State v. Mo Comm'n on Human Rights, 83704

• Decision Date: 28 May 2002
• Docket Number: 83704
• Citation: 77 S.W.3d 600
• Parties: State of Missouri, ex rel. Roma Martin-Erb, Appellant v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, et al., Respondents. SC83704 Supreme Court of Missouri 0
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

State of Missouri, ex rel. Roma Martin-Erb, Appellant v Missouri Commission on Human Rights, et al., Respondents

SC83704

Supreme Court of Missouri

05/28/2002

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Thomas J. Brown, III

Counsel for Appellant: Frank E. Wallemann

Counsel for Respondent: Lowell D. Pearson, Marshall V. Wilson, Jane C. Drummond, James R. Layton, Keith D. Halcomb and Alan L. Rupe

Opinion Summary: Roma Martin-Erb went to work for a Wal-Mart photo lab in August 1991, first as an hourly lab associate and then as photo lab manager. In January 1997, Wal-Mart fired her, and she filed a complaint with the state commission on human rights, alleging she was discharged illegally on the basis of her race. After investigating the case for more than three years, the commission's executive director in February 2000 sent Martin-Erb a letter indicating the commission found no probable cause that Martin-Erb had been discriminated against. Martin-Erb then sought review under section 536.150, RSMo, asking the circuit court to compel the commission to follow its procedures in considering her complaint. She also asked the court to grant her relief against Wal-Mart. The court initially granted a preliminary order in mandamus, but later quashed its preliminary writ and dismissed her petition, finding the executive director's decision was not reviewable. Martin-Erb appeals.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Court en banc holds: When the commission did not issue its determination within 180 days of receiving the complaint, Martin-Erb could have requested a right-to-sue letter and proceeded against Wal-Mart on her own. Because she did not seek a right-to-sue letter, the commission was required to continue investigating her complaint to determine whether probable cause existed to find discrimination. Once the director issued the decision, it was a final decision determining Martin-Erb's legal rights, duties and privileges with no specific right to judicial review. Accordingly, under the general provisions of section 536.150, the executive director's "no probable cause" determination is reviewable as a noncontested case for the limited purpose of determining whether the executive director arbitrarily exercised or refused to exercise her statutory and regulatory duties in making that determination. The executive director is a necessary party to such review because she is the one on whom the statute imposes the duty. Because Martin-Erb sued only the commission and its chairperson, the court's judgment quashing its preliminary writ is affirmed, but the case is remanded for further proceedings as to Martin-Erb's claims, in which Martin-Erb must set out specifics of how she believes the executive director failed to follow her statutory duties. To the extent Martin-Erb requested relief directly against Wal-Mart, the court correctly dismissed her claims as time-barred under section 213.111 because they were filed more than two years after the alleged discrimination occurred.

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. Limbaugh, C.J., White, Wolff and Price, JJ., and Dierker, Sp.J., concur. Benton and Teitelman, JJ., not participating.

Laura Denvir Stith, Judge

Ms. Roma Martin-Erb filed a complaint in 1997 with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) alleging that she was fired by Wal-Mart because of her race, in violation of section 213.055, RSMo 1994¹ of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Three years later, the executive director of the MCHR determined there was "no probable cause" to believe that discrimination occurred and closed her complaint. Ms. Martin-Erb sought a writ of mandamus to compel the MCHR to follow its own procedures in reviewing her complaint and to grant her relief against Wal-Mart. On motion of the MCHR and Wal-Mart, the circuit court dismissed the petition, finding the executive director's decision was not reviewable. Ms. Martin-Erb appealed.

This Court holds that the executive director's "no probable cause" determination is reviewable under section 536.150 as a noncontested case for the limited purpose of determining whether she arbitrarily exercised or refused to exercise her statutory and regulatory duties in making that determination. The executive director is a necessary party to such a suit, however, because she is the one on whom the statute imposes the duty. Because Ms. Martin-Erb sued only the MCHR and its chairperson, the court's judgment quashing its preliminary writ is affirmed, but the case is remanded.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Wal-Mart hired Ms. Martin-Erb on August 5, 1991. She began as a hourly photo lab associate and was later promoted to photo lab manager on August 24, 1991. She was terminated on January 11, 1997. Ten days later, she filed a complaint with the MCHR alleging that Wal-Mart discharged her on the basis of race in violation of the MHRA.

After investigating her complaint for over three years, the executive director of the MCHR sent Ms. Martin-Erb a "no probable cause" letter on February 4, 2000, stating that, after investigation, a finding of "no probable cause" was made and her complaint closed. The letter also informed her that she had 30 days to seek judicial review of the "no probable cause" determination. Within that time period and pursuant to section 536.150, Ms. Martin-Erb filed what she styled as a petition for writ of review and mandamus requesting that the court set the matter for full evidentiary hearing on the merits; find Wal-Mart violated chapter 213; find the MCHR failed to fulfill its statutory duties in processing a meritorious complaint; find its decision was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and involved an abuse of discretion; and direct that she be made whole and offered back pay and reinstatement. The court issued a preliminary order in mandamus. Wal-Mart intervened, and it and the MCHR moved for dismissal.

The court quashed the preliminary writ and dismissed the petition, concluding that Ms. Martin-Erb's petition was, in effect, a civil action against Wal-Mart, and that she could have sought a "right to sue" letter from the MCHR permitting her to file such an action, but that she had failed to do so within the two-year statutory period provided in section 213.111. It held that section 536.150 did not give her a separate right to seek judicial review of the "no probable cause" determination once the two-year period had passed and that the earlier opportunity to seek a "right to sue" letter provided her with an adequate remedy at law, precluding equitable relief. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

II. PROVISIONS OF THE MISSOURI HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

It is helpful to briefly set out certain pertinent provisions of the MHRA as they relate to the issuance of a "probable cause" letter and the right to file suit. A person who claims to have been subjected to an unlawful discriminatory practice may, within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, file a complaint with the MCHR, providing details of the alleged discriminatory conduct and such other information as the MCHR may need. Sec. 213.075.1. The MHRA provides that "[t]he executive director shall, with the assistance of the commission's staff, promptly investigate the complaint." Sec. 213.075.3. The statute further specifically requires that "[t]he investigation, [and] determination of probable cause ... shall be conducted according to such rules, regulations and guidelines as the commission shall prescribe." Id. The MCHR accordingly adopted regulations providing that the investigation and "probable cause" determination will be:

accomplished by methods including, but not limited to, fact-finding conferences, personal interviews, written interrogatories, tests, requests for production of documents, books or papers, or other materials and reviews of investigations of other civil rights agencies.

8 CSR 60-2.025(9).

Under the MHRA, if the MCHR has not completed its administrative processing of the complaint and issued its determination within 180 days, the complainant may request it to issue a "right to sue" letter. Sec. 213.111.1. If the letter is timely requested, the MCHR must provide it. Id. The complainant must file any civil action against the person or entity allegedly committing the discrimination within 90 days of the date of the MCHR's letter, but in no event later than two years after the alleged discrimination occurred or was discovered. Id.² Once a complainant is provided with a "right to sue" letter, the MCHR is precluded from further pursuing that complaint. Id.

If no "right to sue" letter is requested, the executive director must continue investigating the complaint to determine whether "probable cause" exists to find discrimination. If, after investigation, the executive director determines that "probable cause" exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint, the statute requires the executive director to use various means to attempt to immediately eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice. Sec. 213.075.3. Ultimately, if conciliation fails, the MCHR chooses whether to set the matter for hearing and determination. If it does so, its ruling may be reviewed as a contested case pursuant to sections 213.085 and 536.100.³

If the executive director finds "no probable cause," then the complaint is closed and the complainant can proceed no further. Although the statute does not directly address whether or how the executive director's "no probable cause" determination can be reviewed, agency regulations have, since 1988, provided for judicial review, stating:

Any person aggrieved by dismissal of a complaint may obtain judicial review by filing a petition in the circuit court of the county of proper venue within thirty (30) days after the mailing or delivery of the notice of dismissal. Judicial review shall be in the manner provided by Chapter 536, RSMo for noncontested cases.

8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(E)...