State v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 02 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17320.,17320.
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Linda M. STEVENS.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 771

895 A.2d 771

278 Conn. 1

STATE of Connecticut v. Linda M. STEVENS.

No. 17320.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 14, 2006.

Decided May 2, 2006.

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connolly, state's attorney, and David Gulick, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Richard W. Callahan, special public defender, with whom was Jane E. Carroll, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.^*

KATZ, J.

The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of conviction of the defendant, Linda M. Stevens, who had appealed to that court challenging the sentence imposed on her by the trial court, in accordance with an agreement pursuant to State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 699 A.2d 921 (1997),¹ subsequent to her plea of guilty under the Alford doctrine,² to the charge of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a). On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court had violated her federal and state due process rights by imposing as one of the conditions of the Garvin agreement that, if the defendant were to be arrested prior to her sentencing and the court were to find that there was probable cause for that arrest, the court could enhance her three year sentence under the plea agreement to seven years and not allow her to withdraw her plea. State v. Stevens, 85 Conn.App. 473, 474, 857 A.2d 972 (2004). The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that the trial court improperly had enhanced her sentence based on her arrest pending sentencing and remanded the case to the trial court with direction either to grant specific performance of the Garvin agreement by imposing a three year sentence or to reject the agreement altogether in conformity with the rules of practice. Id., at 480, 857 A.2d 972. We thereafter granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the trial court's judgment sentencing the defendant to seven years?" State v. Stevens, 272 Conn. 902, 863 A.2d 695 (2004). We agree with the state that the no arrest condition was valid and that the trial court acted properly, after finding probable cause for the arrest, in imposing the seven year sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following facts and procedural history that are relevant to our resolution of the state's appeal. "On August 6, 2002, in exchange for a sentence of three years incarceration, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of narcotics in violation of § 21a-279(a).³ The court advised the defendant that if she was arrested with probable cause subsequent to making her plea, but prior to sentencing, the court could enhance her sentence from the agreed three years to seven years, and she would not be able to withdraw her plea. Two days later, on August 8, 2002, the police arrested the defendant and charged her with several [drug offenses].⁴ On October 17, 2002, the defendant appeared for sentencing on the charge of possession of narcotics, to which she had pleaded guilty, under the Alford doctrine, on August 6, 2002. Taking note of the defendant's August 8, 2002 arrest, and declaring there to have been probable cause for that arrest, the court, pursuant to the terms of the August 6, 2002 Garvin agreement, sentenced the defendant to seven years incarceration." State v. Stevens, supra, 85 Conn.App. at 475, 857 A.2d 972.

Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming that, by adding the no arrest condition to the plea agreement and by using it to enhance her sentence,⁵ the trial court had violated the principal tenet of State v. Garvin, supra, 242 Conn. at 314, 699 A.2d 921, that a court may impose sentences predicated on the defendant's failure to fulfill a condition of the agreement, but only as long as "[f]ulfillment of [the] condition [is] within the defendant's control." Additionally, the defendant claimed that the trial court had failed to determine the issue of whether the Garvin agreement had been breached in accordance with the requirements of procedural due process because the trial court had not held a hearing to determine whether she had breached the agreement by engaging in criminal conduct, not merely by having been arrested. She claimed that she should have been sentenced to the three years pursuant to her plea agreement or that, at the very least, the state should have been required to prove that she had breached the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. The state contended that, pursuant to the terms of the Garvin agreement, the seven year sentence was proper and that the defendant's procedural due process rights had not been violated.

The Appellate Court reversed the judgment, concluding that the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court.⁶ State v. Stevens, supra, 85 Conn.App. at 480, 857 A.2d 972. The court determined that, under Garvin and our rules of practice, because fulfillment of the no arrest condition was not exclusively within the defendant's control, as would be, for example, a condition requiring that a defendant appear for sentencing, it was improper for the trial court to impose that requirement as a condition of the plea agreement.⁷ Id., at 477-78, 857 A.2d 972. The Appellate Court further reasoned that, by imposing the seven year sentence, the trial court actually was rejecting the defendant's guilty plea and therefore was required under Practice Book § 39-10; see footnote 7 of this opinion; to afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw her plea. State v. Stevens, supra, at 479, 857 A.2d 972. The court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the defendant of a liberty interest without due process. Id., at 477, 857 A.2d 972. This certified appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, the state claims that the Appellate Court acted improperly because the trial court reasonably had sentenced the defendant in accordance with the terms of the Garvin agreement and in accordance with the defendant's rights to due process.⁸ The state also contends that, even if the Appellate Court properly invalidated the no arrest condition, it should not have extended to the trial court the option of either rejecting the plea agreement or sentencing the defendant to the lesser three year sentence under the agreement. Instead, if this court determines that the condition is improper, the state contends that it should be afforded the choice to rescind the plea agreement or accede to the lesser sentence. We agree with the state that the no arrest condition was valid and that the trial court acted properly in imposing the seven year sentence.

"A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement that has two possible binding outcomes, one that results from the defendant's compliance with the conditions of the plea agreement and one that is triggered by his violation of a condition of the agreement." State v. Wheatland, 93 Conn.App. 232, 235 n. 3, 888 A.2d 1098 (2006). "The validity of plea bargains depends on contract principles." State v. Garvin, supra, 242 Conn. at 314, 699 A.2d 921. Thus, "[p]rinciples of contract law and special due process concerns for fairness govern our interpretation of plea agreements." Spence v. Superintendent, 219 F.3d 162, 167-68 (2d Cir.2000). When the contract language relied on by the trial court is definitive, the interpretation of the contract is a matter of law and our review is plenary. Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 227, 828 A.2d 64 (2003).

In Garvin, the trial court had warned the defendant at the time he entered his guilty pleas that it would not be bound by the agreed upon sentence if the defendant failed to appear for sentencing. State v. Garvin, supra, 242 Conn. at 300, 699 A.2d 921. When the defendant failed to appear and subsequently was apprehended, the court refused to allow him to withdraw his pleas and imposed a sentence greater than what had been set forth in the plea agreement. Id., at 300-301, 699 A.2d 921. Although the condition of the plea agreement in Garvin was that the defendant appear for sentencing, that case does not suggest that a failure to appear is the only condition that may be imposed on the agreement. Indeed, in State v. Trotman, 68 Conn.App. 437, 445, 791 A.2d 700 (2002), the Appellate Court, in reliance on Garvin, upheld the finding of the trial court that the defendant had breached her plea agreement when she produced urine samples that tested positive for opiates. Because the defendant had been warned clearly by the trial court and was aware of and understood her obligation not to produce positive urine samples, the trial court properly had imposed a sentence of incarceration instead of the agreed upon suspended sentence. Id. Similarly, in State v. Small, 78 Conn.App. 14, 22, 826 A.2d 211 (2003), the Appellate Court determined that the trial court properly had imposed as a condition of the defendant's Garvin agreement that he have no contact with the victims of his offenses when it warned him that if, based upon a finding of probable cause, he had violated that condition, it would sentence him to the longer term of incarceration attendant to a violation of the agreement.

In the present case, the state claims that the conditions that the defendant not be arrested while awaiting her sentencing and that she appear for that sentencing were an integral part of the plea agreement. We have examined the plea agreement by evaluating the court's explanation to the defendant of these conditions and conclude that both were part of the Garvin plea agreement between the parties.⁹ The record clearly shows that, if the defendant had wanted...