State v. McDougald, COA21-286
Docket Number | COA21-286 |
Decision Date | 02 August 2022 |
Citation | 284 N.C.App. 695,876 S.E.2d 648 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. William MCDOUGALD |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholas R. Sanders, for the State.
Christopher J. Heaney, for defendant-appellant.
Juvenile Law Center, by Marsha L. Levick, Aryn Williams-Vann, Katrina L. Goodjoint, and Riya Saha Shah, and Phillips Black, Inc., by John R. Mills, for amici curiae.
¶ 1 William McDougald (Defendant) appeals from an Order denying his Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR). Relevant to this appeal, the Record before us tends to reflect the following:
¶ 2 On 12 October 2001, a jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of second-degree kidnapping, misdemeanor breaking or entering, and assault on a female. Defendant had two prior convictions including: a guilty plea to second degree kidnapping, a class E felony, with judgment entered on 16 May 1984 when Defendant was sixteen years old; and a no contest plea to one count of second-degree sexual offense (class H felony), two counts of common law robbery (class D felonies), and one count of armed robbery (a class D felony) with judgment entered on 1 February 1988. Due to these prior felonies, a jury found Defendant guilty of violent habitual felon status on 14 November 2001. On the same day, as required by the violent habitual felon statute, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life without parole (LWOP). Defendant appealed from the Judgment and this Court found no error by Opinion entered on 20 May 2008. See State v. McDougald , 190 N.C. App. 675, 661 S.E.2d 789 (2008) (unpublished).
¶ 3 Subsequently, on 26 June 2017, Defendant filed a MAR in Harnett County Superior Court asserting the mandatory sentence of LWOP for violent habitual felons, as applied to him, violated Defendant's Eighth Amendment rights where one of the predicate violent felony convictions was obtained when Defendant was a juvenile and that the LWOP sentence was disproportionate. On 22 May 2018, Defendant amended his MAR to also include claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Defendant requested the trial court to vacate his convictions for second-degree kidnapping and violent habitual felon status.
¶ 4 On 9 August 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the MAR including both the Eighth Amendment and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated the trial court could determine the Eighth Amendment claims as a matter of law without the introduction of evidence. Defendant elected to abandon his claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel during the hearing.
¶ 5 In support of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, Defendant called Mark Key (Key), his trial attorney, to testify. Key testified Defendant's file was destroyed as part of a routine purge, and to prepare for this hearing, Key tried to remember "as much as I could" by reviewing the trial transcript and the time sheet Key kept during Defendant's trial. Based on this time sheet from 2001, Key testified he visited Defendant on 25 April 2001 and told Defendant the prosecutor was offering a plea deal in which Defendant would serve a sentence of approximately twelve to thirteen years. At the time of this meeting, Defendant had not yet been indicted for violent habitual felon status; however, the charge was pending. Key testified he did not explain or mention the mandatory punishment of LWOP for the pending violent habitual felon status charge during this meeting. Defendant rejected the plea deal. Thereafter, the State obtained a superseding indictment for violent habitual felon status on 14 May 2001. Key testified he did not meet with Defendant to discuss the potential consequences of a conviction for violent habitual felon status until the morning of the trial on the substantive felonies, 1 October 2001. At this time, Key told Defendant there was a potential punishment of LWOP depending on the outcome of the trial but was "not sure [he] told [Defendant] it was mandatory [LWOP]." Key admitted Defendant might not have understood what he meant.
¶ 6 Defendant also called Attorney Michael G. Howell (Howell) who had almost twenty years of experience representing clients facing the death penalty and LWOP in North Carolina. Howell testified Key's performance was "deficient" because Key failed to "fully explain[ ] to [Defendant] on 25 April 2001 the full ramifications of the plea offer and the rejection of it[,]" including exposure to mandatory LWOP sentence.
¶ 7 On 26 November 2010, the trial court entered an Order denying the MAR. The Order makes the following relevant Findings of Fact:
The Order also makes the following relevant Conclusions of Law:
To continue reading
Request your trial