State v. Meador

• Decision Date: 03 July 1926
• Citation: 284 S.W. 890,153 Tenn. 634
• Parties: STATE EX REL. HARNED v. MEADOR ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

284 S.W. 890

153 Tenn. 634

STATE EX REL. HARNED v. MEADOR ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 3, 1926

Appeal from Chancery Court, Macon County; W. R. Officer, Chancellor.

Mandamus by the State on the relation of P. L. Harned, against E. P Meador and others to compel respondents, as the County Court of Macon County, to make provision for a county high school. From a decree granting the writ, respondents appeal. Affirmed.

Frank M. Thompson, of Nashville, and L. A. Ligon and H. B McGinness, both of Carthage, for appellants.

J. T Baskerville, of Gallatin, and Wm. P. Smith, of Nashville, for appellee.

COOK J.

The chancellor awarded peremptory mandamus to compel the county court of Macon county to make provision for a county high school, as required by chapter 115, Acts of 1925. Appeal was prayed and granted, and through assignments of error it is insisted, on behalf of the members of the county court of Macon county, that:

(1) The writ is premature, because the board of education had not submitted a budget for action of the court, as required by the School Law of 1925, and no demand had been made on the court to observe the statute.

(2) That the county court in good faith attempted to observe the statute through the only means within the power of the court to provide the necessary funds, in proposing the issuance of bonds, and in three successive elections the proposal was defeated by the vote of the people, and without public approval the court is without authority to authorize a bond issue.

(3) That the only other means for raising the money to provide a high school would be by a direct tax, and the levy of taxes is not a ministerial function, but involves discretion to be exercised by the county court, which discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus.

(4) That a statute to compel the court to levy taxes for school purposes contravenes article 2, § 29, of the Constitution and violates the right of local self-government, and that the court cannot be compelled under such a statute to levy the tax.

Section 14, c. 115, Acts of 1925, requires that provision be made by the counties of the state for at least one four-year high school in every county, and subsection 9 of section 9 imposes the duty upon the county court to provide funds to erect a suitable building, and maintain at least one first-class four-year high school according to the provisions of the act.

These requirements did not originate with the act of 1925. Chapter 40, § 1, Acts of 1921, created a first-class high school in each county, and subsequent provisions of the act imposed the duty on the county courts to levy a tax for their benefit.

The public school system is a matter of state, and not local, concern, and the establishment, maintenance, and control of the public schools is a legislative function. To promote the public schools, the state, through the Legislature, may levy taxes directly, or the state, having, as it does, full control over its agencies, the counties, may authorize them to levy a tax, or may by statute require them to levy a tax for the establishment and maintenance of public schools. Demoville v. Davidson County, 87 Tenn. 214, 10 S.W. 353; Quinn v. Hester, 135 Tenn. 373, 186 S.W. 459; Hill v. Roberts, 142 Tenn. 215, 217 S.W. 826.

The exercise of the taxing power to promote a system of public schools for all the counties does not infringe upon the right of local self-government, because a public school system, like a highway system, a penal system, or a matter of public health is not of purely local, but of state, concern. The state is a unit, and the Legislature is the state's source of legislative power, from which flows the mandate of the state. Whether or not there should be a uniform system of public schools is a question of policy, which addressed itself solely to the legislative department of the state. Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 534, 53 S.W. 962, 48 L. R. A. 167; 1 Cooley, Taxation (4th Ed.) pp. 915, 916.

The power of the state to require the county courts to provide for the establishment, and co-operate in the maintenance, of the county high schools cannot be doubted. But, supposing this to be so, appellants insist that they have discharged the duty imposed by statute in the submission of bond issues to the voters of the county. The question was submitted in November, 1923, March, 1924, and again in September, 1925. Each submission resulted in disapproval by the voters of the county of the proposal to issue bonds for high school purposes. The last submission was for the issuance of $40,000 of bonds for use in erecting and equipping a high school building as required by the statute. The proposal was decisively defeated. The result was so decisive as to suggest the futility of another submission within any reasonable period.

At the July term, before the last submission to the voters of the county, the county superintendent appeared before the court and directed the attention of its members to the duty of the county under the act of 1925. The court appointed a...