State v. Montgomery
| Decision Date | 23 December 1909 |
| Parties | STATE v. MONTGOMERY. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Wm. A. Huneke Judge.
E. T Montgomery was convicted of rape, and he appeals. Reversed.
Merritt Oswald & Merritt, for appellant.
Fred C Pugh and V. T. Tustin, for the State.
The appellant was convicted of the crime of rape on a female child under the age of 18 years, and prosecutes this appeal from the final judgment of the court. Numerous errors are assigned, in the admission and exclusion of testimony, in the giving and refusing of instructions, and in the failure of the court to instruct the jury in writing; but few, if any, of these rulings, are likely to occur in a retrial, and for that reason we deem it unnecessary to discuss or consider them at this time. Nor do we find it necessary to review the testimony, further than to say that it is sufficient to sustain the verdict, if believed by the jury; but, whether the appellant was guilty or innocent, he was entitled to a fair and impartial trial, according to the forms of law, and we are constrained to hold that this right was denied him.
The prosecuting witness, a girl of the age of 15 years, was taken into custody about three months before the trial, and was confined in the juvenile detention room from the time of her arrest until after the trial. She was called as a witness for the state at the opening of the trial, and testified that the appellant never had sexual intercourse with her at any time or place. The prosecuting attorney thereupon stated to the court, in the presence of the jury, that the witness had stated the contrary to him many, many times; that the witness had been tampered with, and bought, etc. He was when permitted to ask the witness leading questions. In answer to such questions, the witness freely admitted that she had told the prosecuting attorney that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her on three different occasions, but insisted that she was frightened into making such statements. The prosecuting attorney was then permitted, over the objection and protest of the appellant, to interrogate the witness at length, relative to statements she had made, wherein she admitted that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her at different times and places, with all the details and attendant circumstances. The witness admitted the making of all such statements, but insisted that they were absolutely false. She was thereupon withdrawn from the stand to be recalled some hours later. After leaving the stand, she was first taken to the prosecuting attorney's office, and thence to the detention room and placed in charge of the matron. Before leaving her, the prosecuting attorney told her that he could send her to the penitentiary for perjury, and after he left the matron told her that she would find the prosecuting attorney a very good friend, but a very powerful enemy. The witness herself testified that the matron interceded with the prosecuting attorney in her behalf and asked him not to send her to jail. The respondent contends that the prosecuting attorney and the matron only insisted that the witness should speak the truth; but the record shows only too clearly that the witness was given plainly to understand that her testimony given in the morning was not true, and that she should adhere to and reaffirm the statements made to the officers before the trial. The record clearly shows, also, that the witness was put under duress, and that her testimony was not voluntarily given when she took the stand the second time and testified against the appellant.
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, the respondent earnestly insists that the weight of the testimony of this witness was for the jury in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, and that this court may not interfere with the verdict. We readily concede that the weight of testimony is ordinarily for the jury; but this case presents the far more important question whether a prosecuting attorney may threaten and intimidate witnesses, and place testimony obtained by duress before a jury, against one accused of a public offense. The duty of such officers has often been defined by the court. In the appeal of Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 18 A. 737, the court said: ...
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State v. Warren
...the savage, by the number of their victims." State v. Charlton, 90 Wash.2d 657, 665, 585 P.2d 142 (1978) (quoting State v. Montgomery, 56 Wash. 443, 447-48, 105 P. 1035 (1909)). ¶ 9 In analyzing prejudice, we do not look at the comments in isolation, but in the context of the total argument......
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State v. Trout
...like the prowess of the savage, by the number of their victims.'" Reed, 102 Wash.2d at 147, 684 P.2d 699 (quoting State v. Montgomery, 56 Wash. 443, 447-48, 105 P. 1035 (1909)). As a quasi-judicial officer the prosecutor has a duty to see that an accused is afforded a fair trial. State v. W......
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State v. Walker
...‘devotion to duty is not measured, like the prowess of the savage, by the number of their victims.’ ” (quoting State v. Montgomery, 56 Wash. 443, 447–48, 105 P. 1035 (1909) )). ¶ 21 In reversing Walker's convictions, we do not retreat from the general rule that a defendant should contempora......
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State v. Ollivier
...17, 27–28, 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (quoting State v. Charlton, 90 Wash.2d 657, 665, 585 P.2d 142 (1978) (quoting State v. Montgomery, 56 Wash. 443, 447–48, 105 P. 1035 (1909))). When trial is delayed as long as this one primarily because the defense claims to be having difficulty obtaining reco......