State v. Merritt
Decision Date | 14 December 2018 |
Docket Number | APPEAL NO. C-170649 |
Citation | 2018 Ohio 4995 |
Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHANNON MERRITT, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
J. Rhett Baker, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant-appellant Shannon Merritt pleaded guilty to felonious assault, rape, and kidnapping. Charges of attempted rape and abduction were dismissed. Prior to accepting Merritt's pleas, the trial court informed him that the rape charge was a sexually-oriented offense, and that he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender under, and subject to the registration and verification provisions of, Ohio's version of the Adam Walsh Act ("AWA"). The trial court accepted Merritt's pleas, found him guilty, and imposed an agreed aggregate sentence of 11 years' incarceration. The judgment entry of conviction does not contain Merritt's Tier III sex-offender classification. Merritt has appealed, alleging in a sole assignment of error that his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, because the court did not inform him prior to accepting the pleas that as a Tier III sex offender, he would be subject to community notification and residential restrictions.
{¶3} The inclusion of the defendant's Tier III sex-offender classification in the sentencing entry is mandatory, and its omission renders the sex-offender classification void. Halsey at ¶ 26; see Bonnell at ¶ 29. We have held that a judgment convicting the defendant of an offense that subjects him to the AWA's registration and notification requirements must accurately reflect his tier classification. State v. Rucker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110082, 2012-Ohio-185, ¶ 31 and 48. We affirmed our holding that the proper tier classification must be included in the judgment of conviction in State v. Rucker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150434, 2016-Ohio-5111, ¶ 11, appeal not allowed, 148 Ohio St.3d 141, 2017-Ohio-573, 69 N.E.3d 751. Merritt's tier classification is part of the sentence for his rape offense, and therefore, it must be included in the entry of conviction and sentence. See id.; Hildebrand, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150046, 2018-Ohio-2962. In the absence of a proper tier classification in the judgment of conviction, there is no order in placerequiring Merritt to register as a sex offender. See State v. Arszman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160698, 2017-Ohio-7581.
{¶4} This court is required to address assignments of error that are not moot. App.R. 12(A)(1). Merritt's assignment of error alleges that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, because the trial court did not inform him that as a Tier III sex offender, he would be subject to community notification and residential restrictions. The trial court did not include Merritt's tier classification in the judgment of conviction, and therefore, he is not subject to the AWA's community-notification provisions and residency restrictions.
{¶5} In State v. Halsey, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-10-211, 2015-Ohio-3405, Halsey pleaded guilty to sexual battery. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court informed Halsey that he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender and required to register every 90 days for the rest of his life. Halsey signed an "Explanation of Duties to Register as a Sex Offender" form, but the form had not been filed with the clerk of courts and was not in the record for review on appeal. The sentencing entry was silent with regard to Halsey's sex-offender classification. Halsey completed his community control, and the trial court entered an order "terminating his case." The Butler County Sheriff's Department continued to enforce the Tier III registration and reporting requirements on Halsey.
{¶6} Subsequently, Halsey filed a motion to vacate his Tier III sex-offender classification, arguing that it was void because his sentencing entry did not include the Tier III classification. He also argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to impose the Tier III classification, because his case had been "terminated." The trial court denied Halsey's motion. Halsey appealed, alleging that the trial court had erred in denying his motion to vacate his void sex-offender classification. The Twelfth Appellate District overruled Halsey's assignment of error and affirmed thejudgment of the trial court, stating that the Accord Arszman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160698, 2017-Ohio-7581 (overruling defendant's assignment of error alleging that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to vacate his Tier I sex-offender classification, and holding that the trial court did not err in overruling Arszman's motion to vacate, because there was no classification to vacate where there was no judgment of conviction classifying Arszman as a Tier I sex offender); Rucker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150434, 2016-Ohio-5111 (overruling defendant's assignment of error alleging that the trial court erred in modifying his sentence by adding Tier II sex-offender registration requirements after he had served his term of imprisonment for the sex offense, and holding that the trial court did...
To continue reading
Request your trial