State v. Miranda

Decision Date06 February 1969
Docket NumberNo. 1802,1802
Citation104 Ariz. 174,450 P.2d 364
PartiesThe STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ernest A. MIRANDA, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrell F. Smith, former Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Lewis, Roca, Beauchamp & Linton, by John P. Frank, John J. Flynn and Paul G. Ulrich, Phoenix, for appellant.

MOLLOY, Judge, Court of Appeals.

This is an appeal from a conviction of rape and kidnapping, resulting from a retrial mandated by the decision of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In its second appearance before this Court, 1 there are ramifications of the same constitutional problems involved previously, with new assertions being posed as to the necessity of providing counsel to an indigent defendant at a preliminary hearing, as to the right of cross-examination of a witness despite a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege and as to the prejudicial effect of remarks of the prosecuting attorney at time of closing argument.

The trial below was mainly devoted to ruling upon the defendant's contention that the identification of him by the prosecuting witness, and a confession made to a woman with whom he was living at the time of the offense, were the 'fruits' of the confession determined to be illegal by the Supreme Court of the United States. 2 The facts surrounding the identification of the defendant by the prosecutrix, and the communication of a confession to a Mrs. Twila Hoffman, are largely without dispute. The evidence, we now state, was taken in the absence of the jury, in connection with the defendant's contentions that he was arrested without cause, that he was not warned of his Fifth Amendment privileges, and that both the identification of him by the prosecutrix and the confession related to Mrs. Hoffman were the 'fruits' of these violations of his constitutional rights.

In the early morning hours of March 3, 1963, the prosecutrix, an eighteen-year-old girl, reported to the police that she had been kidnapped and raped. She gave the police a description which generally applied to the defendant. She described the car in which she had been taken as an 'old model, possibly 1955 Chevrolet or Ford, light green with good paint and clean on the outside, brown upholstery, very shabby inside.' 3 She described two 'ropes' on each side of the back of the front seat, attached in such manner as to give passengers in the rear seat a grab hold to raise themselves out of the back seat. There was testimony that this type of accounterment was unusual in model cars 1950 and later. The prosecutrix also described a vertical stripe on the upholstery in the back seat.

Approximately one week after the assault upon her, the prosecutrix was again returning to her home after working late hours as a cashier in a theater. She was to be met at the bus stop by her brother-in-law, who was to walk home with her. While waiting for the prosecutrix, the brother-in-law saw an old model car 'cruising' in the neighborhood in a manner that invoked his attention. When the prosecutrix arrived, they saw the car parked on a side street one block from where the car, into which the prosecutrix was forced the previous week, had been parked. The prosecutrix was of the opinion that the car looked like the car in which she had been raped. The driver of the car was outside of his vehicle at that time and the brother-in-law chased this unknown person to his vehicle but was unable to approach him for questioning before he drove off. The brother-in-law identified the make of the car as a 1953 Packard and this was confirmed by him when he was shown a 1953 Packard in a used car lot. 4 The brother-in-law derived a license number which he gave to the police as 'DFL 312' (Arizona). A police check with the Motor Vehicle Division disclosed that there was no 1953 Packard licensed in this number, but that there was a car with license No. DFL 317, registered in the name of Mrs. Hoffman.

A check in the neighborhood of the Mesa, Arizona, address given in the vehicle registration disclosed that an Ernest Miranda and family had been living at that address and had recently moved. The neighbors gave a description of the Miranda that had lived at this address which was similar to the description given by the prosecutrix. The neighbors also informed the police of the name of the current employer of the defendant. From the employer, the police learned that the defendant was ordinarily employed nights, but had not been working on the night of March 2--3, when this incident occurred. A check with the Mesa police disclosed that the defendant had a police record, including a robbery, a Dyer Act conviction, a conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, and numerous arrests for drunkenness and fighting. From the employer, the police obtained the new address for the defendant and when they arrived at the new address, they saw the 1953 Packard parked beside the house. The investigating detective looked inside the car before going to the door of the house and ascertained that there were two ropes on the back of the rear seat, as described by the prosecutrix, that there was a vertical stripe on the back seat upholstery similar to that described by the prosecutrix.

The detectives were met at the door by Mrs. Hoffman, who called the defendant to the door to talk to them. These officers asked the defendant to come down to the police station to discuss a case they were investigating and which they would rather not discuss in front of his family. The defendant acceded to this request and went with the officers at about 11:30 a.m. This was on March 13, 1963.

The police interrogated the defendant upon his arrival at the police station for approximately thirty minutes, during which time he denied all connection with (1) this crime, (2) a rape attempt on another female, and (3) a purse snatching offense. Thereupon defendant was asked whether he would participate in a lineup, to which he agreed and selected position No. 1 in the lineup. The prosecutrix was brought to the station to observe the lineup. A previous lineup had been conducted on the morning of March 3, with the participation of the prosecutrix, with negative results. On this occasion, the prosecutrix stated that the No. 1 person in the lineup had the same type build and features as her assailant but that she could not 'identify' the subject. She stated that, if she could hear the suspect's voice, she might be able to identify him through his voice. With this information, the officers again interrogated the defendant and informed him that the prosecutrix had identified him. This interrogation was shorter than the first one and resulted in a full confession by the defendant of this offense. His verbal account of what had occurred coincided generally with the story previously given by the prosecutrix.

After this oral confession, the prosecutrix was brought into the room and in her presence, the defendant acknowledged that she was the girl he had assaulted. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutrix made a positive identification. At the hearing before the court, in the absence of the jury, she testified that she was able to positively identify the defendant without hearing him speak. 5 At approximately this same time, the defendant signed a written confession. At 1:30, in the afternoon, the defendant was formally arrested for kidnapping, rape and failure to register as an ex-convict.

Subsequent to this lineup, and either before or after his formal arrest, on this same afternoon, the defendant was put in another lineup, which resulted in an identification for the attempted rape of another female and a confession by the defendant as to this offense. Additionally, a confession was obtained in connection with a purse snatching charge. These other charges become collaterally pertinent here in considering the defendant's contention that, at the time of his confession to Mrs. Hoffman, he was illegally detained.

On March 14, the defendant was brought before a city magistrate on the failure to register charge, and after acknowledging his failure to register as a convicted felon, after his move to the City of Phoenix, the defendant was sentenced to ten days in jail for this offense. On March 15, the defendant was interrogated in the forenoon for one hour and five minutes by police officers in connection with various purse snatching incidents. To these accusations, the defendant stated that 'he could not remember for sure.' No further confessions were obtained in this regard, but police reports admitted in evidence, in this trial in the absence of the jury, indicate a 'positive identification' of a purse snatching offense. At this same time, on the 15th, the defendant was interrogated as to a homicide charge, which was denied.

After this interrogation, the defendant was brought before a justice of the peace for an 'arraignment' 6 on the kidnapping and rape charge and upon the robbery (purse snatching) complaint. At the time of his appearance before the justice of the peace, the defendant was informed, as required by Rule 16, R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., of the charge against him, of his right to the aid of counsel during the proceedings, but at his own expense, and of his right to waive a preliminary examination. At the time of his initial appearance before the justice of the peace, the defendant indicated that he wished a preliminary hearing on both charges, and a preliminary examination was set for March 27. On March 27, the defendant indicated to the magistrate that he was financially unable to employ counsel and for this reason would waive the preliminary examination. Upon this waiver, the defendant was bound over to the superior court to answer the felony charges against him.

After his initial appearance before the justice of the peace, the defendant was not further interrogated by the police. Total...

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15 cases
  • Robinson v. Borg
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 11, 1990
    ...require a brief response. As was true in Miranda itself, where the defendant was ultimately retried and convicted, see State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S.Ct. 140, 24 L.Ed.2d 122 (1969), our opinion does not foreclose the possibility of a new tria......
  • State v. Hatton
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1977
    ...(1973). Specific past acts of a witness' untruthfulness may not be shown to suggest that the witness is presently lying. State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S.Ct. 140, 24 L.Ed.2d 122 Appellant also urges that the testimony should have been allowed t......
  • Crews v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • February 16, 1977
    ...a superficial demonstration of a causal chain between the improper act and the disputed evidence. See, e. g., State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969) (en banc); People v. McInnis, 6 Cal.3d 821, 100 Cal. Rptr. 618, 494 P.2d 690 (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061, 93 S.Ct. 56......
  • State v. Bojorquez
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • May 5, 1975
    ...to grant the defendant an opportunity for discovery but to determine probable cause to hold the defendant to answer. State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S.Ct. 140, 24 L.Ed.2d 122. Any discovery that occurs at a hearing is incidental to that p......
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