State v. Nagel
| Decision Date | 20 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-101,19-101 |
| Citation | 232 A.3d 1081 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Eric G. NAGEL |
David Tartter, Deputy State's Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Matthew Valerio, Defender General, Joshua S. O'Hara, Appellate Defender, and Katarina Marczeski, Legal Intern, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson and Eaton, JJ., and Burgess, J. (Ret.)1 and Morris, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. Defendant Eric Nagel appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and dismiss. He argues that police officers violated Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution by expanding the scope of a valid traffic stop into a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. We agree and reverse.
¶ 2. The following facts are undisputed. In October 2017, a deputy sheriff was driving on Route 2 and recognized the vehicle in front of him from prior law enforcement encounters. He ran a registration check on the vehicle and learned the car was registered to Courtney Nagel. The officer knew from prior law enforcement experience that Courtney Nagel was married to defendant and that defendant's license was criminally suspended. He also was aware that defendant had been known to visit residences suspected of drug dealing. The deputy observed that the driver of the vehicle appeared to be defendant.
¶ 3. Defendant was alone in the vehicle and voluntarily pulled off the road after being followed by the deputy. The officer activated his blue lights and initiated a traffic stop. Several other officers were also present at the stop. The deputy confirmed through the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles database that defendant's license was criminally suspended. The deputy told defendant he would issue a citation for the suspended-license offense. Defendant asked whether the officer would arrest him, and the deputy said that he could but would not. He said they would take his keys to the police office and a valid driver could pick them up and retrieve the vehicle. He informed defendant he must fill out the citation paperwork and returned to his vehicle. As the deputy returned to the police car, he told the other officers that he would "let [defendant] think that this is going to be a go and then I'm going to ask him to search his car."
¶ 4. The deputy worked on paperwork in his vehicle for several minutes. Another officer asked defendant to step outside the vehicle and patted him down. The deputy came back to defendant and asked him if he could search the vehicle for drugs. Defendant stated that there were no drugs in the car. The officer said he knew defendant was associated with people and residences suspected of drug-related crime and again asked to search his car. Defendant said the officer "had no reason to look through it." Another officer present, the sheriff, stated, "OK, then, I'm going to call a wrecker tow because I've got probable cause because somebody has smoked marijuana in the vehicle in the last thirty days." He said the "faint hint of marijuana" gave him "probable cause to seize it, impound it and do up a search warrant." The sheriff did not claim that defendant had been smoking marijuana. The deputy stated they could "call a canine out to do a search on the car." Defendant then gave consent orally and in writing for the officers to search his vehicle. The officers found drugs and drug-related paraphernalia in the vehicle.
¶ 5. The State charged defendant with operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license; possession of heroin; and possession of a regulated drug greater than the recommended therapeutic dosage. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss, arguing that the State had violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to driving with a suspended license and entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of possessing a regulated drug in an amount greater than the recommended individual therapeutic dosage. He was sentenced to two-to-five years’ imprisonment, all suspended, and released on probation.
¶ 6. Defendant timely appeals, arguing that (1) the officers violated Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution by expanding the scope of this stop into a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion and (2) defendant's unlawful detention invalidated his consent. "When reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we review the court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error." State v. Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 10, 200 Vt. 423, 132 A.3d 716.
¶ 7. We first address defendant's argument that the officers unlawfully detained him in violation of Article 11. Defendant does not dispute that the initial motor vehicle stop, based on the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving with a suspended license, was lawful. Rather, defendant contends that the officers’ subsequent questioning of defendant about suspected drug-related activity prolonged the initial stop, and this was unlawful because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in drug-related crime. The State counters that the officers’ conduct did not unreasonably prolong the stop because the drug-related questioning took place before the officers had completed the tasks associated with the initial stop. Alternatively, the State argues that prolonging the motor vehicle stop was justified because the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. The State does not argue that the officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in drug-related crime.
¶ 8. "Like the Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution], Article 11 protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures." Zullo v. State, 2019 VT 1, ¶ 58, 209 Vt. 298, 205 A.3d 466 (quotation and alteration omitted); see also State v. Cunningham, 2008 VT 43, ¶ 16, 183 Vt. 401, 954 A.2d 1290 (). "The temporary stop of a vehicle is a seizure subject to Article 11 protection from governmental invasions of privacy." Zullo, 2019 VT 1, ¶ 58, 209 Vt. 298, 205 A.3d 466. "Although seizures normally require that a law enforcement officer have probable cause to believe that the person being seized has engaged in criminal activity, the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion of either criminal activity or even a minor traffic violation can form the basis of a valid temporary stop." Id. ¶ 59. "[A] reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity ... means there must be more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Rutter, 2011 VT 13, ¶ 8, 189 Vt. 574, 15 A.3d 132 (mem.) (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). "In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to effectuate a seizure or extend an investigative detention, we look at the totality of the circumstances." Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14, 200 Vt. 423, 132 A.3d 716.
¶ 9. An investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion must be "sufficiently limited in scope and duration." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (); State v. Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 17, 175 Vt. 123, 824 A.2d 539 (). Continued detention following a lawful traffic stop may be lawful if it falls within the scope and duration of the initial stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (); see also State v. Alexander, 2016 VT 19, ¶ 16, 201 Vt. 329, 139 A.3d 574. But if continued detention exceeds the limits of the initial stop, the detention will be unlawful unless it is supported by additional reasonable suspicion. Cunningham, 2008 VT 43, ¶ 30, 183 Vt. 401, 954 A.2d 1290 (); see also Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423, 132 A.3d 716 ().
¶ 10. The investigatory stop's purpose is central to deciding whether continued detention is justified by the reasonable suspicion supporting the initial stop or whether it is an additional seizure that requires additional reasonable suspicion. State v. Alexander, 2016 VT 19, 201 Vt. 329, 139 A.3d 574, is instructive. In Alexander, the defendant was a passenger in a taxi cab, which was detained due to a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer asked the driver to exit the vehicle and questioned the driver about defendant. Then the officer questioned defendant and asked to search defendant's bags, where the officer discovered...
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State v. Ferguson
...review the court's legal conclusions without deference and its factual findings for clear error. State v. Nagel, 2020 VT 31, ¶ 6, ––– Vt. ––––, 232 A.3d 1081. For purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding that Trooper June's initial warrantless search of the home was unconstituti......