a defendant to meet bail requirements may be admissible against him at trial." 2 Id. at 1174. In Dohm the magistrate tried several times to warn the defendant not to hurt himself by speaking without a lawyer, but the warnings were confusing. 3 Because the warnings were obfuscating, the appeal court reversed Dohm's conviction and remanded for a new trial excluding the confession.
We acknowledge it to be good policy for trial judges to initially inform defendants, at a hearing such as occurred here, the advisability of having counsel, not to speak to the merits of the offense as their words might be used against them. In Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the Court pointed out a warning is needed to make the defendant aware he is in an adversary system,--that he is not with people acting in his interest. Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. 4 However strongly we may urge trial courts to caution defendants before they speak, nevertheless, we hold McClain's admissions should have been admitted. The Indiana Supreme Court has consistently held:
Minneman v. State, (1982) Ind. 441 N.E.2d 673 at pp. 676. See also Lucas v. State, (1980) Ind., 413 N.E.2d 578; Hatcher v. State, (1980) Ind., 410 N.E.2d 1187; Adams v. State, (1979) Ind., 386 N.E.2d 657; Hoskins v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 290, 375 N.E.2d 191; Hill v. State, (1978) 267 Ind., 480, 371 N.E.2d 1303. Our supreme court in Staton v. State, (1981) 428 N.E.2d 1203 adopted the United States Supreme Court definition of interrogation given in Rhode Island v. Innis, (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 as follows:
Id. 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. In utilizing this definition, Indiana will admit statements into evidence which are made in response to a question by the police while the defendant is in custody if the court determines the response was volunteered rather than the result of the interrogation. See Staton v. State, supra; Johnson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 370, 380 N.E.2d 1236; Nading v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 634, 377 N.E.2d 1345; Bugg v. State, supra; Lane v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 485, 364 N.E.2d 756; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307, 259 N.E.2d 696.
For example in Nading v. State, supra, the officer was completing the routine paperwork for incarceration and did not intend to question the defendant on his criminal involvement. Therefore he gave no warnings. When the defendant asked who signed the charging affidavit, the officer responded that he didn't know, whereupon Nading exclaimed whoever did it was going to pay. The officer then asked if he intended a threat against the signer and Nading replied he didn't, but the informer was going to pay. Our supreme court, in response to Nading's challenge to the admission of those statements which were not preceded by a Miranda warning, held there was no interrogation, and advisement of rights was not necessary. "An interrogation occurs only when officials intend to elicit, by whatever means, substantive evidence concerning criminal activity." Id. at 639, 377 N.E.2d at 1348. The court also held the statement was voluntary. "Such a spontaneous statement ... with no suggestion of force, fraud or threats on the part of the police, is plainly admissible under the test of voluntariness." Id. Similarly in Johnson v. State, supra, the supreme court held admissible a confession by Johnson made while in custody at his home. Without giving a Miranda warning, the police said, "What happened?" Immediately Johnson confessed. Our supreme court found this opening remark by the police was like a greeting intended "for its calming effect than for obtaining an admission." Id. at 377, 380 N.E.2d at 1240....
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Lewis v. State, 45S00-8603-CR-248
...the commissioner and that it was entirely voluntary. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing to suppress it. State v. McClain (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 1131. Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance so that he could be reexamined as to his co......