State v. McLymore

• Decision Date: 11 February 2022
• Docket Number: 270PA20
• Citation: 868 S.E.2d 67,380 N.C. 185
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Datorius Lane MCLYMORE
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

380 N.C. 185

868 S.E.2d 67

STATE of North Carolina

v.Datorius Lane MCLYMORE

No. 270PA20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed February 11, 2022

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Marc X. Sneed, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Sterling Rozear, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

EARLS, Justice.

¶ 1 This case requires us to decide whether the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that the defendant, Datorius Lane McLymore, could not claim self-defense to justify his use of deadly force because he was also in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, which makes it a Class G felony for an individual with a prior felony conviction to possess a firearm. In answering this question, we must interpret the scope and meaning of certain provisions of North Carolina's "Stand Your Ground" Law. Specifically, we must interpret a provision which states in relevant part that a defendant may not claim self-defense if he or she "used defensive force and ... [w]as attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a felony." N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 (2021). We conclude that this provision requires the State to prove an immediate causal nexus between a defendant's attempt to commit, commission of, or escape after the commission of a felony and the circumstances giving rise to the defendant's perceived need to use force.

¶ 2 Because it failed to instruct the jury on this causal nexus requirement, the trial court's jury instructions were erroneous. Further, although McLymore admitted that he had previously been convicted of a felony offense and was possessing a firearm at the time he used deadly force, the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury denied him the opportunity to dispute the existence of a causal nexus between his violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 and his use of force and to assert any affirmative defenses. Because we do not interpret N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) to categorically prohibit individuals with a prior felony conviction from ever using a firearm in self-defense, we cannot say that the trial court's failure to instruct on the causal nexus requirement was not prejudicial with respect to McLymore's purported violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1.

¶ 3 However, at trial, McLymore was also convicted of another felony offense, robbery with a dangerous weapon. This outcome and the uncontroverted facts conclusively establish that McLymore's commission of robbery with a dangerous weapon immediately followed the confrontation during which he used deadly force. Under these circumstances, McLymore could not have been prejudiced by the trial court's issuance of the erroneous jury instruction because, based on the jury's verdict, the immediate causal nexus between his use of force and his commission of the disqualifying felony of robbery with a dangerous weapon was established. Thus, under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1), he was disqualified from claiming the justification of self-defense. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. Background.

¶ 4 In April 2014, McLymore was working as a door-to-door magazine salesman. After completing a sale, he used the proceeds to purchase laundry detergent and food. Shortly thereafter, he quit his job with the sales company. Later that day, his supervisor at the sales company, David Washington, met McLymore at a local hotel. The two left together in Washington's vehicle. When Washington asked McLymore about the proceeds from his magazine sale, McLymore responded that he "spent it on food and washing powder." According to McLymore, while the vehicle was stopped at a traffic light, Washington punched McLymore in his jaw, grabbed him by the shirt, and pushed him against the door. In response, McLymore pulled out a gun, "closed [his] eyes[,] and fired two" shots at Washington, killing him. McLymore then pulled Washington's body out of the driver's seat, left it on the ground, and fled the scene in Washington's vehicle. McLymore evaded police for over an hour before being apprehended.

¶ 5 On 5 January 2015, McLymore was indicted for the first-degree murder of Washington, felonious speeding to elude arrest, and robbery with a dangerous weapon for taking Washington's vehicle. At trial, McLymore admitted that he had previously been convicted of multiple felony offenses including common law robbery, larceny of a firearm, and assault inflicting serious bodily injury. The trial court also admitted evidence that twenty days before McLymore shot Washington, McLymore was involved in another alleged robbery, during which he entered the victim's house, fought with the victim over money, and then took the victim's gun and shot him. The State presented evidence that McLymore used this same gun to shoot Washington.

¶ 6 At trial, McLymore did not dispute that he killed Washington. Instead, he claimed that he justifiably used deadly force in self-defense. During the charge conference, the trial court explained that it would instruct the jury on self-defense but that "it is disqualifying for self-defense under State [v.] Crump that he was a felon in possession of a firearm, which is a disqualifying felony [under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) ]." McLymore objected, arguing that N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) did not apply because he was claiming perfect self-defense under the common law, and that even if N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) did apply, it would violate his rights to interpret this provision to categorically bar individuals with prior felony convictions from ever using a firearm in self-defense. The trial court overruled his objection and instructed the jury, in relevant part, that

[t]he Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of self-defense if he was committing the felony of possession of a firearm by a felon.... [T]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, that the Defendant did not act in self-defense, or that the Defendant was committing the felony of possession of a firearm by felon if the Defendant did act in self-defense.

The jury found McLymore guilty of all charged offenses. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

¶ 7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected McLymore's argument that N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 "only applies to statutory self-defense" as created by N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 and not "common law self-defense," which McLymore attempted to invoke at trial.¹ State v. McLymore , No. COA19-428, 2020 WL 2130670, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. May 5, 2020) (unpublished). According to the Court of Appeals, while another provision of the statutory law of self-defense expressly provided that it was "not intended to repeal or limit any other defense that may exist under the common law," the General Assembly chose not to "carve out a [ ] common law exception" to sections 14-51.3 and 14-51.4. Id. at *7. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that sections 14-51.3 and 14-51.4 wholly "supplant[ ]" the common law of self-defense

in situations where (1) the defendant "was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a felony"; (2) the defendant "[i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself or herself" unless he or she was "in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm"; or (3) "the person who was provoked continues or resumes the use of force" after the defendant withdraws.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 (2019) ). Applying the precedent it had established in State v. Crump , 259 N.C. App. 144, 815 S.E.2d 415 (2018), in which the Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) only required proof that a defendant was committing a felony at the time he or she used assertedly defensive force, the Court of Appeals concluded that McLymore was not entitled to invoke the statutory right to self-defense because "when [McLymore] shot Washington, he was committing the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon which is punishable as a Class G felony under N.C.[G.S. §] 14-415.1." McLymore , 2020 WL 2130670, at *7.

¶ 8 This Court allowed McLymore's petition for discretionary review.

II. Sections 14-51.3 and 14-51.4 supplant the common law of self-defense.

¶ 9 McLymore first argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) applies in his case. McLymore contends that he invoked the common law right to self-defense, which he argues continues to exist separate and apart from the statutory right to self-defense created by N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3. Thus, in McLymore's view, even if N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) bars him from invoking the statutory right to self-defense, it does not disqualify him from justifying the use of defensive force by invoking what he asserts is his still-existing common law right to self-defense. In response, the State contends that the General Assembly has exercised its authority to displace the common law through statutory enactment and that once the General Assembly chose to codify the right to self-defense, the common law right to self-defense was entirely extinguished.

¶ 10 No one disputes that the General Assembly possesses the authority to displace the common law through legislative action. As we have previously explained, "the General Assembly is the policy-making agency of our government, and when it elects to legislate in respect to the subject matter of any common law rule, the statute supplants the common law rule and becomes the public policy of the State in respect to that particular matter." McMichael v. Proctor , 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231 (1956). Instead, the question is whether the General Assembly intended to add to the common law right to perfect self-defense or abrogate it in its entirety.

¶ 11 Although not expressly stated, the General Assembly's intention to abolish the common law right to perfect self-defense is unmistakable. Our caselaw describes the common law of perfect self-defense as follows:

The law of perfect self-defense excuses a killing

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