State v. Moilen

• Decision Date: 19 April 1918
• Docket Number: No. 20831.,20831.
• Citation: 140 Minn. 112,167 N.W. 345
• Parties: STATE v. MOILEN et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

140 Minn. 112

167 N.W. 345

STATE

v.MOILEN et al.

No. 20831.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 19, 1918.

Certified from District Court, St. Louis County; Edward Freeman, Judge.

Matt Moilen and others were indicted for criminal syndicalism, and before sentence at the instance of defendant Maki, convicted on separate trial, the cause was certified to the Supreme Court for the determination of certain questions. Certified questions answered, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Syllabus by the Court

It is the exclusive province of the Legislature to declare what acts, deemed inimical to the public welfare, shall constitute a crime, to prohibit the same, and impose appropriate punishments for a violation thereof. Judicial consideration of such enactment is limited to the inquiry whether the constitutional rights of the citizens are thereby violated or impaired.

Chapter 215, General Laws 1917 (Gen. St. Supp. 1917, §§ 8596-1 to 8596-4), declaring and defining the crime of criminal syndicalism, and prohibiting the advocacy or teaching of sabotage or other methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political ends, is not obnoxious to either the state or federal Constitution, and no rights thereby secured or protected are in any way impaired or abridged.

The penalties imposed by the statute for a violation thereof do not come within the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishments.

The relation of employer and employé may properly be made the basis of legislation involving rights and duties arising therefrom.

On the facts presented by the indictment and certified case, it is held that the question whether defendant intended by the distribution of the posters referred to in the opinion to advocate the form of sabotage condemned by the statute was one of fact for the jury. Lyndon A. Smith, Atty. Gen., and E. L. Boyle, Asst. Co. Atty., of Virginia, Minn., James E. Markham and Clifford L. Hilton, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Warren E. Greene, Co. Atty., of Duluth, for the State.

Sigmond Slonin, of Duluth, for defendant.

BROWN, C. J.

Defendant were jointly indicted by the grand jury of St. Louis county, and thereby charged with the crime of criminal syndicalism, as that crime is defined and declared by chapter 215, General Laws 1917 (Gen. St. Supp. 1917, §§ 8596-1 to 8596-4). Defendant Maki on a separate trial was found guilty as charged in the indictment, and at his instance and before sentence was pronounced the cause was certified to this court for the determination of two questions, namely: (1) Is the statute on which the prosecution is founded a valid constitutional law? and, if valid, (2) Do the facts presented by the indictment and certified record constitute a violation thereof? We answer both questions in the affirmative.

The statute in question defines the crime charged against defendant in the following language:

‘Criminal syndicalism is hereby defined as the doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage [this word as used in this bill meaning malicious damage or injury to the property of an employer by an employé] violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political ends.’

The advocacy or teaching of the acts or things thus condemned, whether by word of mouth or by the circulation, distribution or public display of written matter in any form is declared a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by fine not exceeding $1,000, or by both fine and imprisonment. Public assemblies for the advocacy and teaching the condemned doctrines are prohibited, and all persons voluntarily participating in any such assembly by their presence, aid, or instigation are declared guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both fine and imprisonment.

It is contended by defendant that the statute violates the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, wherein it is declared that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to him the equal protection of the law. And, further, that the statute violates the provisions of the state Constitution prohibiting special or class legislation, and also the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments for crimes.

[1][2] 1. The contention that the statute violates rights granted and secured by the federal Constitution is without special merit. The design and purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of the statute was the suppression of what was deemed by the lawmakers a growing menace to law and order in the state, arising from the practice of sabotage and other unlawful methods of terrorism employed by certain laborers in furtherance of industrial ends and in adjustment of alleged grievances against employers. The facts surrounding the practice of sabotage, and like in terrorem methods of self-adjudication of alleged wrongs, are matters of common knowledge and general public notoriety of which the courts will take notice. That they are unlawful and within the restrictive power of the Legislature is clear. Sabotage as practiced by those advocating it as an appropriate and proper method of adjusting labor troubles embraces among other lesser offensive acts the willful and intentional injury to or destruction of the property of the employer in retaliation for his failure or refusal to comply with wage or other kindred labor demands. It amounts to malicious mischief and is a crime at common law as well as by statute. The methods of terrorism referred to in the statute have close relation to sabotage, and are practiced for the purpose of intimidation, and to coerce employers into a compliance with labor demands. Methods of that sort are equally unlawful and open to legislative condemnation.

It is the exclusive province of the Legislature to declare what acts, deemed by the lawmakers inimical to the public welfare, shall constitute a crime, to prohibit the same and impose appropriate penalties for a violation thereof. With the wisdom and propriety thereof the courts are not concerned. State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N. W. 935,9 Ann. Cas. 634; Clark & Marshall, Crimes, § 41. Judicial consideration of enactments of the kind is limited to the inquiry whether the constitutional rights of the citizen have been invaded or violated. If such rights be in no wise infringed or abridged, the statute must stand however harsh it may seem to those who run counter to its commands. It requires no argument to demonstrate that the subject-matter of this statute was and is within legislative cognizance, vesting in that body the clear right to prohibit the advocacy or teaching of the iniquitous and unlawful doctrines which it condemns.

The argument in attempted palliation or justification of the practice of sabotage, on the theory that it is an appropriate and effective method of combating or countervailing frauds committed by others, such as the act of the manufacturer in the adulteration of food products with ingredients and foreign substances detrimental to the consumer, which is placed on the market under the label of pure food, is wholly beside the question. The law equally condemns frauds and deceits of that kind and the perpetrator thereof is punishable to the extent and in the manner prescribed by particular statutes. No person heretofore has had the courage publicly to advocate such frauds as a means of redressing alleged wrongs, nor the temerity, when...