State v. Morris

• Decision Date: 05 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–1842.,2010–1842.
• Citation: 972 N.E.2d 528,132 Ohio St.3d 337,2012 -Ohio- 2407
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. MORRIS, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

132 Ohio St.3d 337

972 N.E.2d 528

2012 -Ohio- 2407

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,

v.MORRIS, Appellee.

No. 2010–1842.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 1, 2011.

Decided June 5, 2012.

[Ohio St.3d 338]Syllabus of the Court

Trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) are evidentiary determinations that rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Appeals of such decisions are considered by an appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew Kern, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

David C. Sheldon, Ashtabula, for appellee.

William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew E. Meyer and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office.

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David E. Romaker Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

CUPP, J.

{¶ 1} We are asked to determine the proper standard of review that an appellate court is to apply when reviewing an assignment of error claiming that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, in violation of Evid.R. 404(B). We conclude that appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Evid.R. 404(B) is conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court for further proceedings.

I. Background

{¶ 2} Defendant, Carl Morris, was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape involving a minor. Defendant appealed, and one of his assigned errors asserted that the trial court had improperly allowed the state to introduce evidence of his “other * * * acts to show proof of [his] character in violation of Rules of Evidence 404(B) and 403.” Defendant pointed to several instances of other-acts testimony that the trial court admitted over defendant's objection.

{¶ 3} The first portion of challenged testimony was the state's general questioning of the victim's mother about her sexual relationship with defendant. Over a continuing objection to the line of inquiry, the trial court allowed the testimony because “it could be relevant.”

{¶ 4} The second portion of challenged testimony involved more specific statements sought by the state from the victim's mother about her relationship with defendant. In these statements, the victim's mother described defendant's reaction when she declined his daily sexual advances: he was verbally and mentally abusive, and he even kicked the dog. The state argued that these [Ohio St.3d 339]statements showed defendant's modus operandi, knowledge, and a plan for subsequent sexual gratification within the meaning of Evid.R. 404(B). When the mother further testified that defendant would ejaculate into towels, the state argued that this statement was consistent with the victim's testimony about how the abuse occurred and showed defendant's “modus operandi, knowledge and other acts of evidence” as permitted by Evid.R. 404(B). The court overruled defendant's objections to these statements.

{¶ 5} In the final portion of challenged testimony, the state presented testimony from the adult sister of the victim. The sister testified about an incident in which defendant had grabbed her and made what she interpreted as a sexual proposition. She also stated that when her mother learned of defendant's conduct, her mother kicked him out of the house for the night. Defendant's counsel objected to this testimony on the basis that it was prejudicial under Evid.R. 403, and a sidebar was held. The court concluded that the conduct could be interpreted by the jury as a sexual advance and that the described action was similar enough to rape of a minor that it was admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence.” In response to the concern expressed by defendant's counsel, the court acknowledged a continuing objection several times during the trial, and the court ensured that defendant's counsel was satisfied with the court's acknowledgment of that continuing objection.

{¶ 6} At the end of the trial, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury. The judge cautioned that evidence of other acts was received for the limited purpose of deciding whether that evidence proved the absence of mistake or accident, or the defendant's motive, opportunity, intent or purpose, preparation, or plan to commit the offense charged, or knowledge of circumstances surrounding the offense charged.

{¶ 7} In his merit brief to the appellate court, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion and acted unreasonably when it admitted the state's other-acts testimony because none of the incidents described in that testimony had the tendency to prove any of the “enumerated exceptions” admissible for other purposes under Evid.R. 404(B), involved any element of proof required for the commission of the indicted crimes, or had any relevance to the charges on which he was eventually convicted. Defendant further argued that the evidence of his guilt was not overwhelming and that admission of the other-acts testimony was not harmless.

{¶ 8} In its merit brief to the appellate court, the state asserted that the testimony was properly admitted because the challenged testimony did not show defendant's character “in order to show action in conformity therewith,” Evid.R. 404(B), but instead showed defendant's common scheme, motive, and plan, and [Ohio St.3d 340]“idiosyncratic behavior that shows a common plan and modus operandi ” with respect to his commission of the charged crimes.

{¶ 9} A divided appellate court concluded that the trial court improperly admitted other-acts testimony, that the trial court's error was not harmless, and that the error materially prejudiced defendant. The court sustained in part defendant's assigned error pertaining to the state-proffered other-acts testimony. Finding that its resolution of the foregoing was dispositive of the appeal, the court declared the remaining assignments of error moot, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. 2010-Ohio-4282, 2010 WL 3528992.

{¶ 10} Thereafter, the state sought certification of an interdistrict conflict from the appellate court, which the court denied. 2010-Ohio-5682, 2010 WL 4792415. The state further requested en banc reconsideration of the matter, but the appellate court also denied that request in a divided en banc decision. 2010-Ohio-5973, 2010 WL 4968633. We initially declined the state's discretionary appeal but accepted it on reconsideration. 127 Ohio St.3d 1533, 2011-Ohio-376, 940 N.E.2d 986; 128 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2011-Ohio-1618, 944 N.E.2d 697.

II. Analysis: Standard of review for appeals in which a trial court's decision to admit other-acts evidence is challenged

{¶ 11} The general principle that guides admission of evidence is that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible * * *.” Evid.R. 402. Evid.R. 403 provides exceptions to this general principle and provides circumstances for the exclusion of relevant evidence.

{¶ 12} Another exception to the principle that all relevant evidence is admissible is Evid.R. 404(B), which provides: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

{¶ 13} Evid.R. 404 codifies the common law with respect to evidence of other acts of wrongdoing. State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994). The rule contemplates acts that may or may not be similar to the crime at issue. State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 282, 533 N.E.2d 682 (1988). If the other act is offered for some relevant purpose other than to show character and propensity to commit crime, such as one of the purposes in the listing, the other act may be admissible. Id. Another consideration permitting the admission of certain other-acts evidence is whether the other acts “form part of the immediate background of the alleged act which forms the foundation of the crime charged in the indictment” and are “inextricably related” to the crime. State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). See also Broom at 282, 533 N.E.2d 682.

[Ohio St.3d 341]{¶ 14} “The admission of such [other-acts] evidence lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse of discretion that created material prejudice.” State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 66.See also State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus (“The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court”). “Abuse of discretion” has been described as including a ruling that lacks a “sound reasoning process.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). A review under the abuse-of-discretion standard is a deferential review. It is not sufficient for an appellate court to determine that a trial court abused its discretion simply because the appellate court might not have reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less persuaded by the trial court's reasoning process than by the countervailing arguments. Id.

{¶ 15} In its review of this matter, the appellate court concluded that two portions of the state's other-acts testimony did not meet the substantive, legal...