State v. McKown
| Decision Date | 20 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | C1-90-767,Nos. CX-90-766,s. CX-90-766 |
| Citation | 475 N.W.2d 63 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Kathleen Rita McKOWN, William Lisle McKown, Respondents, Mario Victor Tosto, Defendant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Indictment charging respondents with second degree manslaughter must be dismissed because the state officially advised respondents they would be permitted to rely on spiritual treatment and prayer in the care of their child without sufficient notice that should those methods fail, they might face criminal charges.
Hubert H. Humphrey, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Michael Freeman, Hennepin County Atty. and Michael Richardson, Asst. County Atty., Hennepin County Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Peter J. Thompson, Thompson & Lundquist, Minneapolis, for Kathleen McKown.
Ronald J. Riach, Peterson, Franke & Riach, Roseville, for William McKown.
Peter M. Lancaster, Timothy E. Branson, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, amicus for Minnesota Civ. Liberties Union.
Terrence J. Fleming, and Ansis V. Viksnins, Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, amicus for Church of Christ--Scientist.
Heard, considered, and decided by the Court en banc.
On May 9, 1989, 11-year-old Ian Lundman died at his home in Independence, Minnesota. 1 Ian's death was apparently caused by diabetic ketoacidosis, a complication of diabetes mellitus. Ian was occasionally ill in the weeks preceding his death and became seriously ill two or three days before he died.
Kathleen McKown, Ian's mother, and William McKown, Ian's step-father, are Christian Scientists. In accord with their religious beliefs, Ian was treated with Christian Science spiritual healing methods throughout his final illness. He did not receive conventional medical care at any time during that illness.
In late September and early October, 1989, the Hennepin County Attorney presented evidence related to Ian Lundman's illness and death to the Hennepin County Grand Jury. The grand jurors heard testimony from medical doctors indicating that Ian's diabetes was apparently treatable through conventional medicine and that his condition probably could have been stabilized as late as two hours before he died. The jurors also heard testimony regarding the nature and practice of Christian Science healing, and regarding the specific healing methods used in treating Ian Lundman.
Following this testimony, the county attorney instructed the grand jury as to the definition of second degree manslaughter. 2 Having heard this instruction, two of the jurors asked, The county attorney replied, He then read the entire child neglect statute aloud to the jurors, and asked, "Did that answer your question, ma'am?" The juror who posed the question responded, "Mm-hmm." 3 After deliberating, the grand jury returned indictments charging both Kathleen and William McKown with second degree manslaughter. 4
The McKowns moved the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, the Honorable Eugene J. Farrell presiding, to dismiss the indictments against them for lack of probable cause, because the indictments violated due process of law and their rights to freely exercise their religious beliefs, and because the grand jury was improperly instructed with respect to the McKowns' duty of care. The district court dismissed the indictments. It concluded that the child neglect statute and the second degree manslaughter statute were in pari materia, such that the spiritual treatment and prayer exception to the child neglect statute also operated as a defense to the charge of second degree manslaughter. The court determined that the McKown's rights had been prejudiced because the grand jury was not instructed as to the effect of the spiritual healing and prayer exception. It also concluded that the indictments violated due process of law in that the child neglect statute informed individuals that they might rely on spiritual healing and prayer without violating that statute, but did not state that doing so might expose them to other criminal charges if the treatment failed.
On appeal by the state, the court of appeals concluded that while the child neglect and second degree manslaughter statutes were not in pari materia, the trial court was correct to dismiss the indictments as violations of due process. 461 N.W.2d 720. The court reasoned that the child neglect statute did not provide fair notice of potential liability under other criminal statutes, that it permitted arbitrary enforcement, that the McKowns may well have relied on the spiritual treatment and prayer exception to the child neglect statute in determining the course of their son's treatment, and that the state had not clearly enough defined when reliance on spiritual healing became criminal conduct.
The state appealed to this court for reinstatement of the indictments charging respondents with second degree manslaughter. It contends that the court of appeals was correct in concluding that the spiritual healing and prayer exception to the child neglect statute does not apply to the second degree manslaughter statute because the two provisions are not in pari materia. It argues that both the trial court and the court of appeals were incorrect, however, in concluding that the indictments violate due process of law.
The trial court concluded that the child neglect statute and the second degree manslaughter statute are in pari materia, requiring that they be interpreted in light of one another. We disagree.
"Statutes 'in pari materia' are those relating to the same person or thing or having a common purpose." Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, Inc. v. State, 352 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Minn.1984). Such statutes should be construed in light of one another. See id.; Doe v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 435 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn.1989). In Doe, this court held that Minn.Stat. § 13.41, Subd. 4 (1986), governing all state licensing agencies, and Minn.Stat. § 147.01, Subd. 4 (1986), which applied specifically to the state Board of Medical Examiners, were indeed in pari materia. The court therefore concluded that a general phrase in section 147.01 could be read to incorporate a similar, but more specific phrase in section 13.41. See id. 5
Unlike the statutes at issue in Doe, the child neglect and second degree manslaughter statutes are not in pari materia and thus, the spiritual treatment and prayer exception to the former cannot be imported into the latter. The child neglect provision applies specifically to individuals with legal responsibility for a child who wilfully neglect that responsibility and thereby cause the child substantial physical or emotional harm. The statute defining second degree manslaughter, however, permits the state to prosecute anyone who causes the death of another by exposing that person to an unreasonable risk of death or great bodily injury. The two statutes are therefore clearly based on separate and distinct purposes. Further, nothing in the language of either provision suggests they are so closely related as to require they be interpreted in light of one another, and neither contains an explicit mandate to construe them together. See Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, 352 N.W.2d at 406 ().
In State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480 (1946), the appellant contended that a statute allowing the prosecution of an individual who took the life of another by operating a vehicle in a "reckless or grossly negligent manner," Minn.Stat. § 169.11 (1941), was unconstitutionally vague. This court disagreed, relying in part on the definitions assigned to "reckless" and "grossly negligent" in other contemporary homicide statutes. See Bolsinger, 221 Minn. at 156, 21 N.W.2d at 486. The court explained that this was appropriate because
[t]he statute in question and those relating to homicide in force at the time of its enactment relate to one common subject matter, that of homicide. As such, they should be construed as constituting one systematic body [of] law. Each statute should be construed in the light of, with reference to, and in connection with the others. So construed, the statute in question should be fitted to the statutes in force at the time of its enactment and carried into effect conformably to them.
Id. at 162, 21 N.W.2d at 486. Thus, the words "reckless" and "grossly negligent" as used in section 169.11 carried the same meaning as they did in other, then-existing homicide statutes.
Respondents here suggest a significantly different application of the doctrine of in pari materia. First, they contend that "culpable negligence" as used in the second degree manslaughter statute, adopted in 1963, should be defined in light of "neglect of a child" as used in section 609.378, enacted by the legislature in 1983. The statutory language at issue in Bolsinger, however, was construed in light of identical language in existing homicide provisions--the question was whether "reckless" and "grossly negligent" meant the same thing in the one statute as in the others. Second, respondents argue for interpreting the earlier of two statutes in light of the later, while in Bolsinger the court adopted precisely the opposite approach. Finally, the court in Bolsinger noted several times that the statute at issue and those considered in pari materia with it were all homicide statutes, "relate[d] to one common subject matter * * *." Id. Here the statutes do not appear to bear the same sort of common purpose. Therefore, application of the doctrine of in pari materia in this case is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Respondent also contends that the legislative history underlying the spiritual...
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