State v. Meyer
| Decision Date | 18 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 31317.,31317. |
| Citation | 180 Iowa 210,163 N.W. 244 |
| Parties | STATE v. MEYER. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Madison County; Lorin N. Hays, Judge.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced accordingly. He appeals. Reversed and remanded.Jno. A. Guiher and W. S. Cooper, both of Winterset, for appellant.
Geo. Cosson, Atty. Gen., John Fletcher, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Phil R. Wilkinson, Co. Atty., of Winterset, for the State.
The defendant was married to Ethel Clayton in February, 1915, and she died from a gunshot wound July 25th of the same year. At the time defendant and his mother only were on the premises, a farm about seven miles from Van Meter. The defendant testified before the coroner's jury, as was proven, that at about 6 o'clock in the morning in question he arose and did his chores, returning to the house with the milk at about 7 or 7:30 o'clock, and, with his mother, strained the milk and ate breakfast. He then asked his wife, who was upstairs, if she wanted breakfast and, as she did not care for any, went back to bed and slept until about 11 o'clock. Upon waking his wife suggested that they go to a neighbor's for the day, and, having so agreed, he dressed and went out to harness the team, his wife being engaged in dressing her hair as he left. Having put the harness on, he proceeded to bridle one of the horses, when his mother called him to see what had happened upstairs. When both went up they saw his wife lying near the window at the head of the bed, head over the window sill, and hair down. This was in the south bedroom of the second story. A bullet had entered the forehead three-fourths of an inch to an inch above the bony arch of the right eye, and it and two fragments of lead subsequently were extracted from the brain. A 38-caliber revolver was lying on the floor with one chamber empty, and a 32-caliber revolver was in the bureau drawer. The blood was still flowing and brain matter oozing out when a physician reached the house. The theory of the state was that defendant had shot his wife with a revolver other than the one on the floor or his mother had done so, and he was accessory before the fact, while that of the defense was that death resulted from suicide or accident. As the judgment must be reversed, details need not be recited other than to say that no motive whatever was shown, not even previous ill feeling on the part of either mother or son toward the wife, who was about five months advanced in pregnancy, and was somewhat afflicted with skin disease known as lichen and impetigo. Twenty-two errors are assigned, but of these only such as involve doubtful rulings will be reviewed; the others being approved without specific reference thereto.
I. One Fisher, who had had 12 or 13 years' experience as undertaker, prepared the body for burial, and, after describing its appearance and saying that the wound was surrounded by a dark circle which he first thought powder burn, but which the embalming fluid caused to disappear, testified that “the skull did not seem to be shattered,” and was then asked if he ever had any experience in taking care of a body in case of suicide and answered: An objection as incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, “and for the further reason that the conditions under which the wound had been inflicted had not been shown to be the same, and the witness should describe the condition and appearance of the wound and let the jury make comparison,” was overruled, and he answered, The witness explained on cross-examination that the wound on the body of one suicide had been inflicted with a shotgun, another committed suicide with a 32-caliber revolver, the shot having entered the right temple at a place where the bone structure is lighter than that above the eye, and the other body was merely supposed to have been a suicide, and the wound supposed to have been inflicted with a 38-caliber revolver in the right temple, and that he knew nothing as to the distance the guns were from the heads of these men when discharged, and further that he understood that some revolvers of the same make and caliber shot with greater force than others, but said that he was not informed as to whether the kind of powder made a difference or amount in the cartridge, or the kind of bullet or its shape or the length of the barrel, but supposed these would have some effect.
[1] There was manifest error in permitting this witness to make the comparisons, without showing of similarity of conditions and had objection been interposed in permitting him to testify as an expert. He was not shown to have information as to the relative effects of bullets striking the skull when discharged close to the head and from some distance, and the objections to the questions calling for testimony as to relative condition of the skull, as well as the motion to strike, should have been sustained.
[2] II. The court struck out on motions evidence of declarations of the deceased concerning her physical condition, and complaint of these rulings is made. In each instance the witnesses were afterwards permitted to state fully what she had said in so far as tending to show despondence, melancholy, or depression--a condition of mind likely to exist in one contemplating self-destruction. Ordinarily testimony of what the alleged victim of murder may have said, save when part of the res gestæ, is regarded as hearsay; but when evidence adduced tends to show that the homicide may have been suicidal, the condition of deceased's mind is somewhat in issue and evidence tending to prove a predisposition toward self-destruction is admissible. Such predisposition may be shown by acts or declarations of the deceased within such reasonable time before the killing as that there may have been some tendency to establish such a condition of mind when this happened. Such declarations are in the nature of verbal acts and as others have a direct bearing as indicative of the condition of the mind. Of course, consideration of evidence of what may have been said by deceased should be limited to this purpose, and the jury warned that such declarations are not evidence of the truth of what deceased may have said. Com. v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. A. 235;People v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624;State v. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177, 47 N. W. 720;Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 46;State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Pac. 318; 4 Chamberlayn on Ev. § 2673; 6 Ency. of Ev. 746; State v. Asbell, 57 Kan. 398, 46 Pac. 770;Boyd v. State, 82 Tenn. (14 Lea) 161. See, contra, Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 32 N. E. 431;State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 409, 32 S. W. 1113.
The matters stricken did not come within the rule as stated, and there was no error in sustaining the motions to strike.
[3] III. One Lenz testified that defendant had said to him that his wife objected to his going to “beer drinks,” and when he met him on the road wanted to know ...
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