State v. Morris

• Decision Date: 14 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 121,733,121,733
• Citation: 469 P.3d 103 (Table)
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Doug MORRIS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

469 P.3d 103 (Table)

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Doug MORRIS, Appellant.

No. 121,733

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed August 14, 2020.

Jonathan Laurans, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.

Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Arnold-Burger, C.J., Bruns and Schroeder, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam:

Doug Morris appeals the district court's summary denial of his untimely and successive motion for habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507. Morris argues he was entitled to a hearing on his claims because the change in the law announced by our Supreme Court in State v. Dunn , 304 Kan. 773, 375 P.3d 332 (2016), should be applied retroactively and creates the exceptions to allow his untimely and successive motion to be set for hearing. We disagree and affirm the district court.

FACTS

Morris was originally charged with attempted first-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Through plea negotiations, he agreed to enter an Alford plea of guilty to the attempted first-degree murder charge in exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining two charges and recommendation of a 15 years to life sentence. See North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) (guilty plea entered while defendant maintains innocence). At the plea hearing, the State presented a four-page statement of facts thoroughly detailing what the State would prove if the case went to trial. The statement was signed at the plea hearing by Morris, his attorney, and the prosecuting attorney. After the hearing, it was then filed with the clerk of the district court for inclusion in the court file. The district court also discussed the four-page statement in detail with Morris on the record, as well as the process of waiving his right to a jury trial and the effect of his Alford plea. Morris is still serving his sentence of 15 years to life.

Morris never filed a direct appeal, but, over the years, he has filed many postconviction motions, including a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in 1989, which raised the same issues now before us. His 1989 motion was summarily denied by the district court, and its decision was affirmed by a panel of this court. Morris v. State , No. 64,659, 1990 WL 155418, at *1 (Kan. App. 1990) (unpublished opinion). The Kansas Supreme Court denied Morris' petition for review. 248 Kan. 996 (1991). Morris also filed a federal action for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966), without success. Morris v. McKune , 1 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion).

In 2017, Morris filed his second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion—the subject of this appeal—through counsel. Raising the same argument he raised in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Morris claimed his conviction was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the State's complaint failed to allege all the essential elements of attempted first-degree murder. For the first time, however, he argued our Supreme Court's decision in Dunn supported his argument and should be applied retroactively to his case. Morris filed a legal memorandum along with his motion in which he also challenged the facts alleged in the complaint and issues of federal due process and notice under the United States Constitution. He later filed a supplemental memorandum in which he claimed Dunn established the manifest injustice and exceptional circumstances necessary for the district court to consider the merits of his arguments.

The district court summarily denied Morris' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in 2019. It found the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Dunn was an intervening change in the law, but it could not be applied retroactively to Morris' case. The district court noted even if Dunn could be retroactively applied, the decision could not give Morris relief because it limited issues of subject matter jurisdiction arising from a defective complaint rather than expanding them. The district court held Morris' motion did not warrant a hearing on the merits because his claims were untimely, successive, and failed to establish manifest injustice or exceptional circumstances. It also found Morris had argued in previous postconviction motions the allegedly defective complaint divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

Our analysis upon the summary denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion depends on the means the district court used to resolve it. Beauclair v. State , 308 Kan. 284, 293, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018). Here, the district court summarily denied Morris' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing, making our review unlimited. Like the district court, we must determine whether the motion, court files, and records of the case conclusively show Morris has no right to relief. See Sherwood v. State , 310 Kan. 93, 99, 444 P.3d 966 (2019).

In his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, supporting legal memoranda, and his brief on appeal, Morris has consistently maintained Dunn supports his claim that his conviction is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the State's complaint failed to allege all essential elements of attempted first-degree murder. Our independent review of the record reveals the district court was right, and several procedural hurdles prevent the consideration of Morris' underlying claims.

The district court properly denied Morris' motion as untimely.

First, Morris' latest K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is untimely. A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must be filed within one year from the date the movant's conviction becomes final. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1)(A). This one-year time limit was added to the statute and became effective on July 1, 2003. L. 2003, ch. 65, § 1. For movants, like Morris, who had a preexisting case before the amendment became effective, "the deadline for filing a 60-1507 motion was June 30, 2004." See Noyce v. State , 310 Kan. 394, 399, 447 P.3d 355 (2019). Morris entered his Alford plea in 1987 and did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Morris filed his current motion on May 8, 2017, nearly 13 years after the statutory deadline and more than 29 years after he entered his Alford plea, was found guilty, and sentenced. The deadline for filing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion can be extended only to prevent manifest injustice. In considering whether manifest injustice compels the court to consider his untimely motion, we only consider the movant's reasons for failing to timely file or the movant's claims of actual innocence. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) ; see White v. State , 308 Kan. 491, 503, 421 P.3d 718 (2018) (statutory amendment applies to any motions filed after its effective date—July 1, 2016).

Here, Morris does not claim actual innocence, nor does he present a valid claim based upon the reasons for an untimely filing. Instead, he claims he could not file this motion earlier because he is now basing his claim on Dunn —a case that was not decided until July 16, 2016. The existence of an intervening case may be a basis to find exceptional circumstances to overcome a dismissal for successiveness, but the reasons for failing to timely file is a different analysis. In this case, it has been 13 years since his deadline for filing a K.S.A. 60-1507 action. Morris seems to suggest we should consider his untimely claim because this court, the Kansas Supreme Court, and the federal courts have denied his claim in the past and now he has a better argument. We do not find this reasoning persuasive.

The merits of the movant's case cannot serve as the sole basis for extending the time to file. Even before the Legislature limited the manifest injustice inquiry to the factors under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A), our Supreme Court rejected the argument that "manifest injustice necessarily occurs when the merits of a movant's timebarred claim will never be considered by a court." Vontress v. State , 299 Kan. 607, 618, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014). The court reasoned that such a rule would make the one-year time limit meaningless. 299 Kan. at 618. Rather, the movant must explain why the claim could not have been filed within the one-year time limit. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-15071(f)(2)(A). For example, in White , the defendant alleged he was not informed of the end of his direct appeal, the event which would have started the one-year deadline to run. Our Supreme Court found the movant's allegation, if true, was an acceptable explanation. 308 Kan. at 508. But Morris does not make such an allegation here. Morris provides no real explanation other than Dunn applies to establish manifest injustice. We disagree.

The district court properly denied Morris' motion as successive.

Second, his motion is successive, meaning Morris has already filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion seeking similar relief. "The rationale for the limitations on the availability of postconviction relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 is the necessity for some degree of finality in the criminal appeal process in order to prevent endless piecemeal litigation in the state and federal courts." Toney v. State , 39 Kan. App. 2d 944, 948, 187 P.3d 122, rev. denied November 4, 2008. Accordingly, a K.S.A. 60-1507 movant " ‘is presumed to have listed all grounds for relief and a subsequent motion need not be considered in the absence of [a showing of] circumstances justifying the original failure to list a ground.’ " State v. Trotter , 296 Kan. 898, 904, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013) (quoting Walker v. State , 216 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 2, 530 P.2d 1235 [1975] ); see K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(c) ; Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183(d) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 223). To avoid dismissal of his current motion as an abuse of remedy, Morris had the burden to show exceptional circumstances—" ‘unusual events or intervening changes in the law’ "—prevented him from raising the issue in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. See Beauclair , 308 Kan. at 304 (quoting State v. Mitchell , 284 Kan. 374, Syl. ¶ 5, ...