State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co.

• Decision Date: 03 August 1906
• Citation: 99 Minn. 158,108 N.W. 935
• Parties: STATE v. SHEVLIN-CARPENTER CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

99 Minn. 158

108 N.W. 935

STATE

v.SHEVLIN-CARPENTER CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 3, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Homer B. Dibell, Judge.

Action by the state against the Shevlin-Carpenter Company. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Chapter 163, p. 349, Gen. Laws 1895, declaring certain acts of trespass upon state lands a crime, imposing a penalty therefor, and fixing the measure of damages to be recovered in a civil action, construed, and held to impose upon a casual or involuntary trespasser criminal punishment and also double damages for his wrongful acts.

So construed, the statute is held not obnoxious to constitutional principles, but a valid legislative enactment.

It is within the exclusive power of the Legislature to declare what acts shall constitute a crime, to define the same, and to provide such punishment therefor as may be deemed appropriate.

A statute imposing double or treble damages for a trespass upon lands owned by the state does not violate the constitutional rights of the citizen, even though the same act of treaspass may be punishable as a crime.

The state may recover such damages in a civil action, and, though in the nature of a penalty, the wrongdoer is not thereby twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Section 7, art. 1, of the state Constitution, providing that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, applies only to criminal prosecutions.

The title of the statute above referred to held sufficiently to comply with the constitutional requirement that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. Clapp & Macartney and A. Y. Merrill (Davis, Kellogg & Severance, H. B. Fryberger, and R. J. Powell, of counsel), for appellant.

Edward T. Young, Atty. Gen., and C. S. Jelley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROWN, J.

This action was brought under the provisions of section 7, c. 163, p. 352, Gen. Laws 1895, to recover treble damages for an alleged willful trespass upon lands owned by the state by cutting and removing timber therefrom. Defendant interposed a general demurrer to the complaint, and from an order overruling it appealed to this court.

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time stated therein defendant, a corporation, willfully, wrongfully, and unlawfully, well knowing that the state was the owner thereof, entered upon certain school lands of the state and cut and removed therefrom 2,444,020 feet of timber of the value of $17,108.14; that by reason of the fact that the act of defendant was willful it became, and is liable, to the state for treble the value of the timber so cut and removed, and judgment was demanded accordingly. The statute under which the action was brought provides as follows: ‘Section 7. If any person, firm or corporation, without a valid and existing permit therefor, cuts or employs, or induces any other person, firm or corporation to cut, or assist in cutting any timber of whatsoever description, on state lands, or removes or carries away or employs, ior induces or assists any other person, firm or corporation to remove or carry away any such timber, or other property, he shall be liable to the state in treble damages, if such trespass is adjudged to have been willful; but double damages only in case the trespass is adjudged to have been casual and involuntary, and shall have no right whatsoever to any remuneration or allowance for labor or expenses incurred in removing such other property, cutting such timber, preparing the same for market, or transporting the same to or towards market. Whoever cuts or removes, or employs or induces any other person, firm or corporation to cut or remove any timber or other property from state lands, contrary to the provisions of this act, or without conforming in each and every respect thereto, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand (1,000) dollars, or by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding two (2) years, or by both in case the trespass is adjudged to have been willful.’

The questions presented by defendant in support of the demurrer, which we deem entitled to special consideration, resolve themselves into four propositions, or contentions, namely: (1) That the statute, in imposing a double liability for a casual or involuntary trespass, is obnoxious to those provisions of the state and federal Constitutions which provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. That in declaring the casual or involuntary trespass a crime, it violates sections 2 and 7 or article 1 of the state Constitution, as well as contravenes natural justice, and invades those natural rights, which, if not directly, are impliedly, secured by the Constitution, or are protected by the fundamental principles of the social compact and exist independent of constitutional guaranty. (2) That in so far as it provides for the recovery of double or treble damages in a civil action, it contravenes section 7, art. 1, of the state Constitution, which provides, among other things, that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. (3) That the damages given by the statute, being in the nature of a penalty, can be recovered only by way of indictment and criminal prosecution. (4) That the subject of the statute is insufficiently stated in its title.

1. Counsel for the state suggest that the first contention of defendant above mentioned is not involved in the case, for the reason that the action was not brought to recover double damages, but under the treble damage feature of the statute, and based upon allegations that the trespass and acts of defendant complained of were willful and unlawful. But this view of the case is not tenable. The statute was intended to establish a definite measure of damages in all cases of trespass upon state lands, and to that end breble damages are provided for a willful, and double damages for a casual or involuntary, trespass, thus wholly abrogating the rules of the common law in such cases. It is true that the action is founded upon an alleged willful trespass; but if the state should fail to prove the allegation of willfulness, and the trespass should, on the trial, turn out to have been casual or involuntary, recovery could undoubtedly be had for the amount fixed by the statute for a trespass of that nature, viz., double damages. If, as in all probability will be the case, the main issue in the litigation should be the alleged willfulness on the part of defendant, the latter would be entitled to an instruction to the jury that, in the event the state failed to prove the affirmative of that issue by a fair preponderance of the evidence, treble damages could not be given; and coupled therewith the court would be required to say that the failure of proof on that issue would not deprive the state of the right to a verdict for damages under the next and only other rule applicable to the case. So that defendant is in position to insist that the statute is invalid, so far as it imposes a penalty in the way of double damages for a casual or involuntary act of trespass. 5 Ency. Pl. & Prac. 729: Starkweather v. Quigley, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 29; Sprague v. Irwin, 27 How. Prac. 51;Du Bois v. Beaver, 25 N. Y. 123, 82 Am. Dec. 326;Clark v. Field, 42 Mich. 342, 4 N. W. 19;Rhemke v. Clinton, 2 Utah, 230.

The first subject for consideration is the construction of the statute. If susceptible of a construction to the effect that there was no intention on the part of the Legislature to declare the casual or involuntary trespass a crime, one feature of defendant's position would be eliminated, and it is important to ascertain the intention of the statute in this respect. The first paragraph of the section treats of the civil remedy. It provides that if any person, firm, or corporation, without a valid and existing permit issued in accordance with other provisions of the statute, cuts, or induces any other person to cut or assist in cutting, any timber of any description upon any state land, or removes or carries the same away, or employs or induces another to do so, he shall be liable to the state in treble damages, if the trespass is adjudged to have been willful, but double damages where it is adjudged to have been casual or involuntary. The second paragraph deals with the subject from the penal standpoint, and declares that any person who shall cut or carry away such timber, or assist another in such an act, contrary to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, shall be guilty of a felony and punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of not more than one year, or by both fine and imprisonment where the trespass is adjudged to have been willful. The statute contains remedial and penal features, and as respects the former is entitled to a liberal construction, but as to the latter must be strictly construed. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 337, 532. Remedial statutes are generally treated with considerable liberality and are construed in the light of what was demanded or required of the lawmakers, the evils intended to be guarded against, and the particular wrongs to be remedies. Words are often omitted, or supplied by implication, and sentences transformed, to render the statute a consistent whole and effectuate the legislative will; and this, too, in construing penal, as well as remedial, statutes, though many of the courts hold that the strict letter of a penal statute must control as against the state. But, after all has been said in generalizing upon the rules of construction, they all converge to the same point and bring up at the ultimate inquiry, the intention of the Legislature.

By taking into consideration well-known facts...