State v. Michael F.

• Decision Date: 09 November 2021
• Docket Number: AC 43485, (AC 43504)
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. MICHAEL F.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

208 Conn.App. 663

265 A.3d 972

STATE of Connecticut

v.MICHAEL F.^*

AC 43485, (AC 43504)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 23, 2021

Officially released November 9, 2021

Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the appellant in both appeals (defendant).

Sarah Hanna, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Melissa Patterson, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Patrick Griffin, state's attorney, and Alexandra Arroyo, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee in both appeals (state).

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Sheldon, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

In these consolidated appeals, the defendant, Michael F., appeals from the judgments of the trial court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his motions to open three disposed criminal cases. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motions, (2) abused its discretion in failing to retain jurisdiction to rule on the motions, and (3) violated his right to due process when it dismissed the motions without providing him notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of jurisdiction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following procedural history is relevant to the defendant's claims. On April 25, 2008, in Docket No. CR-06-0062422-S (2008 case), the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault in the third degree, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of eleven months of imprisonment, execution fully suspended, with two years of conditional discharge. In June, 2009, the defendant was arrested in connection with a physical altercation with the mother of his child and charged with assault in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree in Docket No. CR-09-0093196-S (2009 case). The trial court, Damiani , J ., entered a protective order prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with the victim.

On October 16, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine¹ to one count each of assault in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree in the 2009 case. On the same date, the defendant admitted to violating his conditional discharge stemming from the 2008 case, and the court released him on a written promise to appear in each case, conditioned on the defendant entering and completing the Evolve program.² The court explained that, if the defendant successfully completed the program, the state would recommend that he receive a fully suspended sentence. If, however, the defendant failed to abide by the conditions of his release or to complete the Evolve program, he would be exposed to a total effective sentence of two years of imprisonment.

Prior to completing the Evolve program, the defendant was arrested and charged with criminal violation of a protective order and criminal trespass in the first degree in Docket No. CR-10-0101345-S (2010 case). Because the new arrest would violate the plea agreement in the 2009 case and expose the defendant to two years of imprisonment, the court held a hearing on March 23, 2010, pursuant to State v. Stevens , 278 Conn. 1, 11–13, 895 A.2d 771 (2006), to determine whether probable cause existed to support his arrest. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the defendant violated the conditions of his plea agreement and continued the matter for sentencing.

On May 21, 2010, the court, Licari, J. , terminated the defendant's conditional discharge in the 2008 case and, in the 2009 case, imposed a total effective sentence of two years of imprisonment, execution fully suspended, with two years of conditional discharge. On that same date, in the 2010 case, the defendant pleaded guilty, under the Alford doctrine, to criminal violation of a protective order, and the court sentenced him to an unconditional discharge.

In July, 2013, the defendant was arrested and charged with assault in the third degree and conspiracy to commit assault in the second degree in Docket No. CR-13-0139979-S (2013 case). On November 15, 2013, the defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to assault in the third degree, and the court, Kamp, J. , sentenced him to one year imprisonment, execution fully suspended, with two years of probation. On December 3, 2014, the court, Keegan, J. , terminated the defendant's probation early.

In January, 2019, more than five years after his probation was terminated in the 2013 case and more than seven years after his sentences had been served in the 2008, 2009, and 2010 cases, the defendant filed motions to open the 2009, 2010, and 2013 disposed cases, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel in each of those cases due to an alleged conflict of interest. On January 11, 2019, the court, Cradle, J. , denied the motions on the papers without stating the reasons for its decisions.

The defendant thereafter filed applications for waiver of fees, costs and expenses and appointment of counsel on appeal in each of the three cases. On June 3, 2019, Judge Cradle held a hearing on the applications at which she addressed the defendant as follows: "[Your motions] were motions to open disposed cases. And it looks like on the papers this court denied the motion[s] .... The court checked the box that the motion is denied. I just want to note for the record ... the reason why I denied the motions is because ... I did not feel that this court had jurisdiction to hear these specific motions, okay. So technically, the matter should have been dismissed by the court, not denied. So I'll vacate my prior order[s] denying [them] and dismiss them for lack of jurisdiction."

The court then asked the defendant questions about his fee waiver application. After granting the fee waiver, the court returned to the motions to open and stated: "The prior orders [are] vacated. The ... matter should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as opposed to just stating it was denied, okay. That was the basis for the court's denial of the motion. But in retrospect it should have been a dismissal, okay." The defendant responded: "Yes, thank you." The court then had a further discussion with the defendant about the appointment of counsel and granted the defendant's application in the 2013 case only and appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. On June 7, 2019, the court held another hearing to address the two applications filed by the defendant in the 2009 and 2010 cases, which the court had overlooked at the previous hearing. The court granted the applications and appointed counsel to represent him on appeal in those cases as well. These appeals followed.³

I

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. Although we review a court's ruling on a motion to open a judgment for abuse of discretion; see Disturco v. Gates in New Canaan, LLC , 204 Conn. App. 526, 532, 253 A.3d 1033 (2021) ; the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's motions to open. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. See State v. Smith , 150 Conn. App. 623, 634, 92 A.3d 975, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 904, 99 A.3d 1169 (2014).

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motions to open. The state argues that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motions because the defendant had been sentenced already in each of the underlying criminal cases and there is no applicable constitutional or statutory grant of jurisdiction that permits the court to retain or exercise jurisdiction over the defendant's judgments of conviction after he has been sentenced. We agree with the state.

"The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction. In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law. ... It is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed. ... This is so because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection and begins serving the sentence. ...

"[In other words] the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a defendant's sentence has begun, and, therefore, that court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant's sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act. ... This principle is memorialized in Practice Book § 39-26, which provides: A defendant may withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted. After acceptance, the judicial authority shall allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book §] 39-27. A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed. ...

"Thus, although this court has recognized the general principle that there is a strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction ... in criminal cases, this principle is considered in light of the common-law rule that, once a defendant's sentence has begun ... th[e] court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant's sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos , 306 Conn. 125, 133–35, 49 A.3d 197 (2012) ; cf. State v. Waterman , 264 Conn. 484, 491, 825 A.2d 63 (2003) ("[i]t is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed " (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).

The defendant attempts to avoid this...