State v. McFadden

• Decision Date: 09 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. SC95614.,SC95614.
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Gregory McFADDEN, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

772 So.2d 1209

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Gregory McFADDEN, Respondent.

No. SC95614.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 9, 2000.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Michael J. Neimand, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Criminal Section, and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review McFadden v. State, 732 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), based on express and direct conflict with Barber v. State, 413 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and Johnson v. State, 449 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We granted review to resolve the conflict among the district courts of appeal on the issue of whether a plea of guilty without an adjudication of guilt constitutes a prior "conviction" for purposes of impeachment under section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (1997), of the Florida Evidence Code.

BACKGROUND

Respondent Gregory McFadden was charged with a domestic battery offense. At trial, in an attempt to impeach McFadden's credibility, the State sought to introduce evidence under the authority of section 90.610(1) that McFadden previously had pled guilty to a separate aggravated battery charge involving the same victim. See McFadden, 732 So.2d at 412

. Although McFadden had pled guilty to this prior charge, adjudication had been withheld. See id. Over McFadden's objection, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask McFadden on cross-examination whether he had previously pled guilty to a separate aggravated battery upon the same victim. See McFadden, 732 So.2d at 414. The jury found McFadden guilty, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence, and McFadden appealed.

On appeal, the Third District reversed McFadden's conviction, concluding that "there should have been no reference whatever to the previous case because withholding adjudication simply does not result in the defendant's having been `convicted' of an offense as is required to impeach a witness under section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (1997)." McFadden, 732 So.2d at 413. The Third District also determined that the "basic error" in allowing the impeachment was "compounded" and new errors created when the trial court allowed the State to point out both the precise nature of the charge to which McFadden had pled guilty and the identity of the victim. Id. at 414.

ANALYSIS

Section 90.610(1), which is the specific part of the Evidence Code governing impeachment by a prior conviction provides:

90.610. Conviction of certain crimes as impeachment

(1) A party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment....

The issue that we must address is what constitutes a "conviction" of a crime for purposes of impeachment pursuant to this section.

Generally, when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea to the crime charged or a verdict of guilty is returned against a defendant after trial, the court will adjudicate the defendant guilty and enter a "final judgment of conviction." Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.670.¹ The "term `judgment' means the adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or not guilty." Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.650. Where a person is adjudicated guilty by a trial court, there is no question that a defendant or witness could subsequently be impeached by that prior conviction so long as the other necessary requirements of section 90.610 are satisfied. However, trial courts may withhold adjudication of guilt after a plea has been accepted or after a verdict of guilty has been rendered and place the defendant on probation provided that the requirements of section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1997), are met. See also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.670.²

Given this framework, the question becomes whether an adjudication of guilt by the court or a final judgment of conviction is required in order to constitute a conviction for purposes of impeachment pursuant to section 90.610(1). Although this Court has never squarely addressed the issue, in State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 996, 1001 (Fla. 1998), we stated, albeit in dicta, that if at sentencing "adjudication is withheld, there would be no conviction under section 90.610(1)." Consistent with this view, the Third District in this case held that there can be no impeachment by a prior conviction where there had been a guilty plea but adjudication was withheld. See McFadden, 732 So.2d at 413

. However, the Third District "recognize[d] that there is Florida authority which points in the opposite direction," citing to Barber and Johnson. Id.

In Barber, the Second District framed the issue as whether "a jury verdict of guilty without an adjudication of guilt constitutes a conviction for purposes of impeachment." 413 So.2d at 482. During direct examination, the defendant testified that he had no prior criminal convictions. See id. One week earlier in another case, a jury had returned a guilty verdict against the defendant but he had not yet been adjudicated guilty by the court. See id. The trial court allowed the State to impeach with the jury verdict even though the defendant had not yet been adjudicated guilty. See id.

The Second District affirmed, holding that "for purposes of impeachment, there is no significant difference in probative value between a jury's finding of guilt and the entry of a judgment thereon." Id. at 484. However, the Second District also recognized that "an anomaly will occur if the court ultimately chooses to withhold adjudication and place appellant on probation for the crime of which the jury had previously found him guilty. Should this happen, appellant cannot thereafter be impeached by evidence concerning that crime." Id.

In Johnson, the First District addressed the issue of whether a witness could be impeached with a prior plea of guilty where the court had not yet adjudicated the witness guilty. 449 So.2d at 922-23. The First District agreed with Barber that the witness could be impeached pursuant to section 90.610 even though adjudication had not yet taken place. See Johnson, 449 So.2d at 923

. As to the possibility that adjudication might be withheld, the First District also agreed with the dicta in Barber that the witness could not be impeached by evidence concerning a prior crime where the court withheld adjudication. See id. (citing Barber, 413 So.2d at 484).

In contrast to Barber and Johnson, the Fourth District in Roberts v. State, 450 So.2d 1126, 1126-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), reversed after determining that the State's attempt to impeach the defendant with a prior conviction was improper because the trial court in the earlier case had not yet adjudicated him guilty. Accord Parker v. State, 563 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)

(agreeing with concurring opinion of Justice Anstead (then Chief Judge) in Roberts and concluding that impeachment on the basis of a prior conviction was improper if the defendant had not yet been adjudicated guilty).³

Although there appears to be agreement among the appellate courts that a witness or defendant cannot be impeached by a guilty verdict or guilty plea where adjudication has been withheld, there is actual conflict on the broader question of whether a guilty verdict or plea of guilty without an adjudication of guilt constitutes a prior "conviction" for purposes of impeachment under section 90.610. Therefore, because of the continued conflict and confusion over the issue, we now address whether an adjudication of guilt by the trial court is required in order for a witness to be impeached with a prior "conviction" under section 90.610(1).⁴

The key to our analysis is the definition to be given to the term "conviction" as used in section 90.610(1) of the Florida Evidence Code. Section 90.610 does not define the term "conviction" for purposes of impeaching a witness. As this Court has determined, section 90.610(1) involves a matter of court procedure solely within the province of this Court to enact pursuant to article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution. See State v. Page, 449 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1984)

; Bobb v. State, 647 So.2d 881, 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see generally In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So.2d 1369, 1369 (Fla.1979). It is therefore this Court's responsibility to determine what constitutes a prior "conviction" for purposes of impeachment under section 90.610(1) consistent with the limited purpose for which convictions have been historically admissible. See Page, 449 So.2d at 815; Bobb, 647 So.2d at 884.

The appellate courts and this Court agree that if a trial court withholds adjudication there can be no prior conviction under section 90.610(1). See Raydo, 713 So.2d at 1001 n. 7

; Johnson, 449 So.2d at 923; Barber, 413 So.2d at 484; see also Parker, 563 So.2d at 1131-32; Roberts, 450 So.2d at 1127 (Anstead, C.J., concurring specially). The assumption underlying this conclusion is that an adjudication of guilt or judgment of conviction is required in order to constitute a conviction for purposes of impeachment. Otherwise, if the adjudication of guilt or judgment of conviction was not essential to impeachment by prior conviction, appellate courts would have permitted impeachment even though adjudication had been withheld.

The crux of the issue is whether the definition of "conviction" should be consistently applied, regardless of whether adjudication has been withheld, or whether a person has pled guilty or been found guilty but adjudication has not yet occurred. As a result of the distinction drawn by the First and Second Districts in Johnson and Barber...