State v. Mitchell
| Docket Number | 23-KA-225 |
| Decision Date | 27 December 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DONTE MITCHELL |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
1
STATE OF LOUISIANA
v.
DONTE MITCHELL
No. 23-KA-225
Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit
December 27, 2023
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 21-4026, DIVISION "L" HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
SJW
SMC
JGG
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr., Juliet L. Clark, Thomas J. Butler
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, DONTE C MITCHELL John C. Butler, John D. Perez
Panel composed of Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Stephen J. Windhorst, Judges.
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST, JUDGE.
Appellant/defendant, Donte C. Mitchell, appeals his guilty plea conviction for vehicular homicide in violation of La. R.S. 14:32.1. For the following reasons, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 26, 2021, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office filed a bill of information charging defendant with vehicular homicide of Caleb Clayton, while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle and while having a blood alcohol content ("BAC") of .09% and/or while having tetrahydrocannabinoid in his bloodstream, in violation of La. R.S. 14:32.1. On October 15, 2021, defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty.[1]
On September 26, 2022, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and pled guilty as charged pursuant to a plea agreement. As part of the plea agreement, defendant agreed his sentence would be determined by the trial court after reviewing a pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI").[2]
On December 9, 2022, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. After considering victim impact statements, the PSI, defendant's testimony, and mitigating evidence produced by defendant,[3] the trial court sentenced defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor with the first three years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that the sentence was excessive and harsh. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This appeal followed.
FACTS
Because defendant pled guilty, the underlying facts were not fully developed at a trial. However, the bill of information alleges that on June 1, 2021, defendant "violated La. R.S. 14:32.1 in that he did kill one Caleb Clayton, while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle and while having a blood alcohol content of .09 and/or while having tetrahydrocannabinoid in his bloodstream."
The following additional facts were taken from the April 12, 2022 suppression hearing. The State presented testimony from two Louisiana State Police troopers that were involved in the investigation of this case.
Trooper Nicholas Dowdle, lead investigator, testified that he responded to a vehicular accident on the Westbank Expressway. Upon arrival, he briefly spoke to defendant to assess his injuries and to see if he needed medical assistance before sending him to the hospital. He was not able to speak to the victim because the victim did not have a pulse and was not breathing. Trooper Dowdle testified that he helped pull the victim from his vehicle and started chest compressions. The victim was transferred to the hospital where he later succumbed to his injuries. Trooper Dowdle confirmed that an independent witness stated that there was a car parked on the side of the road; however, he did not learn why the car was parked on the side of the road. He acknowledged that it would be illegal for a car to be parked on the side of the road without an emergency. He could not state whether the witness expressed facts indicating that there was an intervening cause for the accident.
Trooper Dowdle testified that through his investigation, he determined that defendant's vehicle ran off the road and hit the victim's parked vehicle, resulting in the victim's death, and a subsequent blood analysis showed that defendant was intoxicated. He stated that defendant's BAC was .09% "about hour and half to two hours after the time of the crash, which means [defendant] had time to start sobering up . . ." Trooper Dowdle testified that when he was at the scene of the accident, he
could smell the faint odor of alcoholic beverages and when he spoke to defendant at the hospital in a closed area, he could "still smell the odor." As a result of his investigation, Trooper Dowdle determined that defendant was at fault for the accident and an arrest warrant was subsequently issued for defendant's arrest.
Trooper David Lowe testified that he spoke to defendant at the hospital wherein he advised defendant of his rights, defendant signed a consent form to have his blood tested for alcohol or other substances, and defendant made a statement. While speaking with defendant, Trooper Lowe testified that he smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and defendant admitted to smoking marijuana "earlier." Trooper Lowe stated he did not know whether there was an independent witness to the accident.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In his first assignment of error, defendant alleges that his guilty plea is constitutionally inadequate because he did not knowingly and intelligently understand the complex nature and elements of the charge of vehicular homicide, especially the "causation/contribution" element of the charge. Defendant asserts that he is not claiming that he made an Alford[4] plea or that he proclaimed his innocence at the plea hearing. However, because the trial court was put on notice during the suppression hearing that an independent witness could corroborate his innocence as to an intervening cause and that this witness could be produced at trial, defendant argues that the trial court should have engaged in a colloquy with him as to each element of vehicular homicide. Defendant contends that (1) the trial court did not ask him if he was pleading guilty because he is in fact guilty; (2) the trial court did
not read or explain the elements of vehicular homicide; (3) the trial court did not inquire as to whether or not defense counsel explained the elements of vehicular homicide to him; and (4) despite notice of the witness, the trial court did not engage in a further colloquy with him as to each element. For these reasons, defendant contends he did not intelligently plead guilty and requests that his guilty plea be vacated.
In his second assignment of error, defendant contends that his guilty plea is statutorily inadequate because the trial court violated La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1, by accepting his guilty plea without first determining if he understood the nature of the charge against him, especially the causation/contribution element of vehicular homicide. Considering these facts, it is reasonable that he would not have pled guilty given the evidence that a witness could have exonerated him. Defendant asserts that the trial court's failure to explain the nature and elements of vehicular homicide was not harmless error, and therefore, his guilty plea must be vacated.
LAW and ANALYSIS
The validity of a guilty plea turns on whether the defendant was informed of three fundamental constitutional rights-his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, his right to a trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers -and whether, having been informed of those rights, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived them. State v. Farinas, 09-396 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/23/09), 28 So.3d 1132, 1140; State v. Juniors, 03-2425 (La. 06/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 334, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1115, 126 S.Ct. 1940, 164 L.Ed.2d 669 (2006).
A guilty plea normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea and precludes review of such defects by either appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Abrego, 21-166 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/01/21), 334 So.3d 883, 891; writ denied, 21-1949 (La. 02/22/22), 333 So.3d 450; State v. Dadney, 14-511 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d 55, 59, writ denied, 15-90
(La. 10/30/15), 179 So.3d 614. Once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty pleas that are constitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Ferrera, 16-243 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 208 So.3d 1060, 1063-64. A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin[5] colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain, or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain, and that bargain is not kept. State v. Williams, 18-71 (La.App. 5 Cir. 07/31/18), 251 So.3d 1250, 1256; State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La.App. 5 Cir. 02/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Williams, 251 So.3d at 1256. Under Boykin, the decision to plead guilty will not be considered free and voluntary unless, at the very least, the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to a trial by jury, and to confront his accusers. State v. Patin, 19-157 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/13/19), 285 So.3d 48, 55. When the record establishes that an accused was informed of and waived his rights to a trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and against self-incrimination, the burden shifts to the accused to prove that, despite this record, his guilty plea was involuntary. State v. Riley, 14-98 (La.App. 5 Cir. 06/24/14), 145 So.3d...
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