State v. Moore, 2007 Ohio 3600 (Ohio App. 7/16/2007)
| Decision Date | 16 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-06-96.,No. 1-06-89.,1-06-89.,1-06-96. |
| Citation | 2007 Ohio 3600 |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy J. Moore, Defendant-Appellant. State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy J. Moore, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Brandie L. Hawkins, Attorney at Law, Reg. #0078485, 124 South Metcalf Street, Lima, Ohio 45801, for Appellant.
Jana E. Emerick, Asst. Prosecuting Attorney, Reg. #0059550, 204 North Main Street, Suite 302, Lima, Ohio 45801, for Appellee.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Timothy J. Moore appeals the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} In February 2006, Moore lived in a house in Allen County, Ohio with his wife, the victim in this case. The victim's two young daughters also lived in the house. Moore and the victim had marital difficulties, and the victim shared a bedroom with her 12-year-old daughter. Apparently, the victim planned to leave Moore when her daughters finished the school year.
{¶3} On the evening of February 27, 2006, the victim and her daughters visited David and Janice Pohlman on the Pohlman's farm, where the victim boarded horses. The victim exercised her horses for several hours, and she and her daughters left the farm and arrived home between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. Within an hour, the victim's daughters laid down in their respective bedrooms.
{¶4} Thereafter, Moore and the victim engaged in an argument that escalated into a physical altercation. During the fight, the victim was stabbed in her heart with a knife with an eight-inch blade. When the victim's 12-year-old daughter heard the victim scream, she left her bedroom and found the victim lying on the living room floor covered in blood. Moore called 911. According to Moore, the victim attacked him with the knife, he defended himself, he struggled with the victim, and the victim accidentally fell on the knife.
{¶5} Marion Township Police Chief Doug Vermillion and four paramedics arrived at the house minutes after Moore called 911. Moore met everyone outside in front of the garage. The paramedics entered the house to tend to the victim, and Chief Vermillion spoke with Moore in the driveway and garage area. Two additional officers arrived later, and one of the officers arrested Moore. Unfortunately, the victim died at the scene.
{¶6} On March 16, 2006, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Moore for one count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), a first-degree felony. Moore pled not guilty to the charge.
{¶7} Prior to trial, Moore moved to suppress the statements he made to Chief Vermillion in the driveway and open-garage area. Moore argued Chief Vermillion did not administer Miranda warnings to him and, thus, Chief Vermillion obtained the statements in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied Moore's request.
{¶8} The matter proceeded to a four-day jury trial. On September 22, 2006, the jury found Moore guilty of murder, and the trial court accepted the jury's verdict. In accordance with R.C. 2929.02(B), the trial court sentenced Moore to a mandatory term of 15 years to life in prison. Moore subsequently moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied his request.
{¶9} Moore now appeals to this court and sets forth ten assignments of error for our review. For purposes of clarity, we combine Moore's fourth and tenth assignments of error. We also consider Moore's ninth assignment of error out of the order that he presented it to us in his brief.
The trial court committed an error of law when it overrulled [sic] appellant's motion to suppress.
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Moore claims the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the statements he made to Chief Vermillion in the driveway and open-garage area. To support his claim, Moore argues Chief Vermillion did not administer Miranda warnings to him and, thus, Chief Vermillion obtained the statements in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶11} Our review of the trial court's decision to deny Moore's motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact. See State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶8. We must give deference to the trial court's factual findings so long as competent, credible evidence exists to support the findings. Id. With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710, 707 N.E.2d 539.
{¶12} At issue is whether the circumstances required Chief Vermillion to administer Miranda warnings to Moore. Only "custodial interrogation" triggers that requirement. State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 153, 694 N.E.2d 932. "Custodial interrogation" means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
{¶13} During the suppression hearing, Chief Vermillion testified that he responded to the house at approximately 10:30 p.m., that the 911 dispatcher described the incident as an unknown "accident," and that he encountered Moore outside in front of the garage. Moore was shirtless, shoeless, and covered in blood. Chief Vermillion asked Moore what happened, and Moore replied that the victim had been stabbed. To make sure that an assailant did not remain in the house, Chief Vermillion asked Moore who stabbed the victim, and Moore said that he did.
{¶14} The transcript of the suppression hearing reflects: no one other than Chief Vermillion spoke to Moore during the relevant time period; the conversation took place in the driveway and open-garage area; and Chief Vermillion asked Moore six to eight questions. For example, Chief Vermillion asked Moore whether the victim had any medical allergies, whether anyone else resided in the house, and whether any other victims existed. In addition, the transcript reflects: Moore did not attempt to leave; Chief Vermillion did not tell Moore he could not leave; Chief Vermillion kept Moore out of the house and away from the paramedics tending to the victim; Chief Vermillion did not keep Moore in the garage; and Chief Vermillion did not place Moore under formal arrest and/or handcuff him. Chief Vermillion acknowledged on cross-examination, however, that he would have required Moore to stay if Moore expressed a desire to leave.
{¶15} Simply put, nothing in the record establishes that Chief Vermillion actually "interrogated" Moore under the particular and unusual facts of this case. "The concept of `interrogation' reflects some measure of compulsion in questioning or in actions." Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 300-302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297. Here, however, Chief Vermillion's testimony at the suppression hearing reveals that he sought to elicit basic facts relative to the investigation of an unknown "accident." The few questions that Chief Vermillion did ask were necessary preliminary investigative inquiries to assess the situation and to tend to the victim, nothing more. Accordingly, we cannot say that Chief Vermillion engaged Moore in "custodial interrogation."
{¶16} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the circumstances did not require Chief Vermillion to administer Miranda warnings to Moore, and the trial court did not err when it denied Moore's motion to suppress. Therefore, we overrule Moore's first assignment of error.
The trial court committed an error of law by denying appellant due process of law when he was obstructed from viewing certain witnesses' testimony by the prosecutor's physical barricade.
{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Moore argues the prosecutor positioned himself in the courtroom as a "physical barricade" when the victim's 12-year-old daughter testified at trial. Moore argues the prosecutor thereby prevented him, as well as defense counsel, from seeing and hearing the witness. Moore thus concludes the prosecutor and/or trial court violated the literal meaning of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
{¶18} The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him." It applies to state prosecutions by way of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d. 923. As such, in this case, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed Moore the right to confront the victim's 12-year-old daughter when she testified at trial. See State v. Self (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 76, 564 N.E.2d 446. Article I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution did so as well. Id.
{¶19} For support, Moore cites the United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Coy v. Iowa (1988), 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857. It held that placing a large screen between a defendant and two 13-year-old sexual assault victims while the victims testified at trial violated the "irreducible literal meaning" of the Confrontation Clause and, thus, the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
{¶20} At trial, the victim's daughter testified against Moore about events related to the fatal altercation. When the prosecutor questioned the...
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