State v. Murrell

• Decision Date: 21 November 1936
• Citation: 98 S.W.2d 105
• Parties: STATE ex rel. McMINN v. MURRELL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

98 S.W.2d 105

STATE ex rel. McMINN v. MURRELL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 21, 1936.

Error to Criminal Court, Hamilton County; Charles W. Lusk, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by the State, on the relation of L. H. McMinn, against E. G. Murrell, superintendent of the county workhouse. From a judgment ordering relator's discharge, the superintendent brings error.

Reversed, and the relator remanded to the custody of the superintendent.

E. A. Bachman, of Chattanooga, for plaintiff in error.

Nat Tipton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

GREEN, Chief Justice.

The relator McMinn was found guilty of assault and battery by the city judge in Chattanooga. On the plea of guilty, after hearing proof, relator was fined $50 and committed to the county workhouse to work out the fine and costs. He filed this petition for habeas corpus against the superintendent of the workhouse to procure his release. The trial judge sustained the petition and ordered relator's discharge. The superintendent of the workhouse has appealed.

The argument made to support the conclusion of the trial judge is that the city judge, endowed by statute with the same jurisdiction as a justice of the peace, was without authority to hear and dispose of a charge of assault and battery because that is an offense which may be punished by a fine exceeding $50 or by imprisonment or by both.

The relator relies on section 6 of article 1 of the Constitution providing that the trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate; section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution providing that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers, etc.; and section 14 of article 1 of the Constitution providing that no person shall be put to answer in a criminal charge but by presentment, indictment or impeachment.

It is conceded that a justice of the peace may entertain jurisdiction of cases in which the defendant is charged with a petty misdemeanor, but it is urged that a misdemeanor, which may be punished by a fine exceeding $50, or by imprisonment, or by both, is not such petty misdemeanor. The contention seems to be that, even upon a plea of guilty, a justice of the peace is not empowered to deal with an offense of the latter class.

To support this proposition, the principal reliance of relator is certain language used by the court in the recent cases of State ex rel. Ward v. Murrell, 169 Tenn. 688, 90 S. W.(2d) 945, and Spurgeon v. Worley, 169 Tenn. 697, 90 S.W.(2d) 948, 950. In the latter case, for instance, it is said: "When statutes prescribe a minimum fine of less than $50 and a maximum fine of more than $50, only a court and jury can assess the punishment." It was also said that jurisdiction of such offenses could not be conferred on a special court functioning without a jury and somewhat similar language of like import appears elsewhere in the opinions in the two cases.

All these expressions referred to litigated cases, not to cases submitted on pleas of guilty. There was no intention on the part of the court to question the established jurisdiction of justices of the peace under the small offense law. That law is contained in section 11494 et seq. of the Code and applies only when a "person brought before a justice of the peace for a misdemeanor, may plead guilty."

Much the same argument made here was made in the early case of McGinnis, v. State, 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 43, 49 Am.Dec. 697, arising under the same law. Among other things, the court said:

"We confess ourselves utterly unable to perceive how either of the sections of the Declaration of Rights referred to, is in the slightest degree infringed by any one of the provisions of the foregoing Act; or that they are in any respect incompatible with each other. How does this Act `put the defendant to answer' without his consent; or how, without his consent, deprive him of a trial by jury, as is the true import of the prohibitions contained in the two sections of the bill of rights in question? When brought before the Justice upon warrant, if of sufficient legal discretion to be amenable to the law for his offence, and left to the exercise of his own volition, why may he not be permitted, in order to escape the...