State v. Myers

• Decision Date: 24 May 2022
• Docket Number: SC 20563
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Kevin MYERS
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

343 Conn. 447

274 A.3d 100

STATE of Connecticut

v.Kevin MYERS

SC 20563

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 16, 2021

Officially released May 24, 2022

Tamar R. Birckhead, Hamden, for the appellant (defendant).

Jonathan M. Sousa, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, Robin D. Krawczyk, senior assistant state's attorney, and Jennifer F. Miller, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C.J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

ROBINSON, C.J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence is a jurisdictionally proper vehicle by which to challenge a parole eligibility date, as calculated by the Board of Pardons and Paroles (board), in light of the sentences, as pronounced by the court. The defendant, Kevin Myers, was convicted in two separate criminal cases for several offenses that he committed in 2007, when he was fifteen years old. He now appeals¹ from the trial court's dismissal in part and denial in part of his two motions to correct an illegal sentence, one filed in each of his two cases. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims in his motions to correct and that (1) he was entitled to resentencing in both cases because the sentencing court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor, in violation of Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), and General Statutes § 54-91g,² (2) the structure of his two sentences deprived him of a meaningful opportunity for parole because it resulted in a later parole eligibility date than he otherwise would have been entitled to under General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1),³ and (3) his parole eligibility date violated his right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant further contends that the trial court improperly denied his claim that his parole eligibility date, as calculated by the board, violated the terms of his plea agreement, in violation of his right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. We affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.⁴

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On April 4, 2007, when he was fifteen years old, the defendant sexually assaulted a woman in her East Hartford apartment. Several months later, on July 8, 2007, the defendant, who was still fifteen years old, returned to the same apartment building, abducted two women, and sexually assaulted one of them. See State v. Myers , 129 Conn. App. 499, 501–503, 21 A.3d 499, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 918, 27 A.3d 370 (2011). On that same night, a police officer arrested the defendant, who matched the description of the suspect, when the officer observed the defendant running across a street in the same neighborhood where the attack had occurred. Id., at 503, 21 A.3d 499.

The state prosecuted the defendant for the April 4 and July 8, 2007 incidents in two separate cases in the judicial district of Hartford, each with its own docket number. The prosecution for the July 8, 2007 incident (July 8 prosecution) proceeded first. In 2009, under docket number CR-07-0211928-T, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-70 (a) (1) and two counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A). Id., at 501, 21 A.3d 499. On April 29, 2009, the court sentenced the defendant, with respect to the July 8 prosecution, to a total effective sentence of eighteen years of imprisonment, followed by twenty-two years of special parole.⁵

The prosecution for the April 4, 2007 incident (April 4 prosecution) went to trial in October, 2011, under docket number CR-07-0212494-T. In the April 4 prosecution, the state charged the defendant with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-70 (a) (1) and burglary in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-102 (a) (2). The jury found the defendant not guilty of burglary in the second degree but was unable to reach a verdict on the sexual assault count, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial as to that count. Subsequently, on December 8, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty in the April 4 prosecution under the Alford⁶ doctrine to one count of sexual assault in the first degree. Pursuant to the court's offer during plea negotiations, the defendant was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment, followed by six years of special parole. The court ordered the sentence in the April 4 prosecution to run concurrently with the eighteen year sentence the defendant already was serving for his conviction from the July 8 prosecution. The court explained to the defendant, however, that, because he already was serving a sentence in connection with the July 8 prosecution, he was not entitled to presentence confinement credit toward his fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution.⁷ As a result of the approximately four year gap between his convictions and sentences in the two separate cases, the defendant's eighteen year sentence in the July 8 prosecution, which commenced in July, 2007, will end in July, 2025, whereas his fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution, which commenced in December, 2011, will end several months later, in November, 2025.⁸

Constitutional and statutory changes to juvenile sentencing laws subsequent to the defendant's sentencing in connection with the April 4 prosecution prompted him to file the motions to correct an illegal sentence that are at issue in this appeal. In order to provide background for the defendant's claims, we summarize the relevant constitutional and statutory changes to juvenile sentencing laws that occurred subsequent to the defendant's convictions.

In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama , supra, 567 U.S. at 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment to the United States constitution bars sentencing offenders who were under eighteen years old when they committed their offenses to a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See id., at 470, 132 S. Ct. 2455. The Supreme Court held that, prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole, a court must "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id., at 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455. Our subsequent decision in State v. Riley , 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016), concluded that the eighth amendment requires a sentencing court to consider the Miller factors before exercising its discretion to impose a sentence on a juvenile offender that is the "functional equivalent" of life without the possibility of parole.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the retroactive effect of Miller in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), in which the court concluded that, although Miller applies retroactively, that "retroactive effect ... does not require [s]tates to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case [in which] a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. A [s]tate may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." Id., at 212, 136 S. Ct. 718.

In 2015, our legislature responded to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller by enacting §§ 1 and 2 of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), which are codified at §§ 54-125a (f) and 54-91g, respectively. Public Act 15-84 exceeds the constitutional floor established by Miller , making changes that affect a broader range of juvenile offenders than just those facing life sentences or the functional equivalent thereof. Section 1 of P.A. 15-84, codified at § 54-125a (f), established new, more favorable parole eligibility rules for juvenile offenders who are "incarcerated on or after October 1, 2015, and who received a definite sentence or total effective sentence of more than ten years for such crime or crimes prior to, on or after October 1, 2015 ...." See footnote 3 of this opinion. Section 2 of P.A. 15-84, codified at § 54-91g, requires a sentencing court, when a child has been convicted following transfer to the regular criminal docket, to consider the Miller factors when sentencing the child for a class A or B felony. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

Relying on these constitutional and statutory changes to juvenile sentencing laws, the defendant claimed in his motions to correct that, in both of his criminal cases, the sentencing court had failed to consider the hallmark features of adolescence as mitigating factors, in violation of Miller and its progeny, and § 54-91g. He sought a resentencing at which the court would consider the Miller factors.

The defendant also claimed that his parole eligibility date in the July 8 prosecution had been altered by the imposition of the fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution, thus depriving him of a meaningful opportunity for parole, as intended by the legislature in § 54-125a (f) (1). The defendant relied on § 54-125a (f) (1) (A), which, because he was serving a sentence of more than ten years but less than fifty years, entitled him to "be eligible for parole after serving sixty per cent of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater ...." He claimed that, rather than calculating his new parole eligibility...