State v. Smith
| Citation | 167 Ohio St.3d 423,194 N.E.3d 297 |
| Decision Date | 03 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2019-1813 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. Cunliffe and Leah Winsberg, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Attorney General Dave Yost.
Brunner, J. {¶ 1} Ohio juvenile law is organized around the tenet that children who are charged with acts that would be felonies if committed by adults must be recognized by courts as children when adjudicating and determining the consequences to be imposed on them if they are found to have committed those acts. In the statutory scheme for juvenile justice, "[i]nstead of ‘defendants,’ children are ‘respondents’ or simply ‘juveniles’; instead of a trial, children receive ‘hearings’; children are not found guilty, they are ‘adjudicated delinquent’; and instead of sentencing, children's cases are terminated through ‘disposition.’ " State v. Hanning , 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000). Legislatures and courts, including this court, have recognized that the special interests involved in juvenile cases cannot be adequately addressed by the adult criminal-justice system, but they have also recognized that juveniles accused of crimes must be afforded the same procedural-due-process protections as adult criminal defendants, see In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Allen v. Illinois , 478 U.S. 364, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986).
{¶ 2} This court has also noted that "[j]uvenile law and criminal law are not synonymous," State v. Hand , 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 13, and that "the very purpose of the state juvenile code is ‘to avoid treatment of youngsters as criminals and insulate them from the reputation and answerability of criminals,’ " id. at ¶ 19, quoting In re Agler , 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 80, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969). Stated another way, the juvenile-justice system must provide for accountability; yet it must also meet society's need to secure its future through its youth. Thus, the juvenile-justice system must hold juveniles accountable for their actions and, whenever possible, provide them with opportunities for learning and growth toward a better path. The juvenile court was created by statute, and consequently, its authority is limited to that which is conferred on it by the legislature. In re Z.R. , 144 Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio-3306, 44 N.E.3d 239, ¶ 14. Today, this court is tasked with determining the legal effect of a juvenile court's order transferring ("binding over") charges filed in juvenile court to the jurisdiction of the general division of the court of common pleas ("adult court").
(First brackets sic.) Hand at ¶ 14. We should respect those stated statutory purposes when examining, applying, and, when necessary, interpreting the statutes for juvenile bindovers for prosecution in adult court. This bindover process is based first on the juvenile court's finding of "probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged," R.C. 2152.12. A juvenile court's finding of probable cause and subsequent bindover of the child are not an open invitation for the adult court to treat the child as if his or her bindover to adult court is the child's first encounter with a tribunal for the acts named in the bindover order—there are limitations. Juvenile bindover does not open the door to prosecution in adult court for any charge the state might later seek in an indictment. Rather, because a juvenile court's finding of probable cause as to any particular "act charged" is what triggers a possible transfer to adult court, when a juvenile court determines that there is no probable cause for an act charged, the adult court has no jurisdiction over that charge.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Nicholas Smith, was 16 years old when he was charged, in an eight-count complaint filed in the juvenile court, with committing acts that occurred on August 18, 2017. Smith and another juvenile, R.H., were alleged to have confronted two women who were about to enter a car parked in front of the women's home on West 65th Street in Cleveland. R.H. was alleged to have told the woman who had the keys to the car, "Give me your keys or I'll shoot you in the f* * *ing head." That woman surrendered her keys, and the second woman said, "Do you want my purse?" and threw her purse on the ground. Smith allegedly grabbed the purse, which contained the second woman's cellphone, and Smith and R.H. drove away in the first woman's car. The women called the police. By tracking the cellphone, the police were able to locate it, along with Smith and R.H.
{¶ 4} Smith and R.H. were taken into custody by police within minutes. The tracked cellphone was found in Smith's pocket at the time of his arrest.
{¶ 5} The juvenile complaint against Smith alleged in Counts 1 and 2 that Smith committed the category-two offense of aggravated robbery (with predicate theft offenses), one count as to each woman, while possessing a deadly weapon and either displaying it, brandishing it, or indicating that he possessed it or was using it. See R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1) (defining "category two offense" as including the offense set forth in R.C. 2911.01, aggravated robbery). Because firearm specifications were attached to the category-two offenses and Smith was alleged to have committed the offenses when he was 16 years old, binding him over to adult court would have been mandatory for Counts 1 and 2 upon a finding of probable cause. R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b).
{¶ 6} Count 3 alleged grand theft, a fourth-degree felony, for stealing the vehicle of one of the women. Count 4 alleged a fifth-degree felony, for theft of the credit cards of one of the women. Counts 3 and 4 were both alleged to have been committed with a firearm.
{¶ 7} Count 5 alleged a first-degree misdemeanor, for taking the purse and/or cellphone of one of the women, and Count 6 alleged a fourth-degree felony for failure to comply with a signal of a police officer—for operating a motor vehicle so as to willfully elude or flee from a police officer after committing a felony. Count 7 alleged a third-degree felony for failure to comply with a signal of a police officer—for operating a motor vehicle so as to elude or flee from a police officer and causing a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property. Count 8 alleged a third-degree felony for having a weapon while under disability, for possessing a firearm after being adjudicated delinquent for an offense that would have been a felony offense of violence if committed by an adult.
{¶ 8} On February 9, 2018, the juvenile court conducted a joint probable-cause hearing regarding Smith and R.H. pursuant to R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30. The two women and three police officers testified.
{¶ 9} In a March 14, 2018 entry, the juvenile court concluded that Smith was 16 years old at the time of the charged conduct and that there was probable cause to believe that Smith had committed acts that if committed by an adult would be felonies. The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Smith had committed the acts that would be aggravated robberies in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), first-degree felonies, if committed by an adult (Counts 1 and 2) and grand theft in violation of R.C. 2912.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony, if committed by an adult (Count 3).
{¶ 10} The juvenile court did not find probable cause with respect to the remaining felony counts—theft (Count 4), failure to comply (Counts 6 and 7), and having a weapon while under disability (Count 8). The juvenile court also found that there was not probable cause to believe that Smith had had a firearm on or about his person or under his control at the time of the acts charged or that he had indicated that he possessed a firearm. The juvenile court ordered the matter to be "continued for amenability hearing * * * upon the State of Ohio's motion for order to relinquish jurisdiction for purposes of criminal prosecution pursuant to R.C. 2152.12."
{¶ 11} On April 9, 2018, the juvenile court conducted a hearing to determine whether Smith was amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and concluded that he was not. Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B), the juvenile court transferred the matter to the adult court on June 1, 2018, finding that "the safety of the community may require...
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