State v. Mikolinski
Decision Date | 03 July 2001 |
Citation | 775 A.2d 274,256 Conn. 543 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | (Conn. 1999) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTIE MIKOLINSKI SC 16275 |
Jeffrey D. Brownstein, with whom, on the brief, was Gregory A. Thompson, for the appellant (defendant).
Eileen McCarthy Geel, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.
Opinion
The issue raised in this certified appeal is whether a sobriety checkpoint established for the purpose of detecting violations of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) §§ 14-227a (a)1 violates the provisions of article first, §§§§ 72 or 9,3 of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant, Christie Mikolinski, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of §§ 14-227a. Before her trial to the court commenced, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information and a motion to suppress, claiming that the checkpoint at which she was stopped violated her rights under the Connecticut constitution. The trial court denied those motions. Accordingly, the evidence gathered as a result of the stop of the defendant at the checkpoint was introduced against her at her ensuing trial. Following her conviction, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court; State v. Mikolinski, 56 Conn. App. 252, 262, 742 A.2d 1264 (1999); and, on the granting of certification,4 the defendant appealed to this court.
The defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's determination that the sobriety checkpoint instituted by the town of Southington did not violate her rights under article first, §§§§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following facts, as stated by the Appellate Court, are relevant to this appeal. "Between 11 p.m. on May 23, 1997, and 3 a.m. on May 24, 1997, the Southington police department conducted a sobriety checkpoint of eastbound and westbound traffic in the area of 1199 Meriden-Waterbury Turnpike. Signs were posted in each direction alerting motorists to the checkpoint, and routes exiting the turnpike were available to motorists in each direction who chose not to enter the checkpoint.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mikolinski, supra, 56 Conn. App. 254. Additional facts will be set forth as required.
The state does not dispute the fact that the initial stop of the defendant at the checkpoint constituted a seizure.5 The state argues as a preliminary matter, however, that, because the defendant voluntarily entered the checkpoint, she cannot now claim that the seizure was unreasonable. Cf. State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 314±n16, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, U.S., 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000). We need not decide whether the defendant voluntarily entered the checkpoint, however, because, even if we assume, arguendo, that this was not the case, she cannot prevail on her claim.
We first address the defendant's claim that Southington's sobriety checkpoint violated her rights under article first, §§ 7.6 In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the use of highway sobriety checkpoints, such as the one at issue in this appeal, is not prohibited under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. See id., 455. We are not persuaded that article first, §§ 7, imposes greater restrictions upon the use of such checkpoints than that imposed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Sitz.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 504, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). 7 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 632, 620 A.2d 746 (1993).
In determining whether the protections secured by article first, §§ 7, extend beyond those secured by the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, we consider several factors: (1) the text of the constitutional provision; (2) holdings and dicta of Connecticut appellate courts; (3) federal precedent; (4) sister state decisions; (5) historical aspects, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers; and (6) economic and sociological or policy considerations. E.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).
Our review of the text and history of article first, §§ 7, reveals nothing to indicate that it forbids the use of sobriety checkpoints. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 533, 628 A.2d 567 (1993). The language of article first, §§ 7, which was based upon the fourth amendment, was adopted with little debate. See Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 600, 660 A.2d 742 (1995). Thus, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of article first, §§ 7, lend weight to the view that, in most cases, a practice permitted under the fourth amendment is permissible under article first, §§ 7.
We have stated that (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 503; see also State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142, 148±n49, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1981).
In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. 444, the court used the similar balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), and United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976), to weigh "the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 449. The court held that the sobriety checkpoint in that case was consistent with the fourth amendment, reasoning that "the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, [weigh] in favor of the state program." Id., 455. We conclude that this balancing test, which is consistent with our precedent, provides the proper means by which to assess the validity of sobriety checkpoints under article first, §§ 7.
In applying this balancing test to the sobriety checkpoint at issue in the present appeal, the defendant does not dispute that the state has a significant interest in preventing motorists from driving while under the...
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