State v. McMahon
| Citation | 94 So.3d 468 |
| Decision Date | 05 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. SC10–2425.,SC10–2425. |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. John McMAHON, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief, Helene Catherine Hvizd and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. McMahon, 47 So.3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Chaves–Mendez, 809 So.2d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The conflict issue concerns whether the State is authorized under section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), to appeal a sentence that is otherwise legal on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue with a defendant without invitation of either party. For the reasons set forth herein, we approve the result reached by the Fourth District in McMahon, and we disapprove the decision of the Fifth District in Chaves–Mendez.
McMahon was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and grand theft. McMahon, 47 So.3d at 369. A hearing was held at which McMahon's counsel advised the court that he hoped to resolve the case at the hearing, and further advised the court that McMahon “scores 18 months at the bottom.” The court agreed that it would be a good idea to resolve the case and, after inquiring about prior convictions, informed McMahon that if he entered a plea at that time, the court would not “habitualize” him if he wanted a sentence of eighteen months. The State had previously filed a notice of intent to seek a habitual felony offender sentence, and objected on the ground that it was entitled to a habitual offender hearing. See id. McMahon was allowed to enter a guilty plea and was sentenced to eighteen months, which was the minimum sentence indicated on the Criminal Punishment Code sentencing scoresheet. See id.
The State subsequently appealed the sentence to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, contending that the trial court improperly initiated plea negotiations with McMahon and failed to conduct a hearing on McMahon's habitual felony offender (HFO) status despite the State's objection. See id. The district court dismissed the appeal, holding that the State cannot appeal the sentence imposed on McMahon even though the district court agreed that the trial court improperly initiated plea discussions with the defendant. McMahon, 47 So.3d at 369–70. The court noted that neither section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), which sets forth the specific circumstances under which the State may take an appeal in a criminal case, nor Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) authorizes the State to appeal from a sentence on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue. See47 So.3d at 369. The district court reasoned that although those provisions authorize the State to appeal a sentence on the ground that it is illegal, the sentence imposed on McMahon was not appealable by the State because it fell within the sentencing guidelines and was therefore legal. Id.1
With regard to the issue of improper court-initiated plea discussions, the Fourth District cited this Court's decision in State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507 (Fla.2000), in which we held that a “trial court must not initiate a plea dialogue; rather, at its discretion, it may (but is not required to) participate in such discussions upon request of a party.” McMahon, 47 So.3d at 369 (quoting Warner, 762 So.2d at 513). The district court held that despite the impropriety of what it concluded was a court-initiated plea negotiation with McMahon, the State was not authorized to appeal the sentence resulting from that plea negotiation. McMahon, 47 So.3d at 369. To support its conclusion, the Fourth District relied in part on its prior decision in State v. Figueroa, 728 So.2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which held that “a trial court's initiation of plea discussions does not render an otherwise legal sentence ‘illegal’ for purposes of a state appeal” under section 924.07 or rule 9.140(c). McMahon, 47 So.3d at 369 (citing Figueroa, 728 So.2d at 788). It is on this point that the district court certified conflict with the Fifth District's decision in Chaves–Mendez, which held in a State appeal that a court-initiated plea negotiation with a defendant constituted per se reversible error. See id. (quoting Chaves–Mendez, 809 So.2d at 910–11).
With regard to the State's second claim, the Fourth District similarly concluded that because the eighteen-month sentence was legal, the trial court's refusal to conduct a hearing on McMahon's habitual felony offender status was also not an appealable issue under the statute authorizing State appeals in criminal cases. See McMahon, 47 So.3d at 370. Based on the foregoing, the district court dismissed the State's appeal. See id. We turn next to the decision certified by the Fourth District to be in express and direct conflict.
The Fourth District certified conflict with State v. Chaves–Mendez, which held that a court-initiated plea negotiation with the defendant was per se reversible error. In Chaves–Mendez, the Fifth District set forth the facts in that case as follows.
The defendant was charged by two count information with committing the crimes of capital sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age, and lewd and lascivious molestation. When the case was called for trial, the trial court sua sponte initiated plea negotiations with the defendant. This negotiation contemplated that, in exchange for the defendant's agreement to enter a plea of nolo contendere to both charges, the trial court would impose a sentence of probation. Over the objection of the State and the victim's family, the defendant accepted the trial court's plea offer. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment on the defendant's plea and sentenced him accordingly.
Chaves–Mendez, 809 So.2d at 910 (footnote omitted). The State appealed the sentences in Chaves–Mendez to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, contending that the sentences were illegal because the trial court erred in initiating plea negotiations with the defendant. See id. The Fifth District agreed with the State, holding that “[t]he trial court's initiation of plea negotiations with the defendant was per se reversible error.” Id. In reaching this holding, the district court relied on this Court's decision in Warner, which was a state appeal from an invalid downward departure sentence. The Fifth District in Chaves–Mendez, noting that Warner held that the trial court must not initiate a plea dialogue with a defendant, reversed the sentences because the trial court impermissibly initiated plea negotiations with Chaves–Mendez. See Chaves–Mendez, 809 So.2d at 910–11.
Although Chaves–Mendez can be distinguished from McMahon, in part, on the basis that the sentence in Chaves–Mendez was apparently an improper downward departure sentence, see Chaves–Mendez, 809 So.2d at 911 (Sawaya, J., concurring and concurring specially), that fact is not apparent in the majority opinion. The majority opinion in Chaves–Mendez conflicts with McMahon in that Chaves–Mendez allowed a State appeal on the claim that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue whereas McMahon did not. Moreover, by holding such an error to be per se reversible, Chaves–Mendez misapplied our decision in Warner wherein we made clear that error by the trial court in improperly initiating a plea dialogue is subject to harmless error analysis. See Warner, 762 So.2d at 515 n. 14.2
To resolve the conflict presented in this case—whether the State may appeal a sentence that is otherwise legal on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue with a defendant—we begin by addressing the State's right to appeal in a criminal case.
“The State's right to appeal in a criminal case must be ‘expressly conferred by statute.’ ” Exposito v. State, 891 So.2d 525, 527 (Fla.2004) (quoting Ramos v. State, 505 So.2d 418, 421 (Fla.1987)). The State's authority to appeal a criminal case is set forth in sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (2009).3Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case in the following circumstances:
(1) The state may appeal from:
(a) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof or dismissing an affidavit charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violation of probation, the violation of community control, or the violation of any supervised correctional release.
(b) An order granting a new trial.
(c) An order arresting judgment.
(d) A ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment. Once the state's cross-appeal is instituted, the appellate court shall review and rule upon the question raised by the state regardless of the disposition of the defendant's appeal.
(e) The sentence, on the ground that it is illegal.
(f) A judgment discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus.
(g) An order adjudicating a defendant insane under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(h) All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case.
(i) A sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921.
(j) A ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.
(k) An order denying restitution under s. 755.089.
(l) An order or ruling suppressing evidence or...
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