State v. Melges
| Decision Date | 17 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | A16-0539 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Darren Gregory Melges, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Reversed and remanded
Kandiyohi County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant)
Melvin R. Welch, Welch Law Firm, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Toussaint, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this pretrial appeal, the state challenges the district court's conclusion that the stop of respondent's vehicle based on information received from an identified informant was not justified by reasonable articulable suspicion of a violation of law. Because the record establishes that objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of law existed at the time of the stop, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In December 2015, J.P., a landowner, made two 911 calls to the sheriff's department about respondent Darren Gregory Melges. When he called J.P. was not present at his property; he was relaying information he received from his girlfriend, J.B., who was alone at the rural residential property. J.P. reported that Melges had come to his home to request permission from J.B. to go on J.P.'s property and search for a deer that Melges believed he had recently shot. J.B. did not grant Melges permission to enter the property. J.P. related to the police that "Melges had been out to my place shooting from the road at some deer" and J.P. further stated that multiple people had recently been "prowling" around his property, driving back and forth on the road.
Melges left the area but soon returned to J.P.'s property. The state argues that the purpose of the second visit was to again ask permission to search for the deer. In its order, the district court stated "that at the time of the second call [to dispatch] J.P. only reportedthat [Melges] had returned without further explanation of the reason." The transcript of the 911 call supports the district court's factual finding. It states:
In the second dispatch call, J.P. also told the dispatcher that J.B. was "scared to death [because] she knows who [Melges] is and knows he's a meth head." J.P. informed the sheriff's office that Melges was driving a blue Ford pickup with an ATV loaded in the truck bed and reiterated his concern that Melges was shooting from the road. J.P. also speculated that Melges did not have permission from any local landowners to hunt in the area.
A deputy responded to the scene based on J.P.'s phone calls. Upon arrival, the deputy observed a blue Ford pickup truck matching the description provided by J.P. The deputy did not observe any traffic violations or indications of illegal activity. Based on J.P.'s information that Melges was likely armed, the deputy initiated a felony stop, drawing his duty firearm, ordering Melges to turn off the vehicle, and instructing Melges to walk backwards towards his voice. After the deputy performed a pat-down search of Melges, a DNR Officer (the officer) arrived on the scene. During the stop, Melges advised them that there was a rifle in the truck. The officer located an uncased, loaded rifle in the rear passenger seat of the vehicle. A review of Melges's criminal history revealed a felony conviction for a crime of violence in 2013. As a result, Melges was placed under arrest forpossession of a firearm by an ineligible person. A subsequent inventory search of the vehicle found marijuana, a clear glass pipe that tested positive for methamphetamine, and additional hunting supplies.
The state charged Melges with possession of marijuana, possessing marijuana in a motor vehicle, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Following a contested omnibus hearing, the district court found that the only evidence provided by J.P.'s phone calls was that Melges had been seen on the road nearby and had requested permission to enter J.P.'s land.
The district court granted respondent's motion to suppress, concluding that the deputy lacked the reasonable, articulable suspicion required to stop respondent's car. The district court also dismissed the case, concluding that "[w]ithout [the suppressed evidence], none of the possession charges against [Melges] are supported by probable cause . . . ." Because the district court concluded there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, it declined to reach the issue of whether there was probable cause for a felony stop. This appeal followed.
The state challenges the district court's conclusion that the deputy did not have a legal basis for the investigatory stop. If the state appeals a pretrial suppression order, the state "must clearly and unequivocally show both that the trial court's order will have a critical impact on the state's ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error." State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998) (quotations omitted). "[T]he critical impact of the suppression must be first determined beforedeciding whether the suppression order was made in error." Id. Because the district court dismissed the charge against respondent as the result of its suppression order, the critical-impact standard is satisfied. See State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) ().
"When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence." State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). In this case, the relevant facts are undisputed on appeal. Whether a search is justified by reasonable suspicion or by probable cause is a legal determination that we review de novo. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. However, a police officer may initiate a limited, investigative stop without a warrant if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)), aff'd, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). Such a suspicion, however, must be more than a mere hunch; an officer must have objective support for his belief that an individual is involved in criminal activity. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn. 1989) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)).
In assessing reasonable suspicion, Minnesota courts "consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted tomake inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person." State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). The factual basis need not arise from the personal observations of the police officer but may be derived from information acquired from another person. Marben v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980). An informant's tip may be adequate to support an investigative stop if the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability. Jobe v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 609 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. App. 2000). When analyzing whether traffic stops based on informant tips are sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion the Supreme Court of Minnesota has focused mainly on two factors: (1) the identifying information given by the informant, and (2) the facts that support the informant's assertion that a driver has violated the law. See City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890-91 (Minn. 1988) (). Identified citizen informants are presumed to be reliable. Yoraway v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 669 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. App. 2003). An officer may rely on information from an informant who also "provides sufficient information so that he may be located and held accountable for providing false information." Playle v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1989).
In the present case, J.P. identified both himself and J.B. by name and provided his address to the dispatcher. This was sufficient information with which to locate J.P. and hold him accountable for any potentially false information. See Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d at 890 ().
As to the second factor, J.P. told the dispatcher that "Melges had been out to my place shooting from the road at some deer"1 and that he "[didn't] think anybody would give [Melges] permission to hunt any other place." J.P. also told the dispatcher that Melges had returned to J.P.'s property after being denied permission to search for a wounded deer. Lastly, J.P. accurately described Melges's vehicle. Therefore, we conclude the tip had sufficient indicia of reliability.
To justify an investigative stop, it is not necessary for a tip to...
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