State v. Miller

• Citation: 110 Wn.2d 528,756 P.2d 122
• Decision Date: 26 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 54289-9,54289-9
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Ronald S. MILLER, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 528

110 Wn.2d 528

756 P.2d 122

The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Ronald S. MILLER, Respondent.

No. 54289-9.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

May 26, 1988.

David F. Thiele, Island County Prosecutor, William H. Hawkins, Deputy County Prosecutor, Coupeville, for petitioner.

Anthony Savage, Seattle, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

We hold Ronald S. Miller is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea made pursuant to a plea agreement, where the parties to the agreement were mistaken as to the relevant mandatory sentence.

I

On June 2, 1985, Thomas Bruce died of multiple gunshot wounds. Ronald Miller admitted to his estranged wife and three friends he had shot Bruce. After being informed of and waiving his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to a lawyer, Miller stated to the police officers who arrested him, "I shot Thomas with a .22 caliber rifle." He further confessed he had decided to shoot Thomas that morning, and had waited so that his wife and children would not see the shooting. Miller was charged with first degree murder.

On November 6, 1985, Miller entered a plea of guilty to first degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement between Miller and the prosecuting attorney. The terms of the plea agreement specified that Miller would be free to argue his sentencing, including recommending an exceptional sentence of less than 20 years. Under the agreement, the State would not agree to an exceptional sentence but would recommend a term of 20 years. The standard range for first degree murder with no prior offenses is 240-320 months. RCW 9.94A.310.

Before entering the guilty plea, Miller had been misinformed by his attorney, who in turn had been misinformed by the prosecutor, that the possibility of a sentence less than 20 years existed. Under RCW 9.94A.120(4) the mandatory minimum term for first degree murder is 20 years. The incorrect legal advice Miller received regarding the possibility of an exceptional sentence of less than 20 years was the result of inadvertence, and not bad faith by his attorney or the prosecutor, who had both overlooked the provisions of RCW 9.94A.120(4).

Three months after entering the plea, and before a sentence was pronounced, Miller was correctly informed about the 20-year mandatory sentence for first degree murder. He then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied that motion, and ruled that the plea agreement between the parties could be specifically enforced, notwithstanding the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. In denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court entered findings that the discrepancy between the possible exceptional sentence of approximately 15 years anticipated by Miller and the mandatory minimum provided by statute was not alarmingly disproportionate when gauged by the maximum term, the seriousness of the offense and the potentially more aggravated sentence Miller avoided by his plea. The court further found that overwhelming evidence would be admissible against Miller; Miller had readily admitted his guilt to friends, family members, the police and in open court, and thus a trial would be unnecessary and useless.

The trial court held that, notwithstanding the proscription of RCW 9.94A.120(4) against an exceptional sentence of less than 20 years for first degree murder, Miller was entitled to be sentenced within the range established at the plea hearing, or outside that range if the court were to find substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. The court found, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, the interests of justice would be better served by a grant of specific performance and by giving Miller the benefit of his bargain, rather than by allowing Miller to withdraw his plea of guilty.

Despite the court's ruling allowing consideration of a term less than the mandatory minimum, Miller's counsel argued for a 20 year sentence, based on his analysis that 20 years was the mandatory minimum. The State also recommended a 20-year sentence. At the time of sentencing, the attorneys did not present the court with any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the court sentenced Miller to a 20-year term.

Miller appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding Miller was entitled to withdraw his plea. State v. Miller, 48 Wash.App. 625, 742 P.2d 723 (1987). This court granted the State's petition for review.

II

A defendant must understand the sentencing consequences for a guilty plea to be valid. Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 501, 503, 513, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976). Here, all parties agree that Miller did not understand the sentencing consequences of pleading guilty to first degree murder, and was thus entitled to some remedy.

This court has recognized two possible remedies where a defendant has entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement based on misinformation or where the prosecutor refuses to abide by the terms of the agreement. "The court can permit the accused to withdraw his plea and be tried anew on the original charges, or grant specific performance of the agreement." State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash.2d 579, 585, 564 P.2d 799 (1977); see also State v. Harris, 41 Wash.App. 561, 705 P.2d 280 (1985). In this case the trial court ordered specific performance of the agreement, despite Miller's request for the remedy of allowing withdrawal of his plea.

CrR 4.2(f) states:

The court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. If the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and the court later determines under RCW 9.94A.090 that the agreement is not binding, the court shall inform the defendant that the guilty plea may be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered.

RCW 9.94A.090 states, in relevant part, "[t]he court, at the time of the plea, shall determine if the agreement is consistent with the interests of justice and with the prosecuting standards." These provisions shed little light on whether a defendant is entitled to withdraw a plea where the prosecutor offers to enforce the specific terms of the plea bargain for the defendant's benefit. Here, the trial court determined that the interests of justice made the plea bargain "binding"; at issue is the correctness of this determination.

Miller argues that the court was statutorily constrained from enforcing the terms of the plea agreement which allowed Miller to argue for a sentence less than the 20-year mandatory minimum of RCW 9.94A.120(4), a statute within the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. ¹ Miller argues the plea agreement was not legal and therefore unenforceable; the only appropriate remedy for the mutual mistake underlying the agreement is to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. We do not accept this analysis. We have held that where fundamental principles of due process so dictate, the specific terms of a plea agreement based on a mistake as to sentencing consequences may be enforced despite the explicit terms of a statute. State v. Cosner, 85 Wash.2d 45, 530 P.2d 317 (1975).

In Cosner, petitioners Cramer and Christian pleaded guilty after being informed that the mandatory minimum would be 5 years. The petitioners were not advised that, because of a prior felony conviction, the special finding they were armed with deadly weapons would result in 7 1/2-year and 8 1/2-year mandatory minimum terms, respectively. Cosner, at 49-50, 530 P.2d 317. This court stated:

Petitioners Cramer and Christian, while advised of the involvement of a mandatory minimum were, nevertheless, misinformed as to the length thereof. Their petitions are accordingly granted to the extent that the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is directed to reduce their mandatory minimum terms in accordance with their understanding of the length thereof at the time of their pleas.

Cosner, at 51-52, 530 P.2d 317.

Cosner demonstrates that the court is not absolutely bound by the statutory mandatory minimum where it conflicts with the terms of a plea agreement. Accord, In re Williams, 21 Wash.App. 238, 583 P.2d 1262 (1978). Defendants' constitutional rights under plea agreements take priority over statutory provisions. See In re James, 96 Wash.2d 847, 849, 640 P.2d 18 (1982). We decline to hold here that withdrawal of a plea is the only legal remedy where the plea agreement clashes with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981.

Moreover, unlike the instant case, if the defendant does not wish withdrawal of the plea, that "remedy" may be unjust, especially where the defendant has relied to his or her detriment on the plea bargaining process by giving evidence to the State. See Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 771, 792-93 (1973). As this court stated in State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash.2d 579, 585, 564 P.2d 799 (1977): "To place the defendant in a position in which he must again bargain with the state is unquestionably to his disadvantage. The security he had gained as a result of the plea negotiation from being charged with the more grievous offense would be lost.... The defendant is entitled to the benefit of his original bargain." (Citations omitted.) To the extent that the opinion of the Court of Appeals below and in State v. Perkins, 46 Wash.App. 333, 730 P.2d 712 (1986) hold that withdrawal of the plea is the only remedy for errors in a plea agreement discovered before sentencing, we disapprove those holdings.

The State argues that the trial court should have the discretion to determine the appropriate remedy. The State bases this argument in large part on the decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pope, 17 Wash.App. 609, 564 P.2d 1179, review denied, 89 Wash.2d 1009 (1977). In Pope, the defendant was misinformed the mandatory minimum sentence for his crime was 5 years, where it was in fact...