State v. McDaniel, 1085
Citation | 298 P.2d 798,80 Ariz. 381 |
Decision Date | 12 June 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 1085,1085 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Winston O. McDANIEL, Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Struckmeyer, Whitney & Perry, Phoenix, for appellant.
Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., L. Alton Riggs, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., T. J. Mahoney, County Atty., Pinal County, and Irving Vincent, Deputy County Atty., Florence, for the State.
Appellant, Winston O. McDaniel, was informed against, tried and convicted of the crime of fellatio, a felony, and he appeals from the judgment and sentence of imprisonment.
On November 21, 1954, three teen-age boys residing at Florence attended a 'Movie' in Coolidge. Afterward, between the hours of 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., they went to a cafe and there encountered defendant, a Coolidge high school teacher. The boys not having transportation home, defendant agreed to drive them as far as the 'Y' and they would attempt to 'hitchhike' on to Florence. However, upon arriving at that point, defendant agreed to drive that lads on home.
After two of the boys were taken to their homes, the complaining witness, a fourteen year old boy, climbed into the front seat and was alone with defendant. The substance of this boy's testimony was that defendant told him that he wanted to see his mother and upon such pretext drove toward his home which was some distance outside the city; that enroute defendant made inquiry of the boy about his private parts; that defendant stopped his automobile and when the complaining witness started to get out, defendant told him it was no use getting out as the door was locked; that he did not agree to the lewd and lascivious acts, known as fellatio, which then were performed upon his body by defendant, but he admitted he did not resist because '* * * He could have had a knife or something there in the floorboard.' On cross-examination the witness admitted that he saw no knife and that no physical violence was threatened by defendant. There was no proof that the door was locked nor that the boy was forced to remain in the car. The next morning, after observing her son's conduct, his mother at his request called the police, and he related the occurrence to the officer the following evening.
The testimony of various witnesses leaves no doubt with regard to the occurrences in Coolidge, that defendant took the three boys to Florence and that he took the complaining witness home after taking the other boys to their homes. The only direct evidence of the act of fellatio by defendant is the testimony of this boy. Defendant did not testify. However, there is other evidence to which reference will be made in the discussion of the assignments of error.
While defendant presents some fifteen assignments of error and thirteen supporting propositions of law we believe the legal problems raised fall into five categories which will be treated in such order as seems best. Accomplice Matter.
Defendant contends the court erred in not granting his motion for an instructed verdict because the evidence, as he construes it, shows the complaining witness to be an accomplice and that there was a lack of corroboration of his testimony. It has always been the rule in this jurisdiction that 'A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless the accomplice is corroborated by other evidence * * *.' Sec. 13-136, A.R.S.1956. There are numerous decisions of this court interpreting this statute, some of the more recent being: State v. Miller, 71 Ariz. 140, 224 P.2d 205; State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 355, 290 P.2d 470.
If the complaining witness in the instant case of his own volition participated in the act of fellatio he would in law be an accomplice, as was the prosecutrix in the Thomas case, supra. Inasmuch as defendant did not testify, the only evidence on this point is the testimony of the boy, who stoutly maintained that he did not enter willingly into the act of fellatio committed upon him by defendant and that the only reason he submitted was because of his fear that defendant would do him bodily harm if he refused.
A similar problem arose in the case of People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 190 P.2d 9, 12. There the defendant was convicted of sodomy and lewd and lascivious conduct with young boys. The question of whether they were accomplices in relation to the alleged acts was submitted to the jury. The decision recites that each of the boys admitted the commission of the acts and that he knew them to be wrongful, but each maintained that he was 'afraid of' defendant and did not 'willingly' participate in the acts. The trial court had covered in its instructions the law pertaining to accomplices as well as mere submission to the violation of their persons would not involve the criminal intent necessary to subject them to prosecution for commission of the acts and so classify them as accomplices. The court pointed out:
We are in accord with the foregoing statements. Cf. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., Vol. 2, Section 453. In the instant case we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of whether the complaining witness was an accomplice to the jury under proper instructions as to the law governing the matter. By its verdict of guilty the jury obviously believed the complaining witness was telling the truth, hence it must necessarily have found (a) that the complaining witness was not an accomplice in this crime so as to require corroborating evidence, or (b) if an accomplice that his testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other competent evidence. (We shall further discuss this matter of corroboration later in the opinion.)
Admissibility of Statement of Police Officer.
The chief of police of Coolidge was permitted to relate a conversation held with defendant regarding the pending charge. This conversation took place while the witness and defendant were riding from Florence to Collidge after defendant's preliminary hearing. Defendant objected upon the theory that if the testimony relating the conversation purported to be a confession a proper foundation had not been laid. The conversation was as follows:
'After we entered the car the conversation was opened by Mr. McDaniel with words to this effect: he turned to me and said, 'This is sure an awful mess, isn't it?' and I replied, 'Yes, Mac.' I said, 'It looks like you have really got your tail in a crack this time."
After objections were overruled, the witness continued:
'As my memory serves me, I told him that I was curious to know if a person-or, rather, if he had ever taken any steps to seek medical help in helping him to overcome his proclivity or desires for having unnatural sex acts with persons of the same sex as he.'
After motions to strike the previous statement were overruled, the witness continued
On cross-examination the following questions and answers were made:
'Did he ever admit to this offense that he is charged with to you?
'Not specifically, no.
'Did he ever admit this offense that he is charged with at all?
'No.'
Defendant assigns as errors the admission of the foregoing testimony (which he maintains falls into the class of a confession), upon the ground that there was no preliminary showing that such statements were freely and voluntarily given, and furthermore that they did not tend to connect defendant with the crime for which he was being tried. The rule regarding confessions does not apply to admissions made by a defendant. In Lawrence v. State, 29 Ariz. 247, 261, 240 P. 863, 868, we quoted from the Kansas Supreme Court found in State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 P. 784, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 533, as follows:
We held in McDaniels v. State, 62 Ariz. 339, 158 P.2d 151, that statements which were mere admissions of fact and which might or might not prove incriminating in their effect and did not constitute a confession of guilt were admissible and the fact that such admissions, coupled with other facts proved at the trial, tended to establish the accused's guilt of crime charged does not require the State to lay the same foundation as for a confession. See also, State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757; State v. Johnson, 69 Ariz. 203, 211 P.2d 469. We hold that there was no error in admitting this testimony of the police officer, nor in refusing to strike the same, as the quoted evidence does not even purport to be a...
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...a limited exception in the area of sex crimes to prove the nature of the accused's specific emotional propensity. State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 798, 802-803 (1956). This inherent significance is recognized by the establishment of a program for treatment, education and rehabilita......
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...persons who consensually participate in criminal sexual activity are accomplices and can be charged as principals. State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 798 (1956). The failure of the trial courts to instruct the juries on this issue was reversible error even in the absence of requests ......
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