State v. Meister
| Decision Date | 04 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 402,Docket No. 39807 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DAVID JOSEPH MEISTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Latah County. Hon. Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis and Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy Appellate Public Defenders, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
David Joseph Meister appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of murder in the first degree, Idaho Code §§ 18-4001, 18-4003, and conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4003, 18-1701. We affirm.
On December 11, 2001, a woman was shot and killed in her home in Moscow, Idaho. In August 2002, police officers interrogated Meister in connection with the victim's death and Meister confessed that he shot the victim in exchange for a $1,000 payment from the victim's boyfriend. Meister was charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Prior to trial, Meister filed a motion to suppress his confession claiming that his confession wascoerced, that it was in violation of Miranda,1 and that the entire interview was not videotaped. The district court denied the motion. The jury convicted Meister of all charges and Meister appealed. This Court concluded that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Meister's confession. State v. Meister, Docket No. 30152 (Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2007) (unpublished). However, this Court found that the district court erred by failing to admit evidence of an alternate perpetrator. The State appealed the alternate perpetrator issue to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred by applying the wrong standard for admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence and vacated Meister's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009).
Prior to the second trial, the State filed a motion asking the district court to apply the law of the case doctrine and preclude Meister from re-litigating any issue addressed by this Court or the Idaho Supreme Court. The district court granted the motion with respect to the issues addressed by the Supreme Court and denied the motion with respect to the issues addressed by this Court. The district court also applied the law of the case doctrine to all rulings of the district court that were not appealed after the first trial, unless a showing could be made that a decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
Meister again filed a motion to suppress his confession based on coercion. The district court held a hearing in which Dr. Ofshe provided expert testimony regarding the coercive nature of some interrogation techniques. Dr. Ofshe concluded that Meister's interrogation was psychologically coercive. Even considering Dr. Ofshe's testimony, the district court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances, Meister's confession was not coerced and denied his motion to suppress his confession.
Thereafter, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Dr. Ofshe from testifying at trial, claiming that the district court's prior ruling that Meister's confession was not coerced made Dr. Ofshe's testimony irrelevant to any issue before the jury. The district court determined that its previous ruling regarding the voluntariness of Meister's confession would stand; therefore, the court ruled that Dr. Ofshe would be precluded from testifying regarding the voluntariness of Meister's confession. The district court also found that Dr. Ofshe would not beallowed to offer an opinion regarding whether Meister's confession was true or false. However, the court ruled that Dr. Ofshe would be allowed to offer testimony regarding the general subject of false confessions, as it could assist the jury in reaching a conclusion as to whether Meister's confession was true or false.
At trial, Dr. Ofshe testified about the general subject of false confessions, including his theories of how interrogation tactics can lead an innocent person to confess to a crime. The State cross-examined Dr. Ofshe regarding the percentage of cases he reviewed that resulted in a false confession. Thereafter, Meister sought permission for Dr. Ofshe to apply his theories to the facts of the case, arguing that the State's cross-examination had opened the door for such application. The district court denied the request.
Meister was convicted of murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit murder. The district court imposed concurrent determinate life sentences for each conviction. Meister timely appeals.
Meister claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to have Dr. Ofshe testify about the application of his theories to the facts associated with Meister's confession. The State contends that Meister failed to show error in relation to the limitation of Dr. Ofshe's testimony. In the alternative, the State asserts that any error was harmless.
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, an expert witness may provide an opinion "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . ." An expert's testimony is not inadmissible merelybecause it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided in the case. I.R.E. 704. "The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average juror." State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 P.3d 1247, 1253 (Ct. App. 2013). "Therefore, expert testimony is inadmissible if it merely draws conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience." Id. Additionally, "evidence is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 702 if it vouches for the credibility of another witness." Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 474, 299 P.3d 781, 786 (2013).
In the instant case, the district court precluded Dr. Ofshe from offering an opinion regarding the truthfulness of Meister's confession in a pretrial order. In the court's written order, the district court stated, The district court relied on State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 813 P.2d 857 (1990)2 in making its determination. At trial, following cross-examination, Meister requested that Dr. Ofshe be allowed to testify regarding the application of his theories to the facts of the case because the State opened the door to such testimony. The district court denied the request but did not elaborate on its ruling stating, "the Court's going to deny that request and still stay with the Court's original ruling and deny your request--or your argument that the door has been opened to allow that line of questioning in this case."
On appeal, Meister claims that the district court abused its discretion by limiting the testimony of Dr. Ofshe. First, Meister contends that Dr. Ofshe should have been permitted to testify regarding the voluntariness of his confession. Meister argues that although the district court determined his confession was voluntary, and thus admissible, he was still entitled to challenge its weight and credibility. Meister relies on a case issued by the Indiana SupremeCourt for support. In Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ind. 2002), the trial court excluded Dr. Ofshe's testimony regarding police interrogation in its entirety. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's initial determination that Miller's confession was voluntary did not preclude Miller from challenging its weight and credibility and thus, Dr. Ofshe's testimony should have been admissible. Id. at 773-74. The Supreme Court also stated that the trial court could have sustained individual objections at trial in the event that Dr. Ofshe's testimony invaded Rule 704's prohibition of opinion testimony as to the truth or falsity of Miller's statements. Id. at 774.3 Therefore, based on Miller, Meister claims that Dr. Ofshe should have been allowed to challenge the weight and credibility of Meister's confession.
Second, Meister contends that the district court erred by precluding Dr. Ofshe from testifying about the specific procedures used in Meister's interrogation. Meister points to State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301 P.3d 242 (2013) for support.4 In that case, an eyewitness identified Almaraz in a photographic lineup. At trial, the defense sought to introduce expert testimony on the suggestiveness of...
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