State v. Mendez

Decision Date18 April 2023
Docket Number2 CA-CR 2022-0142-PR
PartiesThe State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Luis Christopher Mendez, Petitioner.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2015004677001 The Honorable Geoffrey Fish, Judge REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

Rachel Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney

By Faith C. Klepper, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix

Counsel for Respondent

Ballecer & Segal LLP, Phoenix

By Natalee Segal

Counsel for Petitioner Presiding Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Vasquez concurred and Judge Cattani dissented.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ECKERSTROM, PRESIDING JUDGE:

¶1 Luis Mendez seeks review of the trial court's ruling summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 33, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that order unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). We grant relief in part and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this decision, but otherwise deny relief.

¶2 In 2017, Mendez pled guilty to one count of possession or use of a narcotic drug. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he admitted two historical prior felony convictions for offenses he had committed in California.[1] The trial court sentenced Mendez as a category three repetitive offender to a presumptive ten-year prison term, to be served concurrently with the sentence in another matter (the 2014 case).

¶3 Mendez filed a post-conviction petition, claiming his admission to the two prior convictions was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. He observed that the trial court had not provided a separate plea-type colloquy for the prior convictions, as required by Rule 17.6, Ariz. R. Crim. P., and asserted that trial counsel had been ineffective by advising him to admit the prior convictions without receiving or reviewing documentary evidence of the convictions or informing him he was entitled to a priors hearing.[2] The court summarily dismissed Mendez's petition, "incorporat[ing]" the reasons set forth in the state's response to its ruling.

¶4 Therein, the state argued that it had previously disclosed evidence of Mendez's prior convictions, the trial court was not required to conduct a separate colloquy in addition to the one provided for Mendez's guilty plea, and the disclosed proof of the prior convictions defeated Mendez's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It attached documents it characterized as "copies of the certified documents of three Los Angeles County prior convictions as well as [Mendez]'s California DOC penitentiary packets." It stated it had "disclosed" the subject documents on July 22, 2015. It also attached a document entitled "Scottsdale Police Department Crime Laboratory Examination Report," which it maintained had been "completed" on February 22, 2016. That report constituted "a comparison" of Mendez's "prints" and those on the "previously disclosed" California packets. As previously noted, the court adopted the state's assertions in its order.

¶5 The trial court also concluded that Mendez had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily admitted his prior felony convictions at the change-of-plea hearing. It noted he "was in the best position to be aware of any criminal history he had," and determined he had not sustained his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. [3] This petition for review followed.

¶6 On review, Mendez asserts that his plea was not voluntarily entered. He repeats his argument that the trial court was required to conduct a separate plea-type colloquy for the admission of his prior convictions.[4] He specifically challenges the court's statement that he "was in the best position to be aware of any criminal history he had." He asserts that in so finding, the court not only improperly shifted the state's burden to him to show the absence of his prior convictions, but it misapplied Rule 17.6. He also reasserts he was not informed the state had the burden of proving his prior convictions or that he was entitled to contest their validity.

¶7 Mendez further contends, as he did below, that his attorney was ineffective for advising him to admit his prior convictions without "obtaining or vetting the prior[s] packet."[5] See State v. Banda, 232 Ariz. 582, ¶ 12 (App. 2013) (defendant may obtain post-conviction relief on basis that counsel's ineffective assistance led defendant to make an uninformed decision to accept or reject plea bargain, thereby making that decision involuntary). He adds that he would have been "better off pleading guilty to the charge and asking for a trial on the prior convictions." Mendez further maintains the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, ¶¶ 10-12 (2016) (to be entitled to evidentiary hearing, defendant must make "colorable claim" by alleging "facts which, if true, would probably have changed" outcome of case).

¶8 Mendez points out, as he did below, that both defense counsel and the state signed a comprehensive pretrial statement on July 28, 2015. Therein, the parties specifically stated that the disclosure of the out-of-state priors was not yet complete. This contradicted the state's repeated argument in the post-conviction proceeding that it had disclosed the documents attached to its response below on July 22, 2015. However, other than attaching those documents as exhibits to its response, the state has not directed us to any location in the record before us establishing that they were, in fact, disclosed, and when. Mendez contends, therefore, that "[a] material issue of fact exists as to whether the prior packets were obtained and disclosed by the state prior to the plea," and whether they constituted sufficient evidence to support his prior convictions.

¶9 Mendez maintains that if he had understood that the state was required to prove the prior convictions, he "would have contested the priors instead of acting on his attorney's advice to take the plea." In fact, Mendez expressly stated in his affidavit that he "was never told [he] could contest a prior conviction by a trial on the priors."

¶10 A defendant's decision to plead guilty must be voluntary and intelligent. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(b). A plea is involuntary "only where a defendant lacks information of 'true importance in the decision-making process.'" State v. Pac, 165 Ariz. 294, 295-96 (1990) (quoting State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 482 (1987)). A plea will be enforced unless the missing information goes to the "'defendant's essential objective in making the agreement.'" Id. at 296 (quoting Crowder, 155 Ariz. at 481). Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court correctly determined that it was not required to conduct a separate plea-type colloquy for the admission of the prior convictions. Because the right to a jury trial on the priors was reasonably implied by the colloquy given and the contents of the plea agreement, the court was not required to separately advise Mendez under Rule 17.6 that he had a right to a jury trial on the priors. State v. Barnes, 167 Ariz. 186, 188-90 (1991) (trial court not required to advise defendant of right to separate jury determination regarding existence of prior conviction when court accepts defendant's guilty plea to offense with prior felony conviction and advises defendant of right to jury trial).[6]

¶11 However, we must take as true Mendez's allegation that he was not informed that the state had not disclosed evidence of his prior convictions when he pled guilty and that counsel had not reviewed that information. See State v. Speers, 238 Ariz. 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2015). On that basis, he was, at the very least, entitled to an evidentiary hearing to assess the accuracy of those claims and to determine whether counsel was ineffective. See Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, ¶¶ 10-12. We thus remand this matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine (1) if defense counsel failed to receive and review documentation of Mendez's prior convictions before advising him to admit those convictions as part of his guilty plea; and, (2) whether there was any weakness in that documentation such that the deficiency in failing to acquire and review the documents caused Mendez any prejudice.

¶12 In so doing, the trial court should clarify what information regarding Mendez's prior convictions was actually disclosed before he pled guilty. We acknowledge that, in its response to the petition for review, the state suggests that it disclosed the subject documents in the 2014 case, which is not before us on review.[7] However, as we previously noted, those documents were not filed in the original proceeding here.

¶13 And, although the state submitted the documents as exhibits in the Rule 33 proceeding in the trial court, there is nothing in the record showing that the court evaluated them. Because both of the prior convictions arose in another state they may or may not align with comparable Arizona offenses. That determination requires a fact-based inquiry in the first instance, a finding best left to the discretion of the trial court. For all of these reasons, we decline the state's invitation to take judicial notice that the subject documents show matching prints and photographs such that Mendez could not establish prejudice. See Ariz. R. Evid. 201(b). Nor, in advance of the evidentiary hearing, do we have a factual basis to assess whether the state could have proved the prior convictions.[8] Cf. State v....

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