State v. Melot

• Decision Date: 22 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 2166,2166
• Citation: 108 Ariz. 527,502 P.2d 1346
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Milford Glen MELOT, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1346

502 P.2d 1346

108 Ariz. 527

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Milford Glen MELOT, Appellant.

No. 2166.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Nov. 22, 1972.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Albert M. Coury, Former Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee

Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.

LOCKWOOD, Justice:

Milford Glen Melot was charged with murder in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13--451; 452; 453. He was tried by jury, convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to serve a term of not less than mine nor more than ten years in the state penitentiary.

On July 22, 1969, defendant and his brother, Joe Melot, had been drinking a great deal at defendant's home and they began arguing. The hostility became so intense that the defendant's daughter-in-law Lynn Melot went outside the house. Officer Francis Malody received a call from the dispatcher summoning him to the defendant's home to investigate a shooting. The defendant met him at the door and led him into the living room where the dead body of Joe Melot was found. Subsequently a number of other officers arrived to investigate and defendant was handcuffed, advised of his rights and taken to the police station interrogation room.

At that time she observed the defendant leave the house and procure a gun from his truck. Defendant testified that when he returned his brother said, in reference to defendant's gun, 'if you are going to use it, you'd better use it. I'm going to take it away from you and use it on you.' He then started toward the defendant and the defendant 'raised the pistol and started shooting.' According to the testimony of Lynn Melot 'five or more shots were fired.' The defendant testified that he called the police.

The first question raised by defendant on appeal is whether the trial judge improperly admitted various statements made to the police officers who investigated the shooting. The defendant argues that he was not give Miranda warnings and he was interrogated while in custody and when the officers gave him the warnings he informed them that he chose to remain silent but he was nevertheless interrogated. The challenged statements were given in response to questions asked by Officers Francis Malody, John Yeitrakis and John Sellers.

STATEMENTS MADE TO OFFICER MALODY

Upon arrival at the defendant's home Officer Malody approached the door where defendant was standing and asked 'what happened?' Defendant responded, 'I just shot my brother.' Whereupon Melot opened the door and Malody entered and asked 'where (his brother) was and where (the weapon) was?' Defendant responded, '(h)e's in the livingroom, the gun is in the desk in the hallway.'

The procedural warnings prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) are compulsory at the onset of two critical factors: custody and interrogation:

'The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 725.

We have established that determination of whether custody exists is made 'by an analysis of the relevant circumstances with particular attention to probable cause gauged by the 'reasonable man' test.' State v. Mumbaugh, 107 Ariz. 589, 594, 491 P.2d 443, 448 (1971). Accordingly,

'* * * the warning must be given when the police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, and also reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is the one who committed it.' State v. Thomas, 104 Ariz. 408, 410, 454 P.2d 153, 155 (1969).

Upon arrival at defendant's home Officer Malody might have had reasonable cause to believe a crime had been committed. However, it is unquestionable that the defendant's mere presence at the scene did not give him reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the crime. Therefore the initial question 'what happened?' was clearly neutral, non-accusatory in nature, and in furtherance of proper preliminary investigation.

The Miranda decision carefully excluded from the ambit of required warnings 'on-the-scene questioning' of facts surrounding a crime or other general questions of citizens in the factfinding process. The court reasoned that

'It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. The California Court of Appeals was presented with a strikingly similar set of facts in People v. Wright, 258 Cal.App.2d 762, 66 Cal.Rptr. 95, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896, 89 S.Ct. 154, 21 L.Ed.2d 177 (1968). An officer was called to a home to investigate a disturbance the nature of which he was unaware. Upon arrival he was confronted with two seriously injured women and the defendant.

In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.' 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629--1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725--726.

'The deputy had no way of knowing what had occurred, and (one woman) and the defendant each accused the other of responsibility for the incident. It was his duty as an officer to investigate, and he started his investigation, a general inquiry, with the routine question, 'what happened.' At this time defendant was not under arrest; there was not the slightest evidence in the record that he was in custody or deprived of his freedom of action. At this point the deputy was accusing no one; nor was he, through his single inquiry, 'what happened,' carrying out a process of interrogations in an attempt to elicit incriminating statements from defendant. The sole purpose of his question was to find out what had occurred; it is a justifiable type of routine inquiry designed to determine what actually happened, as a means of commencing an investigation.' 258 Cal.App.2d 766, 66 Cal.Rptr. at 97.

We hold that when the officer asked 'what happened' defendant was neither in custody nor being interrogated.

The defendant's response to the initial question was a confession to the crime. The officer at that point had reasonable cause to believe the defendant had committed a crime. In fact the officer testified that the defendant was 'not free to go.'

The officer proceeded immediately to the body and 'began first aid and (attempts) to find any signs of life in the body.' Passing through the house to the location of the body the officer observed the gun 'on the desk' in the 'hallway.'

The factual setting in this case is similar to another California case. Officers responded to a radio broadcast directing them to a particular residence where a stabbing was said to have occurred. When they arrived the officers asked 'what happened' and the defendant replied, 'I did it and I'm sorry.' The officers then asked 'where is the knife' and he told them where it was. The california appellate court did not require exclusion of the defendant's statements concluding that:

'(i)n the present case when Officer Hazen made the inquiry in question he did not know who had been stabbed nor had he seen the victim. The question was clearly investigatory and was relevant, at least, to the prevention of further bloodshed and the safety of the officer himself.' People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.3d 476, 490, 83 Cal.Rptr. 771, 781 (1970).

The instant case is distinguishable from State v. Michael, 103 Ariz. 46, 436 P.2d 595 (1968) where the facts indicated that the defendant was questioned 'for the purpose of eliciting incriminatory statements.' 103 Ariz. at 49, 436 P.2d at 598. After the officer was informed by the defendant's father that the defendant had shot the victim the officer proceeded to the room where he found the victim and the defendant. It was then that the officer attempted to physically restrain the defendant and ask him questions. The investigatory state had already passed at this point.

STATEMENTS MADE TO YEITRAKIS

Officer Yeitrakis was the second officer to arrive at the defendant's home. He entered the door, walked 'into the livingroom, observed the victim, knelt down beside (the body)' and according to his testimony asked Officer Malody 'what happened?' Defendant stated 'I got The Supreme Court of the United States held in Miranda, supra:

tired of arguing with the son-of-a-bitch so I shot him until the gun was empty.'

'Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated.' 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 726.

The defense contends that the determination of whether there was interrogation should be made by an inquiry into whether the defendant thought a question was...