State v. Miranda
| Decision Date | 17 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1837.,02-1837. |
| Citation | 672 N.W.2d 753 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Victor MIRANDA, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Robert DiBlasi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Victor Miranda claims police violated his Miranda rights when he was handcuffed and asked who owned marijuana found in his bedroom. He also alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel in waiving his right to a jury trial, because his attorney failed to ensure the judge tell him he could participate in voir dire and his jury would be drawn from the community.
In our de novo review, we conclude the police unlawfully subjected Miranda to custodial interrogation without giving him the required Miranda warnings; the district court, therefore, should have suppressed an admission Miranda made concerning his ownership of the drug. Because we find Miranda waived his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, we reject his ineffective-assistance claim. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
One night in February 2002, Officers Nading and Banks of the Des Moines Police Department investigated a loud party at an apartment in our capital city. They knocked and a young woman opened the door. The smell of marijuana wafted out of the apartment.
The police asked the woman if they could come in and she let them in. Once inside the apartment, the police saw four males, some marijuana joints, and an assortment of knives in the living room. They also saw gang graffiti on the walls.
In order to make sure it was safe, Officer Nading went to check the two bedrooms in the apartment, while Officer Banks remained in the living room. Nading opened the door to the front bedroom, and turned on the lights. Nading discovered the room in complete disarray. On one side of the room laid Victor Miranda and a teenage boy on a mattress. On the other side of the room was some marijuana on top of a dresser. There was also a bag containing two to three ounces of marijuana in the dresser's open top drawer. Nading brought Miranda and the boy into the living room.
Officer Nading then checked the back bedroom. He saw more knives and encountered four or five more people. Nading brought these individuals into the living room, as well.
Officer Nading asked Miranda if the front bedroom was his. After Miranda said "Yes," Nading handcuffed Miranda and the boy. Nading then asked the entire group who owned the marijuana. Miranda fessed up to owning the marijuana. Nading removed the handcuffs from the boy, and allowed everyone but Miranda to leave. The police arrested Miranda. Eventually, they discovered Miranda was renting the apartment.
The county attorney charged Miranda with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a class "D" felony. See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) (2001). Miranda filed a motion to suppress, in which he alleged his admission was the product of an unconstitutional custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
; U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
The district court denied Miranda's motion to suppress. It recognized Miranda was handcuffed, but held that "[u]p to the point of his admission he was not in custody." The court noted that once Miranda admitted he owned the marijuana, the police allowed all of the other people in the apartment to leave. The court concluded that
Prior to trial, Miranda signed and filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. He appeared in open court and, following a colloquy with the judge, waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the minutes of testimony. Miranda's attorney told the presiding judge the defendant was so stipulating in order to preserve for appeal the issue of the ruling on the motion to suppress. Miranda's attorney also filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which again alleged Miranda's Miranda rights were violated.
The district court, citing the ruling on the motion to suppress, denied Miranda's motion. The district court adjudged Miranda guilty, and sentenced him.
Miranda appeals his conviction, and presents two issues for our review: (1) Did the district court err in denying Miranda's motion to suppress? and (2) Was Miranda's trial counsel ineffective for failing to challenge an allegedly defective waiver of his right to a jury trial?
Where the defendant alleges the district court improperly refused to suppress statements made in violation of his Miranda rights, our review is de novo. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). Although Id. (quoting State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993)).
Our standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving the adequacy of a jury trial waiver is de novo. State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa 2003). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally "preserved for postconviction relief" but "[w]e will resolve the claim on direct appeal ... when the record adequately presents the issue." Id; State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994). We believe the record in this case is sufficient for us to rule upon the issue on direct appeal.
On appeal, the crux of the dispute is whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he admitted owning the marijuana found in his bedroom. The defendant argues he was in custody because the officers handcuffed him. He also points out that police only handcuffed the two persons found in the room with the marijuana.
In response, the State notes this entire episode occurred in the defendant's own apartment, the police were outnumbered, and, in any event, the police questioning here did not constitute the sort of "coercive environment" which Miranda was designed to guard against. In the alternative, the State argues that even if Miranda were subject to "custodial interrogation," any error in admitting his incriminating statement was harmless.
Id. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.
In a passage which is now familiar to much of the American public, the Court mandated persons subjected to custodial interrogation must first be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. Id. They must also be advised "anything [they say] can be used against [them] in a court of law, ... and that if [they] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for [them] prior to any questioning" if they wish. Id. If this prophylactic measure is not carried out, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible. Id.
The State does not deny the police failed to apprise the defendant of his Miranda rights before he admitted to owning the marijuana. We must, therefore, answer one ultimate question: Was the defendant entitled to Miranda warnings? "Miranda warnings are not required unless there is both custody and interrogation." State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997) (citations omitted); accord Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 607
(quoting State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1989)).
The critical issue in this case is whether Miranda was in custody, as articulated in Miranda and its progeny, when the police asked who owned the marijuana. The Miranda safeguards "become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a `degree associated with formal arrest.'" Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 335 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983)). "[A] court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 557-58 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298 (1994) (citations and internal quotation omitted)).
In this inquiry, we apply an objective test. "[T]he appropriate test [is] `whether a reasonable person in the [defendant's] position would understand himself to be in custody.'" Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558 (quoting State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994)). We consider four factors:
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