State v. Montoya
| Decision Date | 10 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37676,A-1-CA-37676 |
| Citation | 482 P.3d 1285 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelo Antonio MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
{1} Defendant Angelo Antonio Montoya appeals his conviction for possession of burglary tools, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-5 (1963). Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Alternatively, Defendant seeks reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct.
{2} We agree that the evidence of intent to commit burglary, an essential element of the crime of possession of burglary tools, was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. Because we reverse on this ground, we do not consider Defendant's remaining claim of error.
{3} Albuquerque Police Department Officer Russell Jones observed a black Ford Bronco (Bronco) towing a brown 2013 Audi SUV (Audi). Noting that the Bronco had no license plates, Officer Jones stopped the two vehicles. The Bronco, towing the Audi, pulled over to the center turning lane. Because there were two vehicles, Officer Jones called for backup.
{4} When Officer Earl Nagy arrived, the two officers approached the Audi, one on each side. Officer Jones opened the driver's side door and asked Defendant to step outside. Defendant stepped out of the vehicle and ran from the officers. Officer Nagy chased and apprehended Defendant.
{5} While Officer Nagy apprehended Defendant, Officer Jones approached the driver of the Bronco. Officer Jones noticed the Bronco had a key broken in the ignition, which the officer testified might indicate the vehicle was stolen. The Bronco, however, had not been reported stolen. Neither the driver nor the passenger in the Bronco was charged with a crime.
{6} A third officer, Officer Cornel Heitzman, arrived and searched Defendant. In Defendant's pocket, Officer Heitzman found, among other things, two hypodermic needles and a keychain with five car keys for different makes and models of cars. Two of the officers testified that the car keys were filed down to make what are known as "jiggle" or "bump" keys. These were described by the officers as a universal key. Officer Jones testified that the only use for "jiggle" keys is to break into and/or steal motor vehicles. Officer Heitzman testified that "jiggle" keys are used to start vehicles and that their purpose is to increase success in taking a vehicle without the owner's permission.
{7} After being searched, Defendant told Officer Jones the Audi had been rented by a friend, its battery died, and the friend asked Defendant to help him jump start the car. Officer Jones asked Defendant for the friend's name. Defendant did not know his name. Officer Jones asked Defendant if the Audi was stolen. Defendant said, if the vehicle had been stolen, the GPS would have found it by now. At trial, no evidence was presented that the Audi was stolen.
{8} The Audi was a push-start vehicle that required a key fob near the ignition to start the car. Neither a key fob nor rental papers were located by the police. The door handles, locks, ignition, and windows of the Audi were not damaged. Officer Jones testified that "jiggle" keys may not be successful in entering a push-start car like the Audi. He also explained that stolen vehicles are not always damaged when stolen.
{9} Defendant was charged with four crimes: receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4(A) (2009) ; possession of burglary tools, contrary to Section 30-16-5 ; possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.1(A) (2001, amended 2019) ; and resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1(D) (1981). A jury trial was held, and at the conclusion of the State's evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the charges of receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle and possession of burglary tools, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict of either charge. The district court granted the motion in part, dismissing the charge of receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle and allowing the possession of burglary tools charge to go to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the possession of burglary tools charge, as well as on the two misdemeanor charges.
{10} Defendant appeals his conviction of possession of burglary tools.1
{11} "The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v. Ford , 2019-NMCA-073, ¶ 7, 453 P.3d 471 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict." State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. The relevant question is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Holt , 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{12} Despite our deferential approach, it is our responsibility to ensure that the jury's decisions are supported by evidence and by reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Slade , 2014-NMCA-088, ¶ 14, 331 P.3d 930. "A reasonable inference is a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning which is a rational and logical deduction from facts admitted or established by the evidence." Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{13} Consistent with Section 30-16-5 and UJI 14-1633 NMRA, the jury was instructed that in order to convict Defendant of possession of burglary tools, it had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the following elements of the crime:
The jury was also instructed, in relevant part, that "burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, ... or other structure, movable or immovable, with intent to commit any felony or theft therein." NMSA 1978, § 30-16-4 (1963). "Jury instructions become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured." State v. Smith , 1986-NMCA-089, ¶ 7, 104 N.M. 729, 726 P.2d 883.
{14} Defendant concedes that the State introduced sufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, all but the third element of the jury instructions. Therefore, we focus solely on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that "[D]efendant intended that the ‘jiggle’ and/or ‘bump’ keys be used for the purpose of committing a burglary."
{15} As Defendant's challenge is limited to the third element of the jury instructions, we assume without deciding that the State's evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that "jiggle" or "bump" keys are designed for the commission of burglary and have no legitimate purpose. Defendant argues that the jury may not infer his intent to commit burglary solely from this evidence; he contends that there must be direct or circumstantial evidence from which the jury can draw a reasonable inference that Defendant actually intended to use the keys to commit a burglary.
{16} The State argues that Officer Jones's testimony that there was "no other purpose for Defendant to possess the ‘jiggle’ or ‘bump’ keys than to obtain unauthorized entry to a motor vehicle" was sufficient to establish the third element of the jury instructions: intent to commit a burglary. Alternatively, the State contends the circumstances at the time of Defendant's arrest were sufficient to allow the jury to infer that "[D]efendant intended the ‘jiggle’ and/or ‘bump’ keys be used for the purpose of committing a burglary."
{17} We first address whether, pursuant to Section 30-16-5, a jury is permitted to infer a defendant's intent to use a tool to commit a burglary solely from evidence that a defendant is carrying a burglary tool that has no legitimate purpose. We then address the State's alternative argument that the circumstances at the time of Defendant's arrest were sufficient to allow the jury to infer Defendant's intent to use the "jiggle" or "bump" keys to commit a burglary. We conclude that a jury may not rely solely on evidence that a defendant is carrying a tool designed for burglary that has no legitimate purpose to prove the element of intent to commit a burglary. Because the evidence of the circumstances at the time of Defendant's arrest was also insufficient to establish this intent, we reverse Defendant's conviction.
{18} Whether proof of possession of a tool designed exclusively for use as a burglary tool is alone sufficient to satisfy the statutory element of intent to use that tool in the commission of a burglary is a question of first impression. Although this Court has addressed the elements of our possession of burglary tools statute, this Court's previous decisions concerning the element of intent have...
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...insufficient to support the specific intent requirement contemplated by the burglary statute); State v. Montoya , 2020-NMCA-006, ¶ 29, 482 P.3d 1285 (No. A-1-CA-37676, Dec. 10, 2020) (holding that the defendant's possession of a tool designed for the purpose of burglary was insufficient to ......
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