State v. Molnar

• Decision Date: 28 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 98864-1,98864-1
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Laszlo MOLNAR, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

497 P.3d 858

STATE of Washington, Petitioner,

v.Laszlo MOLNAR, Respondent.

No. 98864-1

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued June 10, 2021

Filed: October 28, 2021

Jennifer Paige Joseph, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Ave. Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362, for Petitioner.

Lise Ellner, Attorney at Law, Kyle Bryce Berti, Law Offices of Lise Ellner, P.O. Box 2711, Vashon, WA, 98070-2711, for Respondent.

Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, 345 W. Main St. Fl. 2, Chehalis, WA, 98532-4802, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

YU, J.

¶1 This case concerns Laszlo Molnar's postjudgment motion for resentencing on one count of second degree rape based on the State's alleged breach of the plea agreement. The sentencing court denied Molnar's motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We reverse the Court of Appeals.

¶2 Molnar agreed to a contested sentencing hearing, at which he and the State agreed to make different sentencing recommendations to the court. Therefore, the State did not breach the plea agreement by filing a memorandum advocating for its own recommendation, a sentence at the middle of the standard range. The State's short memorandum made this recommendation explicitly and repeatedly, and it did not cross the line into improperly advocating for a longer sentence. We therefore reinstate the sentencing court's ruling denying Molnar's postjudgment motion for resentencing.¹

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Underlying conviction and sentence

¶3 The victim was B.A., an 83-year-old resident of Molnar's 24-hour care facility. B.A. had "severe dementia

," and she passed away before Molnar's sentencing in this case. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4. B.A. could not walk or talk, and she was "unable to perform any functions of daily living to include dressing, bathing, or feeding." Id. B.A. had been living at Molnar's facility for about two and a half years when her daughter noticed that B.A. was behaving differently during a visit. Concerned, she installed a hidden camera in B.A.’s room, which recorded Molnar forcing his penis into B.A.’s mouth. After police confronted Molnar with the recording, he confessed to raping B.A. approximately 10 times.

¶4 On November 18, 2014, the State charged Molnar with one count of second degree rape with a domestic violence designation and an aggravating factor alleging that B.A. "was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance." Id. at 1-2. On August 26, 2015, the State moved to file an amended information charging Molnar with one count of second degree rape without the designation or aggravator "pursuant to Plea Negotiations with the input of the victims." Id. at 37. Molnar filed a statement on plea of guilty, in which he described his offense as follows: "on or about 11/13/14, in King County, WA, I engaged in sexual intercourse with B.A. B.A. was incapable of consenting because she was mentally incapacitated due to her dementia." Id. at 20. The parties’ plea agreement included a checked box next to the statement "In accordance with RCW 9.94A.530, the parties have stipulated that the [facts set forth in the certification(s) for determination of probable cause and prosecutor's summary] are real and material facts for purposes of this sentencing." Id. at 27.

¶5 The court accepted Molnar's plea of guilty to second degree rape as charged in the amended information. The standard sentencing range for Molnar's offense was an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum term of 78 to 102 months’ confinement. In the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a midrange sentence with a minimum 90-month term. Molnar's statement on plea of guilty acknowledged this recommendation but noted that it was "not agreed." Id. at 12.

¶6 In its four-page sentencing memorandum, the State recounted the stipulated facts and contended that a midrange, 90-month minimum sentence was "appropriate given the egregious nature of this offense and the victim's obvious vulnerability." Id. at 56. The State's memorandum also noted that the vulnerable victim aggravator and domestic violence designation were dismissed as part of the plea agreement, and informed the court that "[h]ad this case gone to trial, the State would have added an additional sentencing aggravator of abuse of trust and an additional count of Rape in the Second Degree." Id. at 53-54.

¶7 In his sentencing memorandum, Molnar requested a 78-month minimum sentence at the bottom of the standard range. He emphasized that he was remorseful, that he had faced challenging circumstances as an ethnic Hungarian in Ceausescu's Romania, and that he had worked hard to escape and to provide for his family. He included letters of support from family and friends and a certificate from a class he had completed in jail.

¶8 On October 19, 2015, the court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Molnar to the top of the standard range with a minimum term of 102 months’ confinement.

B. Postconviction motion for resentencing

¶9 On August 1, 2019, Molnar filed a motion for breach of plea hearing with the sentencing court. Id. at 57. He contended that the State's sentencing memorandum "continuously emphasize[d] aggravating sentencing factors." Id. at 59. As a remedy, he asked the court to "remand him for resentencing, where the State must amend the recommendation contained in their Sentencing Memorandum." Id. at 60. The State did not respond, and there is no indication in the record that a response was requested.

¶10 The same judge who presided over Molnar's plea hearing and sentencing denied his motion for resentencing, ruling, "The vulnerable victim aggravator defined under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b) and the domestic violence designation under the authority of RCW 10.99.020 were dismissed pursuant to the guilty plea entered on August 26th, 2015. The defendant pled guilty to the amended information eliminating the aggravator and domestic viol[ence] designation." Id. at 85. Molnar appealed, designated clerk's papers, and filed a statement indicating that he did not intend to arrange for a verbatim report of proceedings. See RAP 9.2(a).

¶11 The State designated one set of supplemental clerk's papers and filed a response brief on the merits, without suggesting that the record was insufficient or that there were any procedural barriers to Molnar's motion for resentencing. The Court of Appeals "[r]eversed and remanded for Molnar to elect either to withdraw his guilty plea or to enforce the plea bargaining agreement before a different judge."

State v. Molnar , No. 80461-8-I, slip op. at 6, 2020 WL 2843870 (Wash. Ct. App. June 1, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/804618.pdf.

¶12 The State filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to supplement the record with new materials. According to the State, it was Molnar's duty to arrange for these new materials to be filed and because he did not do so, the Court of Appeals "should have required supplementation of the record or declined to address the issue" sua sponte. Mot. for Leave To File Late Verbatim Report of Proceedings & Suppl. Clerk's Papers, State v. Molnar , No. 80461-8-I, at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 18, 2020). The State acknowledged that it could have filed the materials itself and did not do so but, nevertheless, argued that the materials were "plainly necessary" to decide the case fairly. Id. at 3. The Court of Appeals denied both of the State's motions.

¶13 We granted the State's petition for review and appointed counsel for Molnar. We accepted for filing an amicus brief by the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA) to which neither party filed a response.

ISSUE

¶14 Did the State's sentencing memorandum undercut its recommendation for a sentence at the middle of the standard range, thereby breaching the plea agreement?

ANALYSIS

¶15 This case presents an opportunity to reiterate and clarify certain well-established principles relating to collateral attacks, plea agreements, and appellate review. Ultimately, we conclude that the sentencing court's decision denying Molnar's motion for resentencing was correct on the merits but procedurally improper. On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the record presented by the parties, but it erred on the merits. No party has briefed any other issue. Therefore, we reinstate the sentencing court's ruling denying relief on Molnar's postjudgment motion for resentencing.

A. A collateral attack on a criminal judgment and sentencing is subject to specific procedural rules, which were not properly raised or applied here

¶16 Before turning to the arguments briefed by the parties, we must address the issues raised by WAPA in its amicus brief. As WAPA correctly points out, Molnar's motion for resentencing was a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence. Neither the courts nor the parties appear to have recognized the implications of this procedural posture. We therefore take this opportunity to briefly set forth the process that usually applies to consideration of collateral attacks, including postjudgment motions for resentencing based on the State's alleged breach of a plea agreement.

¶17 Generally speaking, a person seeking to challenge their conviction or sentence has 30 days in which to initiate a direct appeal. RAP 5.2(a). "[A]ny form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal" is known as a " ‘collateral attack.’ " RCW 10.73.090(2) ; see In re Pers. Restraint of Garcia-Mendoza , 196 Wash.2d 836, 841, 479 P.3d 674 (2021). Most collateral attacks must be brought within "one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." RCW 10.73.090(1). "A year after th[e] judgment is final, the statutory grounds for relief that may be raised are limited. In keeping with the importance of the [constitutional] writ [of habeas corpus], the one-year time limit is subject to equitable...