State v. Meier

• Decision Date: 10 February 1989
• Docket Number: Cr. N
• Citation: 440 N.W.2d 700
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clarence MEIER, Defendant and Appellee. o. 880246.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 700

440 N.W.2d 700

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clarence MEIER, Defendant and Appellee.

Cr. No. 880246.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Feb. 10, 1989.

James W. Wold (argued), State's Atty., Cooperstown, for plaintiff and appellant.

C. Charles Chinquist (argued), Fargo, for defendant and appellee.

LEVINE, Justice.

The State appeals from a district court order which denied the State's motion to correct an illegal sentence and ordered that a prior criminal judgment finding Clarence Meier guilty of class C felony reckless endangerment be amended to redesignate the offense as a class A misdemeanor. We reverse and remand.

Meier was found guilty of reckless endangerment under Sec. 12.1-17-03, N.D.C.C., ¹ following a bench trial in December 1986. The conduct giving rise to the conviction was Meier's act of pointing a rifle, which was later determined to be unloaded, at two police officers. In that proceeding, the trial court found that "the offense does fall within the Class C felony category. The circumstances manifest an extreme indifference to the value of human life...." The trial court sentenced Meier to one year's imprisonment at the State Farm with six months of the sentence suspended. Meier appealed to this court.

While the appeal was pending, the State filed with the trial court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a), N.D.R.Crim.P., ² contending that under Sec. 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., ³ the trial court was required to sentence Meier to at least two years' imprisonment. The trial court issued an order changing Meier's sentence to two years' imprisonment.

A majority of this court affirmed Meier's conviction for class C felony reckless endangerment in State v. Meier, 422 N.W.2d 381 (N.D.1988), but reversed the order for correction of sentence because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence after Meier's notice of appeal had been filed. Although one of the issues raised by Meier in that appeal was "whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant manifested an extreme indifference to human life," the majority opinion did not specifically address this question. Rather, we framed the issue as whether "there was insufficient evidence to convict [Meier] of reckless endangerment," and concluded that the evidence was sufficient. State v. Meier, supra, 422 N.W.2d at 383.

After our decision was rendered, the State again filed with the trial court a motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing that Meier must be sentenced in accordance with Sec. 12.1-32-02.1. Meier responded to the motion by requesting that the State's motion be denied, that his conviction "be redesignated as a Class A Misdemeanor," and that the original sentence be retained. The trial court, relying upon a quotation from the Model Penal Code in the majority opinion stating that " '[a] person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury' " [State v. Meier, supra, 422 N.W.2d at 384], ⁴ agreed with Meier. The court stated:

"[U]nder all of the circumstances here, the Court does not believe at this point, and in light of the Supreme Court language, that the circumstances here manifest an extreme indifference to the value of human life as contemplated by Section 12.1-17-13 and the Court will deny the motion to correct the illegal sentence. The Court will grant the motion to amend its previous findings. The Court will find that the defendant's conduct was not under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. The findings do indeed make the conviction a Class A Misdemeanor."

An amended criminal judgment was entered reflecting that Meier was convicted of "Reckless Endangerment, Class A Misdemeanor, a lesser included offense of Reckless Endangerment as charged in the information," and the trial court declined to change Meier's original sentence. The State appealed.

The State contends that, because this court had previously affirmed Meier's class C felony conviction, the law of the case doctrine precluded the trial court from amending its prior findings and the criminal judgment to reflect conviction of a class A misdemeanor. It is unnecessary for us to explore the varying contours of the law of the case doctrine because the trial court's error rests upon more fundamental grounds.

Generally, when a judgment has become final, the trial court loses jurisdiction to alter, amend, or modify that judgment. See, e.g., 49 C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 238 (1947). This principle underlies the statutory analysis employed in John v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37, 41 (N.D.1968), where this court said that when a "case has been tried, judgment of conviction has been rendered, and sentence has been pronounced, the court loses its jurisdiction." At this point, any attempt by the trial court to amend or modify a final judgment is void unless it is made upon grounds provided by statute or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for correcting or amending a judgment. See State v. Rueb, 249 N.W.2d 506, 509 (N.D.1976); State v. Gronlie, 213 N.W.2d 874, 876-877 (N.D.1973); see also State v. Lawson, 356 N.W.2d 893, 894 (N.D.1984). We have applied the same rule to judgments in civil actions:

" '3. Any order made subsequent to final judgment must be for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the judgment. Insofar as any such order attempts to modify such judgment, unless made on grounds provided for in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure for amending or correcting a judgment, and unless made within the time provided for such amendment or correction, it is void.' " Gruebele v. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d 805, 811 (N.D.1983) [quoting Cokins v. Frandsen, 136 N.W.2d 377, 378 Syllabus p 3 (N.D.1965) ]. ⁵

Meier has not drawn our attention to, nor have we found, any statute or Rule of Criminal Procedure which authorized the trial court at this point in time to amend the final criminal judgment in this case to a class A misdemeanor by, in effect, reversing his previous finding that the circumstances manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

Although Meier asserts that the trial court's action is authorized by the provisions of Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P., we disagree. Rule 35(a) allows a sentencing court to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner "at any time." Rule 35(b) ⁶ further allows a sentencing court to reduce a sentence within 120 days after receipt of a mandate issued upon affirmance of an appeal. However, a motion under either subdivision of the Rule presupposes a valid conviction. See State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 468-469 (N.D.1982); Explanatory Note to Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P., North Dakota Court Rules at p. 315 (West 1988). The "narrow function" of the Rule "is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) [Emphasis in original.] See also U.S. v. Vigil, 818 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir.1987). Issues concerning the validity of a conviction are therefore not cognizable on a Rule 35 motion. See United States v. Scott, 688 F.2d 368, 369-370 (5th Cir.1982); Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026, 89 S.Ct. 630, 21 L.Ed.2d 570 (1969); Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1149-1150 (D.C.Ct.App.1985); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d Sec. 582 (1982); 8A Moore's Federal Practice p 35.06[b][v] (2d ed. 1988). The trial court's reversal of its original finding that the circumstances manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life, which involved a reevaluation of the proof submitted at trial, is not authorized by Rule 35.

Nor can the trial court's action in this case be justified under Rule 36, N.D.R.Crim.P., which allows for the correction "at any time" of clerical mistakes in judgments and errors in the record. Rule 36 does not authorize substantive alteration of a final judgment or reassessment of the merits of an earlier decision after the time for reconsideration or direct appeal has elapsed. See United States v. DeLeo, 644 F.2d 300, 301 (3d Cir.1981); United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1979); Explanatory Note to Rule 36, N.D.R.Crim.P., North Dakota Court Rules at p. 317 (West 1988); see also Gruebele v. Gruebele, supra, 338 N.W.2d at 811-812 [Rule 60(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., providing for correction of clerical mistakes in civil judgments "is not a vehicle for relitigating matters that have already been litigated and decided, nor to change what has been deliberately done."] In this case the trial court did not correct a clerical mistake or an error in the record. The record shows that the original written criminal judgment accurately reflects the judgment the trial court pronounced in open court.

Meier asserts that United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.1986), supports the trial court's reexamination of the offense level of his conviction. In that case the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "once this court has decided the merits of a ground of appeal, that decision establishes the law of the case and is binding on a district judge asked to decide the same issue in a later phase of the same case, unless there is some good reason for reexamining it." United States v. Mazak, supra, 789 F.2d at 581 [Emphasis added.] According to Meier, the trial court in this case had "good reason for reexamining" whether the circumstances manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life because an injustice would otherwise result.

We find the flexible law of the case principles discussed in Mazak wholly inapplicable to the circumstances here. In Mazak, the defendant had earlier filed a...