State v. Morris
| Decision Date | 21 September 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 29941-1-II, No. 30000-1-II, No. 30003-6-II., No. 30001-0-II |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jerry Lee MORRIS, Appellant. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Vincent Edward Johnson, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Chad William Blaylock, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
J. Tobin Krauel, Heiko Philipp Coppola, Cowlitz Co. Prosecutors Office, Kelso, WA, Therese M. Murphy, Kittitas Co. Prosecutor's Office, Ellensburg, WA, for Respondent.
John A. Hays, Attorney at Law, Longview, WA, Manek R. Mistry, Backlund & Mistry, Olympia, WA, for Appellants.
In this consolidated appeal from two counties, the State (Cowlitz County) appeals the trial court's sentencing of Chad William Blaylock and Vincent Edward Johnson under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) (2002) instead of former RCW 69.50-.401(a)(1)(ii). In an appeal from Lewis County, Jerry Lee Morris appeals his sentence for his conviction of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii).1 Morris also appeals the trial court's determination that both his 1995 and his current convictions were the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes. We affirm Blaylock's and Johnson's sentences, and we vacate Morris's sentence under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) and remand for his resentencing.
Chad William Blaylock pleaded guilty to one count of delivering methamphetamine in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA) and one count of VUCSA — possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver while armed. Vincent Edward Johnson pleaded guilty to one VUCSA count — delivery of methamphetamine.
At sentencing, the parties presented experts who testified that, although methamphetamine hydrochloride and methamphetamine base share the same chemical backbone, the two form distinct substances, with distinct chemical structures, compositions, and characteristics. One of the State's experts testified that, although methamphetamine hydrochloride has more versatile uses, it is possible to ingest both the base and salt forms of methamphetamine.
The trial court then found a distinction between methamphetamine base and methamphetamine hydrochloride. And it determined that our decision in State v. Halsten, 108 Wash.App. 759, 33 P.3d 751 (2001),2 compelled its finding that methamphetamine hydrochloride is not methamphetamine for purposes of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1). Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Blaylock and Johnson under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii), resulting in an offender score of 4 for each offense, instead of 8 as the State advocated. The State appeals Blaylock's and Johnson's sentences.
Jerry Lee Morris pleaded guilty to one count of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At a sentencing hearing to determine the identity of the controlled substance for Morris's current offense, the State's expert explained the differences between methamphetamine base and methamphetamine hydrochloride, noting that methamphetamine base is a precursor. The expert also testified that tests conducted on the substances found in Morris's possession indicated that, to the extent the samples contained a methamphetamine compound, it was likely a salt of methamphetamine such as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The trial court then found beyond a reasonable doubt that the controlled substance Morris pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to deliver was methamphetamine hydrochloride. And, based on Halsten, the court initially determined that methamphetamine hydrochloride fell under former 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii). Halsten, 108 Wash.App. 759, 33 P.3d 751. It later changed its ruling and noted that it believed that the legislature intended the word "methamphetamine" to include methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers for purposes of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii).
In sentencing Morris, the trial court also determined that in 1995, a jury convicted Morris of possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a firearm. During sentencing for Morris's current offenses, the court ruled that the 1995 offenses were not the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes. In light of this ruling, Morris waived his argument that his current convictions were the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes, and the court found them not to be the same criminal conduct.
Morris appeals the sentencing court's rulings that (1) neither his current offenses nor his 1995 offenses were the same criminal conduct; and (2) methamphetamine, for purposes of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), means both methamphetamine base and methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)
In its appeal, the State contends that in ruling that Blaylock and Johnson did not possess methamphetamine for purposes of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), the trial court circumvented legislative intent, resulting in an absurd interpretation and application of the statute. The State argues that former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) is ambiguous and that the legislature could not have meant that trafficking in pure methamphetamine was a more serious offense than trafficking in methamphetamine hydrochloride. The State further argues that to correctly apply the statute, the court must refer to the schedule under which the controlled substance is categorized.
In his appeal, Morris contends that because former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) specifically names only methamphetamine, possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine hydrochloride, a salt of methamphetamine, is not included within that statutory prohibition.3 He argues that because he possessed methamphetamine hydrochloride and not methamphetamine base, he should be sentenced under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii).
We review the meaning of a statute de novo. State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130, 122 S.Ct. 1070, 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). Where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, we assume that the legislature means exactly what it says, giving criminal statutes literal and strict interpretation.4 Keller, 143 Wash.2d at 276, 19 P.3d 1030; Halsten, 108 Wash.App. at 762, 33 P.3d 751. And we construe statutes as a whole to give effect to all language and to harmonize all provisions. Halsten, 108 Wash.App. at 763, 33 P.3d 751.
Here, the relevant statutes provided:
In Halsten, 108 Wash.App. at 762,33 P.3d 751, we held that former RCW 69.50.440 (2000) was "plain and clear" when it named pseudoephedrine and not pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Here, the statutory language is similarly plain and clear; the statute names only methamphetamine, not methamphetamine hydrochloride. In certain sections of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW, the legislature specifies that both a drug and its salts are covered.5 Specifically, the legislature recognizes that methamphetamine exists in different forms. See RCW 69.50.206(d)(2) (). Thus, when the legislature intends for a statute to cover a drug and its salts, it is capable of saying so. The language of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) is therefore unambiguous; its prohibition only covers methamphetamine in its pure form, its base.6
Because the legislature did not list methamphetamine's "salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers" in the prohibition under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), Morris must be sentenced under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii). The trial court erred in sentencing Morris under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), and his sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.
As to Blaylock and Johnson, the trial court did not err when it sentenced them under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii).
Morris also contends that his 1995 convictions of possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a firearm were the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes. Morris also makes the same argument with respect to his current offenses.
Under the same criminal conduct test, two or more current offenses are counted as one crime only if they (1) have the same objective criminal intent, (2) are committed at the same time and place, and (3) involve the same victim. State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 123, 985 P.2d 365 (1999); former RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a) (2000). Each element of the test must be satisfied for multiple offenses to encompass the same criminal conduct. State v. Lessley, 118 Wash.2d 773, 778, 827 P.2d 996 (1992). We will not disturb the trial courts determination of whether two crimes involve the same criminal...
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State v. O'NEAL
...(2000); RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Failure to meet any one element precludes a finding of the same criminal conduct. State v. Morris, 123 Wash.App. 467, 475, 98 P.3d 513, 517 (2004). ¶ 105 As noted, Harry did not contest his offender score or standard range below. Generally, a defendant cannot wa......
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...¶ 45 By way of a separate personal restraint petition, Mr. Malone argues that his conviction must be reversed under authority of State v. Morris because delivery of methamphetamine hydrochloride is not listed in former RCW 69.50.401 (1998). State v. Morris, 123 Wash.App. 467, 98 P.3d 513 (2......
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State v. Evans
...more than five years. ¶ 51 We recently addressed interpretation of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) and (iii) in State v. Morris, 123 Wash.App. 467, 472-73, 98 P.3d 513 (2004). There, we held that the language of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) is "unambiguous," such that "its prohibition only......
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State v. Cromwell
...in the statute. The Court of Appeals conceded that its conclusion conflicts with a decision from Division Two, State v. Morris, 123 Wash.App. 467, 98 P.3d 513 (2004), which holds that the word "methamphetamine" as used in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) does not include methamphetamine salts......