State v. Middleton, 16458
| Decision Date | 30 January 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 16458,16458 |
| Citation | 63 S.E.2d 163,218 S.C. 452 |
| Parties | STATE v. MIDDLETON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
L. A. Hutson, Jr., Greenville, L. A. Hutson, Orangeburg, for appellant.
Solicitor Julian S. Wolfe, Orangeburg, for respondent.
Appellant killed Leroy Brown about noon on February 16, 1950. She was tried at the May term of the Court of General Sessions for Orangeburg County and found guilty of manslaughter. A motion for a new trial was overruled and appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years.
The first question for determination is whether the Court below erred in refusing a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.
Appellant and her husband lived in a small three room house near the corporate limits of the City of Orangeburg. The deceased lived only a few blocks away. Just prior to the homicide, the deceased, appellant's husband and several other Negroes were engaged in playing cards in the yard of appellant's home. Her husband left. Shortly thereafter the others stopped playing and were asked to bring the chairs into the house. The deceased came into the kitchen and got into an argument with appellant. She says that he cursed her and she asked him to leave her house; that he refused to do so and knocked her down; that she walked into the adjoining room and was followed by the deceased who continued to curse her; that she again asked him to stop cursing and go home, whereupon he struck her a second time; that he then started toward her with his hands in his pockets, stating he was going to cut her throat; and that she seized a shotgun from behind the bed, loadded it, and shot him. The deceased died instantly. According to the State's testimony, he had no weapon of any kind, made no assault and was unnecessarily killed after being requested to leave appellant's house.
After a careful consideration of all the testimony, a detailed review of which is unnecessary, we are satisfied that there was no error in refusing appellant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty. The testimony presented sharp issues of fact which were properly submitted to the jury.
We now turn to appellant's contention that she was seriously prejudiced by certain proceedings had after the foreman stated that the jury was unable to agree.
The trial Judge gave the usual charge in homicide cases and fully covered the law of self-defense and the defense of one's habitation, which were the principal defenses relied on by appellant. After deliberating a while (the record does not show how long), the jury returned and requested the Court to again charge them on the law of self-defense. This was done and the jury again retired. About an hour later they returned and the foreman stated that they were 'hopelessly disagreed.' Thereupon the trial Judge stated to the jury that they had not deliberated a sufficient length of time to justify his discharging them and that he was 'going back over some points of law involved in this case', and continued as follows:
'Could you tell me, Mr. Foreman, whether your question is in the degree of the offense, or whether it is that some of your members are considering both offenses or whether or not it is simply the question of some of you as to whether or not to find the defendant not guilty.
'The Foreman: Your Honor, what do you mean?
'The Court: Are some of your members of the opinion that the defendant should be found guilty of murder and some feel that the defendant should be found guilty of manslaughter and some think the defendant should be found not guilty?
'The Court: You are divided between acquittal and manslaughter?
'The Foreman: Three are in favor of manslaughter.
'The Foreman: Those three that want a verdict in their favor, what is...
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...agree with Appellant that it is improper for a trial judge to inquire into the numerical division of a jury. See State v. Middleton, 218 S.C. 452, 457, 63 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1951); Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239-40, 108 S.Ct. 546 Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.......
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...on the status of jury deliberations was not only improper, but was also a violation of elementary hornbook law. State v. Middleton, 218 S.C. 452, 63 S.E.2d 163 (1951). Appellant next claims that the trial judge erred in providing supplemental instructions to the jury upon receiving notice t......
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