State v. McDaris

• Decision Date: 17 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. COA20-7,COA20-7
• Citation: 852 S.E.2d 403
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Zachary Dallas MCDARIS, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

852 S.E.2d 403

STATE of North Carolina

v.Zachary Dallas MCDARIS, Defendant.

No. COA20-7

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 17, 2020

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Hugh A. Harris, for the State.

Mark L. Hayes, for defendant-appellant.

MURPHY, Judge.

The trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss a first-degree burglary charge when it considered N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) as the felony underlying the first-degree burglary charge and the evidence failed to support this theory, which was used as the sole basis for the conviction. We reverse Defendant's conviction and remand for entry of judgment on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor breaking or entering, which was supported by the evidence.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on 1 January 2018, Defendant Zachary Dallas McDaris ("Defendant") woke Roy Ridenhour ("Mr. Ridenhour") and his wife, Cynthia Ridenhour ("Mrs. Ridenhour"), by loudly banging on the front door of their residence in Hickory. Mr. Ridenhour looked out the window and thought a neighbor was at the front door. When Mr. Ridenhour went to the front door and flipped the deadbolt, Defendant violently pushed the front door open. The door struck Mr. Ridenhour and knocked him backwards approximately six feet. After shoving the door open, Defendant entered the house and stated, "I'm your savior. You're going to hell for your sins."

Defendant then began beating Mr. Ridenhour, who shouted for his wife to call the police and grab his pistol. Defendant struck Mr. Ridenhour multiple times, causing him to fall down a flight of stairs and knocking him unconscious. Mr. Ridenhour sustained a laceration to his head, a large knot on the back of his head, and bruises and cuts to his shoulder and back. Mrs. Ridenhour entered the hall, pointed a gun at Defendant, and told him to leave. In response, Defendant exited the house, and Mr. Ridenhour regained consciousness and locked the door. Defendant briefly walked in the front yard but returned and began banging on the front door again. Caldwell County Sheriff's Deputies arrived at the scene and detained Defendant at the front door.

Following these events, Defendant was indicted for first-degree burglary and the lesser included offense of felonious breaking and entering. Defendant's indictment read:

The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about [1 January 2018], in [Caldwell County] [Defendant] unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did during the nighttime hours, break and enter a building actually occupied by Roy Ridenhour and wife, Cynthia Gail Ridenhour, used as a residence located at [Street Address], with the intent to commit a felony or larceny therein. This act was in violation to [first-degree burglary and felonious breaking and entering under N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a) ].

At a pretrial hearing on 5 August 2019, Defendant waived his right to a jury trial in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201(b), and a bench trial began the following day. After the State presented its evidence, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Defendant presented evidence and renewed his motion to dismiss. During both the motion and renewed motion, Defendant argued the State had not presented sufficient evidence of his intent to commit an underlying felony when he entered the Ridenhour house, as required for first-degree burglary. State v. Singletary , 344 N.C. 95, 101, 472 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1996).

The trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and renewed motion. During the subsequent charge conference, there was a discussion of potential underlying felonies to satisfy the intent to commit a felony therein requirement of first-degree burglary, including N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1), assault causing serious bodily injuries, and attempted murder; however, the trial court's explicit reasoning for denying Defendant's renewed motion to dismiss was unclear.

In suggesting potential underlying felonies, the State stated:

The first one I would contend would be [ N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) ]. And I would note when we have the felony of breaking or entering, I would contend that that is a felony that, when the language says a felony or larceny therein, it can be considered. And I would point out to the Court that [ N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) ] is the specific language where it says, if any person who breaks or enters any building with the intent to terrorize or injure an occupant of a building is guilty of a Class H felony. Now, that is a separate or distinct way of violating, breaking or entering a building, because [ N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a) ], I would argue to the Court, is our more traditional approach. And it says any person who breaks or enters any building with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein shall be punished as a Class H felony.

...

Now, what else could you consider if this were being argued to the jury? Assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Another felony is attempted murder.

The trial court stated if it were a jury trial it would instruct a jury on, and as finder of fact it was considering, larceny, attempted murder, and N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1).¹ However, the trial court, as finder of fact, convicted Defendant of first-degree burglary solely on the basis of N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1), stating

So I have no doubt a jury could have found that ... [D]efendant entered the house to attempt murder or a larceny or something to that effect, but I think what's important to the Court is ... and from the Court's standpoint -- I'm saying this because if the case does get appealed, ... I want the appellate court to understand that this Court, sitting as a jury, right or wrong, believed that ....

That [ ] [D]efendant ... committed first-degree burglary by committing the felony of [ N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) ] when he broke and entered into the building with the intent to terrorize and injure the occupant, because that's what happened....

...

So ... the Court doesn't have any reasonable doubt that [ N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) ] occurred and that [ ] [D]efendant intended to injure the occupants of the house once he broke in, at a minimum. He certainly terrorized them, and he may have certainly -- I think that statute applies, in other words. So the Court finds [ ] [D]efendant guilty of first-degree burglary.

Defendant entered written notice of appeal on 9 August 2019. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, as breaking and entering with intent to terrorize cannot be the underlying felony for first-degree burglary.

ANALYSIS

We review the "trial court's denial of [Defendant's] motion to dismiss de novo. " State v. Smith , 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). "When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether [the State presented sufficient] evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) that the defendant is the perpetrator of the offense." Id. (emphasis added); see N.C.G.S. § 15A-1227 (2019). To be sufficient, the State must present "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Smith , 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).

"As always, [in our review of a ruling on] a motion to dismiss, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [S]tate and allow the [S]tate every reasonable inference that may arise upon the evidence, regardless of whether it is circumstantial, direct, or both." State v. Cummings , 46 N.C. App. 680, 683, 265 S.E.2d 923, 925, aff'd , 301 N.C. 374, 271 S.E.2d 277 (1980).

A. Underlying Felony

Here, Defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the felonious intent element of first-degree burglary, specifically arguing, inter alia , that N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) cannot be an underlying felony for first-degree burglary because "grammatically and logically, the initial breaking and entering must be distinct from the crime which a burglar subsequently intends to commit therein." We limit our analysis to the element of felonious intent because Defendant challenges no other element on appeal.

Also, like our Supreme Court did in State v. Reese when analyzing a motion to dismiss, we separately analyze the independent theories for the underlying felony element used in Defendant's first-degree burglary jury charge in evaluating whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. State v. Reese , 319 N.C. 110, 144-45, 353 S.E.2d 352, 371-72 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Barnes , 345 N.C. 184, 233, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (1997). However, in determining the acting with the intent to commit therein element of first-degree burglary, the trial court acquitted Defendant of the felonies of attempted murder, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, and larceny when it found beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant had only committed N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1). See State v. Smith , 170 N.C. App 461, 473, 613 S.E.2d 304, 313 (2005), aff'd as modified by 360 N.C. 341, 626 S.E.2d 258 (2006) (quoting Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 352 (1985) ) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ").

Therefore, we examine the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial supporting the State's theory that Defendant had felonious intent, as required by first-degree burglary, to commit the felony of breaking or entering with intent to terrorize or injure under N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a1) therein. See State v. Parker , 54 N.C. App. 522, 525, 284 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1981) ("[The d]efendant first assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charges of breaking or entering and larceny.... We [ ] note that no prejudicial error could have been committed by the court's denial of the defendant's motion to...