State v. Moultrie, 20934
Decision Date | 12 April 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 20934,20934 |
Citation | 273 S.C. 60,254 S.E.2d 294 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Earle MOULTRIE, Johnny Squires and Willie Kinard, of whom Willie Kinard is Appellant. |
James C. Carroll, Jr. and Walter M. Bailey, Jr., Summerville, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes and Staff Atty. Buford S. Mabry, Jr., Columbia, and Sol. Norman E. Fogle and Asst. Sol. Alvin C. Biggs, Orangeburg, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted of armed robbery of a convenience store in Dorchester County. We affirm.
Appellant assigns as error the trial judge's failure to exclude a signed statement which he gave to law enforcement officers one day after his arrest. Uncontradicted testimony indicates appellant was arrested on November 8, 1977, and incarcerated in the Dorchester County Jail. At approximately one o'clock p. m. on November 9, 1977, appellant was taken to the sheriff's office where he was given the Miranda warnings and waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. One and one-half hours later appellant signed a statement admitting his participation in the armed robbery. The basis of appellant's assignment of error is the failure of the law enforcement officers to give him the Miranda warnings immediately prior to signing the statement. Appellant does not contest the original waiver of his Miranda rights, but contends that the lapse of one and one-half hours between the waiver and signing the statement operates as an implied revocation of the waiver.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) states, Inter alia, Id. 384 U.S. at 473, 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. We interpret this as indicating that, once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is effected, the waiver continues in effect until the individual being questioned indicates that he wishes to revoke the waiver and remain silent; or circumstances exist which establish that his will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. (See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). "Whether or not there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel depends upon the particular...
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...or circumstances are such that his will is overborne and his capacity for self-determination is critically impaired. State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 254 S.E.2d 294 (1979). If his will is overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, use of the resulting confession o......
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...critically impaired.'" State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 61-62, 254 S.E.2d 294, 294-95 (1979)). On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed absent an a......
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State v. Crawley, 3475.
...critically impaired.'" State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62, 254 S.E.2d 294, 294-95 (1979)). This Court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of a statement absent an abuse of ......
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