State v. Minamyer

• Decision Date: 06 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40892,40892
• Citation: 232 N.E.2d 401,12 Ohio St.2d 67
• Parties: , 41 O.O.2d 282 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MINAMYER, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 67

12 Ohio St.2d 67

232 N.E.2d 401, 41 O.O.2d 282

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MINAMYER, Appellant.

No. 40892.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 6, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The only purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether sufficient facts exist to warrant the court in binding the accused over to the grand jury and to set bail, and once an indictment has been returned by the grand jury a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is no longer necessary. (White v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 186, 187 N.E.2d 878; Crider v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 190, 187 N.E.2d 875, approved and followed.)

2. In a criminal prosecution a prosecuting attorney may not testify as to or comment upon the refusal of the accused to testify before the grand jury. (Grifin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, followed; State v. Davis, 10 Ohio St.2d 136, 226 N.E.2d 736, approved and followed.)

Appellant was indicted under Section 2905.44, Revised Code, for the crime of sodomy. In view of the fact that the issues herein are questions of law relating to criminal procedure it is unnecessary to recite the detailed facts as to the crime itself.

J. Warren Bettis, Pros. Atty., and Charles B. Lang, East Liverpool, for appellee.

Jack H. Cohen, East Palestine, for appellant.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

In this case, the appellant had filed charges against two persons for allegedly stealing his automobile. Those persons, when apprehended, confessed to having committed acts of sodomy with the appellant on the night the alleged car theft occurred. All three accused of sodomy, but the sodomy charges against the alleged car thieves were never pressed.

The basic and dispositive question raised by this appeal is whether the prosecuting attorney during the trial of an accused may testify or comment upon the fact that an accused refused to testify before the grand jury in relation to charges filed by him against his codefendants.

At the grand jury hearing on the charges of car theft, appellant in this case refused to testify upon being advised by counsel not to do so. During the course of the trial, the prosecuting attorney took the witness stand and testified to this fact. Upon objection, the court instructed the jury that such testimony was not proper and should be ignored. It is appellant's contention that such instruction could not cure the error of the state in this respect.

It is the prosecuting attorney's position that such testimony was not objectionable. He argues that appellant was not called before the grand jury to testify in relation to the charge against him but as to the charge which appellant himself had filed against his codefendants relating to their theft of appellant's automobile. The automobile theft charge was but a part of the chain of events occurring on the night of the crime.

The privilege against self-incrimination extends to proceedings before the grand jury. Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 86 S.Ct. 788, 15 L.Ed.2d 724, and Hebebrand v. State, 129 Ohio St. 574, 196 N.E. 412. The question in any such case is whether the testimony could have prejudiced the accused.

The fact that the testimony of an accused before a grand jury was sought in relation to a crime in which he is the prosecuting witness rather than the crime for which he is the accused does not necessarily affect the right of the accused to refuse to testify. If the crime concerning which a prosecuting witness is called to testify arose during the same chain of circumstances as the crime of which he is accused and such testimony might prejudice his own case, the accused has the right to invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify.

The implications of the prosecuting attorney's statement as to the refusal of the appellant to testify in relation to charges which he had filed against his codefendants could very well prejudice the jury against the accused. It is the refusal to testify rather than the subject matter of the refusal which would impress the minds of the jurors.

In the case of Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, it was held that comment by a prosecuting attorney upon the failure of an accused to testify during his trial violated the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. To permit a prosecuting attorney to comment upon the refusal of an accused to testify before a grand jury would have equally prejudicial effects and to allow such comment would completely circumvent an accused's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, in a criminal prosecution a prosecuting attorney may not testify as to or comment upon the refusal of the accused to...