State v. McRae

• Decision Date: 21 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1D15–1232.,1D15–1232.
• Citation: 194 So.3d 524
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Stacey Renee McRAE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

194 So.3d 524

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Stacey Renee McRAE, Appellee.

No. 1D15–1232.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 21, 2016.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Shalla P. Jefcoat, Assistant State Attorney, Chipley, for Appellant.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WINOKUR

, J.

The State appeals the lower court's order granting Stacey Renee McRae's motion to suppress her statements to police and all physical items seized from her motel room and vehicle. The State argues the court erred in suppressing her post-Miranda statements because the totality of the circumstances justified a protective sweep of the motel room and further questioning of McRae.¹ We agree and reverse.

I.

The parties do not dispute the court's factual findings leading to McRae's arrest for armed robbery. On December 30, 2013, a convenience store was robbed in Vernon. A surveillance camera captured an image of two women. One woman's face was uncovered as she pointed a firearm at the clerk. A surveillance video also captured images of a vehicle arriving and leaving, indicating there was a third person driving the vehicle. On January 3, 2014, a second robbery occurred at a convenience store in DeFuniak Springs. The perpetrator was a lone male with a firearm, and the victim reported a female driver. A surveillance video indicated the robbers were driving a similar vehicle to the one used in the Vernon robbery.

The police issued a BOLO generated from evidence collected in both robberies. The BOLO included the following evidence: a still-frame from an in-store surveillance video, showing the face of a woman holding a firearm pointed at the clerk; a possible tag number of the vehicle; and a picture of a maroon Ford Taurus, similar to the vehicle used in both robberies.

On January 6, a sergeant with the Bay County Sheriff's Office discovered a vehicle at a motel closely matching the description of the vehicle in the BOLO. Lieutenant Daffin of the Bay County Sheriff's Office and approximately ten other officers assembled at the motel. The car was parked directly in front of a motel room. Two officers knocked on the motel room door. McRae answered the door and Lt. Daffin recognized her as the suspect in the Vernon robbery holding the firearm. Officers grabbed McRae and removed her from the room. Officers next conducted a protective sweep of the room for other occupants, as they were unable to see behind the bed or the bathroom area.

After the protective sweep, officers brought McRae back into the room and gave her Miranda warnings. McRae gave a post-Miranda statement to police in which she admitted involvement in the armed robbery. When asked if there were any weapons in the room, McRae responded that there was a revolver in the nightstand, which an officer retrieved. Police later took McRae to the police station for questioning. The vehicle was towed and later searched pursuant to a warrant.

II.

McRae filed a motion to suppress the statements made to police and all evidence collected from her room and vehicle, “after the illegal entry of her motel room.” McRae argued the police acted illegally as they did not have a search warrant, nor was there consent or exigent circumstances justifying the search. In response, the State argued the police acted legally when officers knocked on McRae's door. Once the officers recognized McRae as the suspect in the surveillance photo, they were justified in detaining her and conducting a protective sweep in the interest of officer safety. At the time law enforcement knocked on McRae's door, police knew there were at least two other perpetrators and a possible firearm used in the armed robbery.

The order granting the motion to suppress, provided that:

This Court determines that law enforcement had neither a warrant nor Defendant's consent to enter the motel room. There is no evidence that law enforcement sought to assist someone who was injured or to render first aid. Based upon the evidence as presented there was no evidence of any exigent circumstance, other than an exigency created by law enforcement. This Court is bound by the principles announced in Higginbotham v. State, 17 So.3d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)

; Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) and Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The evidence seized in the motel room, any Defendant statement and any subsequent search of the vehicle using that information is not legally justified and is hereby suppressed.

III.

A.

“We review the suppression order to determine whether competent substantial evidence supports the factual findings; we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts.” State v. DeLuca, 40 So.3d 120, 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)

. The lower court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct on appeal; therefore, we view “the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to sustaining the order.” Id. Because there is no dispute as to the court's factual findings, we review its conclusion as to the constitutionality of law enforcement's actions de novo.

Each of the steps taken by law enforcement leading to McRae's statements was lawful. The knock at the door, the seizure of McRae, the sweep of the motel room, and the questioning of McRae were all permissible. Each of these actions will be discussed in turn.

1. The officers' knocking on the motel room door did not implicate the Fourth Amendment

A private home (including a motel room) “is an area where a person enjoys the highest reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.” Gonzalez v. State, 578 So.2d 729, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)

; see also

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (prohibiting warrantless entry into a home to effect arrest and reiterating that “[t]he physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”); Turner v. State, 645 So.2d 444, 447 (Fla.1994) (stating that for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections, “[a] motel room is considered a private dwelling if the occupant is there legally, has paid or arranged to pay, and has not been asked to leave”). Even so, police, like any other citizen, may approach a residence and knock, hoping that the occupant will open the door. See

Powell v. State, 120 So.3d 577, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Governmental actors, like private actors, have a limited license to approach a dwelling on a defined path, knock on the front door, briefly await an answer, and either engage in a consensual encounter with the resident or immediately depart.”). This investigative technique—known as a “knock and talk”—does not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Jardines v. State, 73 So.3d 34, 46 (Fla.2011)

, aff'd, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (noting that “police generally may initiate a ‘knock and talk’ encounter at the front door of a private residence without any prior showing of wrongdoing”); see also

United States v. Cruz–Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.2006) (“[A] ‘knock and talk’ is a consensual encounter and therefore does not contravene the Fourth Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion.”); State v. Morsman, 394 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla.1981) (“Under Florida law it is clear that one does not harbor an expectation of privacy on a front porch where salesmen or visitors may appear at any time.”).

The trial court order stated, “[a]ccording to LT. Jason Daffin, BCSO, members of law enforcement knocked on the motel door, which was answered by [McRae].” While officers certainly had reason to suspect that the robbers might be in the motel room, they were permitted to knock on the motel room door without any particular level of suspicion. See Jardines, 73 So.3d at 46

. Thus, police acted lawfully in knocking on McRae's motel room door.

2. Probable cause was established when police recognized McRae as the perpetrator from the picture in the BOLO

Once McRae answered the door and Lt. Daffin recognized her as the robber, police had probable cause for her arrest without a warrant. See § 901.15(2), Fla. Stat

. (providing instances when an arrest without a warrant is lawful); see also

United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.1991) ( “Probable cause exists when under the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ”) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423–24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (holding a warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place is lawful as long as the arrest is supported by probable cause). Once probable cause was established, officers could remove McRae from the room's threshold. See

United States v. Crasper, 472 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “when a suspect voluntarily opens the door of his residence in response to a non-coercive ‘knock and talk’ request, the police may temporarily seize the suspect outside the home (or at the threshold) provided that they have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity”); see also

Byrd v. State, 481 So.2d 468, 472 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing that several federal circuit courts have held that the threshold area of a residence is a public place “wherein a warrant is not required to effectuate a valid arrest”); see generally States v.

Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1426–27 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that police may make a warrantless arrest of a suspect who voluntarily opens the door to his residence in response to a knock by the police). Even if police were not justified in reaching into the motel room and removing McRae from the room's threshold, the seizure is still legal as exigent circumstances permitted the intrusion. See

Mercier v. State, 579 So.2d 308,...