State v. Myhre, A14–0670.

• Decision Date: 17 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. A14–0670.,A14–0670.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Joshua Lee MYHRE, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

875 N.W.2d 799

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Joshua Lee MYHRE, Appellant.

No. A14–0670.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 17, 2016.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Samuel D. Jandt, Houston County Attorney, Caledonia, MN; and Jed Hammel, Caldonia, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

On September 29, 2012, Deputy Bill Hargrove of the Houston County Sheriff's Office pulled over a vehicle after he observed the vehicle traveling the wrong way on a divided highway. Deputy Hargrove identified the driver of the vehicle as Appellant Joshua Lee Myhre. During the ensuing traffic stop, Myhre failed two sobriety tests. Myhre also provided a "very weak" breath sample and later refused to provide a second sample. Myhre's refusal to provide a second breath sample violated Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014). Because Myhre had at least three prior alcohol-related driving incidents, he was charged with first-degree refusal to submit to testing and first-degree driving under the influence. See Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 1–3 (2014).

After an unsuccessful motion to dismiss the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause, Myhre challenged the constitutionality of the implied-consent statute. The district court heard argument on the constitutionality of the implied-consent statute during a contested omnibus hearing and ultimately concluded that the statute was constitutional. Myhre subsequently entered into an agreement with the prosecution in order to resolve his case without a jury trial. Under that agreement, the prosecution dismissed the charge for driving under the influence.

Three days later, Myhre signed a plea petition, stating that he was waiving his right to a jury trial and pleading guilty to the refusal-to-test charge. The plea petition also stated that Myhre's attorney told Myhre—and Myhre understood—that he would "have the right to appeal, but that any appeal or other court action [Myhre might] take claiming error in the proceedings probably would be useless and a waste of [his] time and the court's." The district court held a plea hearing to receive Myhre's plea and resolve the case. During that hearing, the district court examined Myhre on the record and obtained a clear and complete waiver of his right to a jury trial. The district court then asked Myhre, "[T]o the charge ... of first degree refusal by way of a Lothenbach plea occurring on September 29th, 2012, how do you plead?" Myhre responded, "Guilty." The parties also submitted a document to the district court entitled "Joint Stipulated Facts." The stipulated facts are identical to the factual narrative portion of the "Statement of Probable Cause" filed by Deputy Hargrove. After examining Myhre and considering the information contained in the stipulated facts, the district court adjudicated Myhre guilty of first-degree refusal to test.

To a casual observer, Myhre's agreement with the prosecution might appear to be an ordinary plea agreement. But the record indicates that the agreement was actually more complex. Despite the entry of a guilty plea, it appears that Myhre, along with the State, intended to proceed under Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. This rule allows a criminal defendant to plead not guilty; waive all trial-related rights, including his or her right to a jury trial; stipulate to the state's evidence in a trial to the court; and then appeal a dispositive, pretrial ruling. Although Myhre entered a guilty plea rather than a not-guilty plea, the record is replete with references to a so-called Lothenbach plea. In 2007, Minn. R. Crim. 26.01, subd. 4, replaced Lothenbach as the method for preserving a dispositive pretrial issue for appellate review in a criminal case. See State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 n. 2 (Minn.2011).

A handwritten portion of the plea agreement indicates that the plea was to be a "Lothenbach plea." Myhre's attorney referenced Lothenbach multiple times when explaining the plea agreement to the district court, stating that the plea would be entered according to the "Lothenbach method." Further, Myhre's attorney explicitly stated that the plea was entered so that Myhre could appeal the district court's pretrial ruling on the constitutionality of the implied-consent law, an appeal Myhre could not have taken if he had truly entered a plea of guilty. See generally State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857–58 (Minn.1980) (noting that Minnesota does not recognize conditional guilty pleas).

The district court specifically asked Myhre if he was going "forward with a Lothenbach plea," to which Myhre responded, "Yes." The district court clarified again that Myhre was pleading "by way of a Lothenbach plea" before Myhre stated that he was pleading guilty. Myhre's attorney once again asked Myhre, this time under oath, whether he was entering a Lothenbach plea. Myhre responded, "Yes." Myhre's attorney also asked whether, after the plea was entered, Myhre intended to "appeal the Court's finding of guilt." Myhre indicated that was his intent.

After Myhre testified under oath, the district court took a short recess during which it considered the stipulated facts the parties had submitted. After returning from the recess, the district court made findings of fact that were consistent with the relevant stipulated facts. The district court found Myhre guilty of "failure to submit to testing in the first degree," citing the current case and Myhre's three prior alcohol-related convictions. Later, during the sentencing hearing, Myhre's attorney and the district court acknowledged that Myhre was pursuing an appeal of the pretrial ruling and Myhre's attorney made yet another reference to the "Lothenbach plea."

Before the court of appeals, Myhre not only argued that the implied-consent law was unconstitutional—which was the gravamen of the pretrial ruling he sought to challenge when he entered his plea—he also argued that his conviction was invalid because the procedure followed in the district court did not comply with Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. He further alleged that the district court did not make sufficient factual findings regarding his three prior offenses. The court of appeals concluded that Myhre's plea did not comply with Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, because Myhre entered a guilty plea rather than a not-guilty plea and because Myhre and the prosecutor failed to acknowledge on the record that the pretrial issue would be dispositive. State v. Myhre,

No. A14–0670, 2015 WL 853465, at *3 (Minn.App. Mar. 2, 2015) ; see Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c). But the court of appeals decided to treat Myhre's guilty plea as if it were a not-guilty plea that complied with Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, and affirmed Myhre's conviction.¹

Myhre, 2015 WL 853465, at *3–4. We granted review exclusively on the issue of whether Myhre's conviction was invalidated by the district court's failure to fully comply with the provisions of Rule 26.01, subdivision 4.

I.

Rules of criminal procedure are enacted under the court's "authority to ensure the effective functioning of the judiciary." State v. Cheng, 623 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.2001). The interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure presents a question of law that we review de novo. Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Minn.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1772, 188 L.Ed.2d 603 (2014) ; State v. Hugger, 640 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn.2002).

Neither party suggests a complete analytical framework through which we should address Myhre's claims, nor does our precedent clearly provide one. Although Myhre does not explicitly propose a rule, he suggests that Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, requires something akin to strict compliance with each of its provisions in order to produce a valid conviction. The State, on the other hand, suggests that noncompliance with Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, should be a basis for vacating a conviction only when the departure from the rule impacts the defendant's "fundamental rights" or if the district court failed to substantially comply with the rule.

Myhre cites no precedent to support a rule of strict compliance, and we are not aware of any cases in which we have required strict compliance with either Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, or Lothenbach in order to produce a valid conviction. On the contrary, we have allowed multiple convictions to stand and appeals to continue despite reliance on flawed attempts to comply with either Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, or the Lothenbach procedure.

In State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn.1986), we addressed the merits of the appeal even though the defendant had pleaded guilty, rather than not guilty, while attempting to comply with the Lothenbach procedure. Id. at 878. We reasoned that, "[a]lthough [the Lothenbach ] procedure was not followed in this case, the circumstances are similar to those in Lothenbach. We will do here as we did in Lothenbach and treat this as an appeal from a finding of guilty based on stipulated facts...." Id. We took a similar approach in State v. Verschelde, 595 N.W.2d 192 (Minn.1999). Even though there was "some confusion" regarding whether the defendant entered a guilty plea or a not-guilty plea, we placed substance above form and allowed the appeal to proceed as if the defendant's plea had fully complied with the Lothenbach procedure. Id. at 193–95. Finally, in State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.2011), the parties submitted the case to the district court on "stipulated facts," rather than stipulating to the State's evidence, but the district court proceeded as if a "Lothenbach plea" had been entered—an error almost identical to one of the errors Myhre claims here. Id. at 842 n. 2. In allowing the appeal to proceed,² we reasoned that the procedure employed by the district court "most closely resemble[d]" a trial under Rule 26.01, subdivision 4. Id.

These cases...