Wood v. Morris
| Decision Date | 23 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 43995,43995 |
| Parties | Glenn Elliott WOOD, Petitioner, v. Charles MORRIS, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, and the Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Richard G. Phillips, Prison Legal Services, Olympia, Allen M. Ressler, Legal Services Center, Seattle, for petitioner.
William C. Collins, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.
Glenn Elliot Wood, petitioner herein, was charged with first-degree murder in March 1974. An amended information was later filed, charging him with manslaughter while armed with a firearm. On May 17, 1974, petitioner pleaded guilty to the amended information and was sentenced by the court to the maximum term. Thereafter, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles set his minimum sentence at 7 1/2 years and, because the felony was committed while petitioner was armed with a firearm, See RCW 9.41.025, set a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years. Petitioner now seeks nullification of the 5-year mandatory minimum, claiming he was not adequately informed of that consequence of his guilty plea before he entered it. We adopt the rule that hereafter the record of the plea hearing must affirmatively disclose a guilty plea was made intelligently and voluntarily, with an understanding of the full consequences of such a plea. However, finding that petitioner Withdrew his objection to the information provided him at the plea hearing, we affirm his conviction.
At petitioner's plea hearing, the trial court questioned petitioner as to his understanding of the following consequences of a guilty plea: that there would be no trial, that he would be found guilty and sentenced, that the maximum sentence was 20 years, that the court was not bound by any recommendation of the prosecutor, and that there would be no appeal. In addition, the following discussion took place:
MR. JOHNSON (Prosecuting Attorney): Your Honor, if I may interpose: The information indicates that he was armed with a firearm as defined (in) RCW 9.41.025. That imposes in the case of this particular defendant a five year minimum, and he should be aware of that also at this time. THE COURT: Are you aware of that? MR. GOODWIN (defense counsel): Your Honor, now this is something I must take issue with, if the Court please. On the report, since that was brought up, this was not discussed with--between Mr. Connelly (a prosecuting attorney) and myself when we entered into this agreement. No discussion was had, and, Mr. Connelly may correct me if I am in error about this, prior to this agreement that I should enter a plea on this matter to my client. Now, whatever the Court does on that, I suppose the court will have to decide that, but there was no discussion about that and it is my opinion that without specifically charging it so that you can ask for the penalty, case law of the State of Washington does not allow you to do that unless you ask for that specifically in the information, and merely stating that there is a deadly weapon or stating the fact of the weapon in this situation will not bring that about, but in any event I want to make it perfectly clear that it was not a part of the bargaining in this case. Now, we still stand on our plea, and I really am concerned about that because we are dealing with a 16 year old boy. I don't think--I think it is something that should be left entirely up to the parole board. I don't think it is necessary in this kind of case, if the Court please, and this is something that really should be handled on sentencing, I suppose. That is--THE COURT: MR. GOODWIN, here again specifically to make the record: Can I assume that you and your client are acquainted with the RCW Section 9.41.025, and acquainted with the fact that the particular information alleges a shotgun? MR. GOODWIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And those are matters that can be considered? MR. GOODWIN: This has been read by my client, yes, but I want it emphatically stated that this was not brought to my attention that this would be sought in this case when we agreed to plead to this charge. Not until I got down here this morning; this afternoon rather, was this brought up by Mr. Johnson, so I just want that clear, that's all. I am aware, and I have advised my client that in some cases this could be sought. THE COURT: And, Mr. Wood, you have heard the discussion, first what Mr. Johnson said about a five year minimum. You have heard the comments of Mr. Goodwin, your counsel. You have heard the Court remind everyone of a particular citation in the Statute, and the fact that the information says, right in it, a shotgun. You have heard that? MR. WOOD: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now, knowing all of these things that have been discussed here, and the fact that the court will be sentencing you, and the fact that there is no appeal whatsoever from any sentence within the law that the Court might impose, it is now your request that the Court accept the plea of guilty to the charge of Manslaughter? MR. WOOD: Yes, sir, it is.
In addition, the following colloquy took place:
MR. CONNELLY: Under the case law, I believe we are required to submit to Your Honor a special findings with reference to the firearm, and I am assuming that the man's plea of guilty to the information phrased and worded as it is, is sufficient basis upon which the Court can make the necessary finding. In other words, he has pleaded guilty to the entire information in which it alleges that he shot and mortally wounded him with a firearm. Of course, it is in the statement that he shot him with a shotgun. MR. GOODWIN: I respectfully differ from counsel, but we are standing on our plea. We are not going to change the plea. This is something the Court has to decide, who is correct about that. MR. CONNELLY: It is a question of law. I will give the Court the case if he wants the case. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOODWIN: We don't wish to withdraw our plea. I think the plea is voluntary. We understood this when he pled that there was differences of opinion about it.
On the date of the plea hearing petitioner also signed a 'Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty' which made no reference to a mandatory minimum sentence.
Two separate theories are urged by petitioner to compel a nullification of his mandatory minimum sentence. He argues that his plea was entered in violation of the constitutional requirements enunciated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and the language of CrR 4.2. In Boykin, the court held it reversible error for a trial court to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing in the record that the plea was made intelligently and voluntarily. The court reasoned that entry of a guilty plea in a state criminal proceeding is a waiver of the federal constitutional rights to a trial by jury, to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and that a waiver of these rights-cannot be presumed from a silent record. The court added '(w)hat is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.' Boykin v. Alabama, supra at 243--44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
We initially limited the application of Boykin in Miesbauer v. Rhay, 79 Wash.2d 505, 510, 487 P.2d 1046 (1971), where we distinguished the Supreme Court decision on the grounds that it involved a capital crime, a direct appeal, and prejudice to the defendant. However, it is now widely recognized that Boykin is to be applied without regard to such qualifications. See e.g., Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. 1975); Commonwealth v. Foster, Mass., 330 N.E.2d 155 (1975); In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449 (1969), Cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911, 90 S.Ct. 1708, 26 L.Ed.2d 72 (1970); Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774, 476 P.2d 959 (1970). See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 549 (1964). In Miesbauer v. Rhay, supra, 79 Wash.2d at 507, 487 P.2d (1046) at 1047 we reiterated the Washington rule that to be valid a guilty plea must be made voluntarily and with a knowledge of its consequences, but stated the establishment of these requirements was 'a fact to be determined from all the circumstances.' Our holding in Miesbauer has invited inquiry at the appellate level in post-conviction remedy cases as to whether or not a defendant in fact understood the nature and consequences of his plea. Often this inquiry has resulted in remands to the trial court for the taking of evidence and the entry of findings as to knowledge and voluntariness. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 2 Wash.App. 943, 472 P.2d 629 (1970); State v. Hadsell, 6 Wash.App. 946, 497 P.2d 254 (1972); Miller v. Morris, 10 Wash.App. 694, 519 P.2d 1314 (1974).
Boykin v. Alabama, supra, established as a matter of constitutional due process that a guilty plea may stand only if the record in some manner indicates an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the three enumerated constitutional rights. The trial judge's active participation in "canvassing the matter with the accused" is also required. In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at 130, 81 Cal.Rptr. at 583, 460 P.2d at 455. However, the Supreme Court's opinion did not make clear whether the defendant must be specifically informed of the enumerated constitutional rights by the trial judge or whether evidence extrinsic to the record of the plea hearing may be considered by the reviewing court in determining if the constitutional standard has been satisfied. Consequently, the divisions of our Court of Appeals have not been in complete agreement as to whether or not the rule of Miesbauer v. Rhay, supra, is consistent with the constitutional requirements of Boykin. Compare Miller v. Rhay, 1 Wash.App. 1010, 1012, 466 P.2d...
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