State v. Milton
Decision Date | 18 February 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 9600,9600 |
Citation | 26 Conn.App. 698,603 A.2d 750 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. James E. MILTON. |
Richard F. Jacobson, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., and John Smriga, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and DALY and FOTI, JJ.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a), possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of General Statutes § 53a-211(a), and possession of a machine gun in violation of General Statutes § 53-202(c). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss filed on the basis of the failure to notify him of his statutory speedy trial rights pursuant to General Statutes §§ 54-82c and 54-82d. 1 We affirm the judgment of conviction.
The defendant was arrested on the charges underlying his conviction on July 15, 1989. Having failed to make bond, the defendant was held in custody at the North Avenue correctional facility in Bridgeport. On December 20, 1989, while those charges were still pending, the defendant was sentenced to a four year prison term for an unrelated charge and immediately began serving his sentence at the Somers correctional institution. Thereafter, the defendant was transferred to correctional facilities in Enfield and Cheshire before being transferred back to the Bridgeport facility on April 6, 1990. On July 25, 1990, the defendant filed the motion to dismiss that is the subject of this appeal. At the start of the defendant's trial on July 26, 1990, he was still serving the four year prison term, which had commenced 218 days earlier.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, additional facts were adduced. The department of correction had maintained a personal inmate file on the defendant since his incarceration on the unrelated charge on December 20, 1989. Such a file follows an inmate from one institution to another as he is transferred through the facilities of the correctional system. The defendant's inmate file contained a "rap sheet." The rap sheet indicated the charges then pending against the defendant arising out of his July 15, 1989 arrest. The file contained no indication that any correction official had given the defendant notice of his speedy trial rights under General Statutes § 54-82c. The defendant testified that he was never notified by any warden or other prison official of his speedy trial rights under § 54-82c while incarcerated at the Somers, Enfield, Cheshire or Bridgeport correctional facilities. The warden of the In its memorandum of decision, the trial court articulated the following reasons in support of its decision to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss: (1) there was nothing in the defendant's inmate file that would have put any correction official on notice of any untried indictment or information against the defendant; (2) correction officials did not have to provide notice to the defendant pursuant to § 54-82c because he had already been arraigned on the subject charges; (3) the defendant never requested final disposition of the pending charges pursuant to § 54-82c; and (4) constitutional speedy trial analysis did not require dismissal of the charges against the defendant.
North Avenue correctional facility in Bridgeport testified that, pursuant to advice received from the office of the attorney general, inmates are not notified of their § 54-82c speedy trial rights concerning charges that are already pending and for which the inmate has already been arraigned at the time the inmate commences his term of imprisonment. 2 The defendant never requested a final disposition of the charges against him pursuant to § 54-82c. Neither the state nor the defendant introduced any evidence regarding the effect, if any, the pending charges may have had on the conditions of the defendant's incarceration, or on his ability to participate in rehabilitative or other programs while in prison
This appeal revolves about the statutory interpretation of General Statutes § 54-82c. The brief legislative history of the bill that became § 54-82c indicates that its purpose was to "allow a prisoner who was committed to jail to ask that he be tried within 120 days on any information or indictment pending against him." 7 S.Proc., Pt. 6, 1957 Sess., p. 3712, remarks of Senator John H. Filer; Craig v. Bronson, 202 Conn. 93, 96, 520 A.2d 155 (1987). The rationale of affording speedier trials to those serving criminal sentences than to those not yet incarcerated has been previously explored by this court. See State v. Harris, 14 Conn.App. 244, 249, 540 A.2d 395 (1988); State v. Foshay, 12 Conn.App. 1, 530 A.2d 611 (1987). The rationale has also been considered by other courts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has thoroughly analyzed the concerns that arose because of the prior system that allowed detainers to remain on file against a prisoner without disposition, concerns that eventually led to the drafting and adoption of interstate and intrastate detainer statutes across the country. "The disadvantages and potential abuses of this system were many. Prison authorities often accorded detainers considerable weight in making decisions with respect to the terms and conditions of the prisoner's incarceration and release on parole. Sometimes the prisoner would automatically be held under maximum security. Sometimes he would be ineligible for special work programs, athletic programs, release for visits to relatives' death beds or funerals, or special minimum security facilities. Often detainers precluded the granting of parole....
United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-40 (2d Cir.1977), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro Similar concerns are reflected in the legislative history underlying General Statutes § 54-82c, our intrastate detainer statute. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1957 Sess., pp. 229-30, remarks of Representative Marjorie D. Farmer; id., pp. 230-31, remarks of Howard Jacobs.
436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978).
General Statutes § 54-82c is patterned after General Statutes § 54-186, which is known as the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and which applies to prisoners who are incarcerated in one state and face charges in another. State v. Foshay, supra, 12 Conn.App. at 11-12, 530 A.2d 611; see also State v. Harris, supra, 14 Conn.App. at 248-49, 540 A.2d 395.
In order to further the purposes of § 54-82c, the statute places clear and unambiguous obligations on state correction officials. Whenever a person has begun a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution in this state, § 54-82c(c) provides in pertinent part that a "warden, community correctional center administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment or information against him concerning which the warden, administrator or other official has knowledge and of his right to make a request for final disposition thereof." This provision, by its very terms, places two related but independent obligations on correction officials: (1) to inform a prisoner of charges pending against him; and (2) to inform the prisoner of his right to request speedy disposition of those charges.
In order to dispose of this appeal, we must decide whether the correction officials failed to fulfill both obligations of the statute, and whether these obligations must be fulfilled even if the defendant is aware of the charges pending against him. If the former questions are both answered in the affirmative, we must also decide whether the charges against the defendant must be dismissed.
The trial court found that "[t]here is nothing in [the defendant's personal inmate] file that would have put any warden, community correctional center administrator or any other...
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