State v. Morris
| Decision Date | 18 June 1975 |
| Citation | 340 A.2d 846 |
| Parties | STATE of Delaware v. Floyd B. MORRIS. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Opinion on motion of defendant to withdraw plea of guilty.
George H. Seitz, III, State Prosecutor, Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for the State of Delaware.
Stephen E. Herrmann, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for defendant.
On December 5, 1974, defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of kidnapping. Five days later, defendant requested his attorney to take action to withdraw the plea of guilty. Inasmuch as this request created a conflict of position between defendant and his then-attorney, the attorney was permitted to withdraw as his attorney and the Court appointed defendant's present attorney to represent him. Promptly thereafter, the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty was filed. Inasmuch as it appeared that the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty did not involve the manner in which the plea was entered or in any way challenge the actions of the Court in connection with the plea, it was agreed among counsel that the proceedings relating to the motion would be heard by the same Judge before whom the plea was entered. Hearings were held to establish facts relating to defendant's motion, and briefs have been submitted on the motion.
Defendant's position is (a) that the indictment should be dismissed because of the failure to provide defendant with a speedy trial, (b) that the indictment should be dismissed because of unnecessary delay in bringing defendant to trial, and (c) that because of the delays between arrest and guilty plea during which defendant was incarcerated and the pressure of the imminence of trial after lengthy incarceration, he should be permitted to withdraw the guilty plea.
The chronology is as follows:
Defendant was arrested on March 17, 1974 and charged with nine criminal counts. He was incarcerated on that date and has remained incarcerated to the present. On April 11, 1974 he was indicted by the Grand Jury on six counts: kidnapping, rape, robbery in the first degree, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, conspiracy in the first degree, and conspiracy in the second degree. Each of these charges grew out of the same occurrence. Each count charged bith this defendant and John E. Barlow with committing the alleged crimes. The count charging rape charged this defendant, John E. Barlow and Harry C. Morris with having committed that crime.
The defendants were initially scheduled for arraignment on April 26, 1974, but arraignment was postponed at the request of the defendants. The case was originally scheduled for trial on June 19, 1974. The trial date was continued to July 24, 1974 at the request of the Attorney General. The Prothonotary's worksheet indicates that at a conference of the attorneys for the three defendants and the prosecutor on July 1, 1974, the Court rescheduled trial for September 16, 1974. On August 28, 1974, the then-attorney for this defendant filed a motion to suppress charging an illegal search and seizure, a motion to suppress charging an illegal photograph line-up and identification, and a motion for discovery. The first two mentioned motions were not noticed for a specific time, but the last mentioned motion was noticed to be presented September 6, 1974. A motion of the attorney for defendant Barlow to postpone the trial on the ground that defendant Barlow was not competent to stand trial was heard and granted on September 10, 1974 on prior notice to all attorneys. The Court's Order postponed trial to the November calendar in order to determine the mental competency of defendant Barlow. At the same time, this defendant's motion for discovery was granted. Apparently, the case appeared on the trial calendar on October 29, 1974 and was postponed because the report of the mental examination of defendant Barlow had not been received. No objection was made on behalf of the other two defendants to the continuance on this ground and no request was made for separate trial. The report on defendant Barlow was received November 20, 1974. The trial date was rescheduled to December 2, 1974. A competency hearing with respect to defendant Barlow was held on November 27, 1974 and the Court determined that defendant Barlow was competent to stand trial, to be held December 2, 1974. On December 2, 1974, the scheduled trial date, the attorneys for defendant Barlow reported to the Court that he had swallowed razor blades and took the position that he was unable to proceed to trial. In view of this emergency, the Court continued the trial to December 5, 1974 in order to permit a further psychiatric evaluation of defendant Barlow and to determine his physical condition. On December 5, 1974, a further competency hearing was held with respect to defendant Barlow and the Court determined that defendant Barlow was competent and physically able to stand trial at that time. A suppression hearing was scheduled for that time with respect to this defendant. This was to be followed by trial. Instead of proceeding with the suppression hearing and trial, this defendant and defendant Barlow entered a plea of guilty to the count of the indictment which charged kidnapping. The Deputy Attorney General thereupon entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge against defendant Harry Morris, and stated on the record that at the time of sentencing of this defendant all other charges against this defendant in the indictment would be nolle prossed by the Attorney General. After interrogation of this defendant by the Court, the Court found the plea of guilty to the kidnapping count to be freely, voluntarily and intelligently given by defendant and permitted the plea to be entered.
The first issue is whether the chronology recited above represents a failure to provide this defendant with a speedy trial. Initially, the Court will consider this contention on its merits without regard to the existence of the guilty plea. The determination of whether the guarantee of the right to a speedy trial has been violated involves consideration of the factors of the circumstances of the particular case. United States v. Barber, D.Del., 296 F.Supp. 795 (1969), aff'd, 3 Cir., 442 F.2d 517 (1971); Garner v. State, Del.Supr., 1 Storey 301, 145 A.2d 68 (1958). This involves 'a difficult and sensitive balancing process' giving consideration to length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant and such other circumstances as may be relevant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) and Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970).
The chronological review of this case, recited above, indicates that this defendant could not have been ready for trial until after September 10, 1974, since only then did he obtain discovery needed to be ready for trial. The several delays in trial thereafter involved matters beyond the control of the prosecution, centering around the mental state of defendant Barlow. This defendant and defendant Barlow were indicted together, and the case proceeded on the basis of a single trial of the defendants. This defendant at no time sought to relieve himself of the problems of delay centering around defendant Barlow, nor did he press for separate or early trial. Cf. Kominski v. State, Del.Supr., 1 Storey 163, 141 A.2d 138 (1958); Garner v. State, supra; In Re Norman's Petition, Del.Supr., 184 A.2d 601 (1962); Cunningham v. State, Del.Supr., 188 A.2d 359 (1962). Not until after entry of the guilty plea did he raise this issue. This defendant has not pointed to demonstrable prejudice resulting to him from this delay. Under the facts persented here, I conclude that this defendant is not entitled to have the indictment dismissed with prejudice for lack of speedy trial.
The next issue raised by this defendant is that the indictment should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 48 of the Criminal RULES OF THIS COURT, DEL.C.ANN., BECAUSE OF 'unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant to trial'.
Rule 48 of the Criminal Rules of this Court requires a case to be dismissed if there is unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant to trial. The application of this provision lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Fischer, Del.Supr., 285 A.2d 417 (1971). While the provision is an implementation of the right of an accused to a speedy trial, the provision serves a broader purpose and is not co-extensive with constitutional limitations under the Sixth Amendment. Ibid.
Under the quoted rule provision, a defendant is protected against ...
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...showing of prejudice is consistent with the "broader purpose" which this Court has consistently stated Rule 48 serves. State v. Morris, Del.Super., 340 A.2d 846, 850, aff'd, Del.Supr., 349 A.2d 748 (1975); Hughey v. State, Del.Supr., 522 A.2d 335, 340 The State responds that whatever "broad......
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