State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1911
• Citation: 135 S.W. 773,124 Tenn. 1
• Parties: STATE v. NASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY. CO.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

135 S.W. 773

124 Tenn. 1

STATE v. NASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 4, 1911

Error to Circuit Court, Maury County; W. O. Gordon, Judge.

The Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company was indicted for violating Acts 1887, c. 208, by threatening to discharge an employé for trading with certain merchants. From a judgment of the circuit court, quashing the indictment, the State brings error. Affirmed.

The Attorney General, for the State.

Hatcher & Hatcher, for defendant in error.

SHIELDS C.J.

This case involves the constitutionality of chapter 208 of the published Acts of the General Assembly of Tennessee for the year 1887, which act is in words and figures, as follows:

"An act to prevent joint-stock companies, associations, and corporations organized or chartered under the laws of this state, from impairing or infringing upon the rights privileges, and liberties of their servants and employés.

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Tennessee, that it shall be unlawful for any joint-stock company, association, or corporation, organized, chartered or incorporated by and under the laws of this state, or operated or doing business in this state under its laws, either as owner or lessee, having persons in their service as employés, to discharge any employé or employés, or to threaten to discharge any employé or employés in their service for voting or not voting in any election, state, county, or municipal, for any person as candidate or measure submitted to a vote of the people, or to threaten to discharge any such employé or employés for trading or dealing or for not trading or dealing as a customer or patron with any particular merchant or other person or class of persons in any business calling, or to notify any employé or employés, either by general or special notice, directly or indirectly, secretly or openly given, not to trade or deal as customer or patron with any particular merchant or person or class of persons, in any business or calling, under penalty of being discharged from service of such joint-stock company, corporation or association doing business in this state as aforesaid.

"Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that any joint-stock company, association, or corporation organized, chartered, or incorporated under the laws of this state, or operated in this state, violating any of the provisions of the foregoing section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and on conviction shall pay a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars, for each offense for which convicted.

"Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, that any person acting as an officer or agent of any joint-stock companies, associations, or corporations of the kind and character hereinbefore described, or for any one of them, who makes or executes any notice, order, or threat, of the kind and character hereinbefore forbidden, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall pay a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not more than five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than three months."

The defendant in error, a corporation incorporated and organized under an act of the General Assembly of this state, passed previous to the adoption of the Constitution of 1870, was indicted under the first section of this act, and charged with having threatened to discharge a certain one of its employés for trading or dealing as a customer with a certain merchant named. It appeared and moved the court to quash the indictment upon the ground that the statute in question was unconstitutional and void because violative of article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee, ordaining that "no man shall be disseised of his freehold, liberties or privileges *** or deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land," and of article 11, § 8, of the same Constitution, ordaining that "the Legislature shall have no power to *** pass any law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions other than such as may be by the same law extended to any member of the community who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law," and of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, ordaining that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law," and also because the act contains two subjects, and violates article 2, § 17, of the Constitution of this state.

This motion was sustained, and from the judgment of the circuit court, quashing the indictment, the state has prosecuted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to this court, and assigned errors.

In the view we have taken of this statute, it is only necessary to consider the contention that the statute is arbitrary and vicious class legislation, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

It is obvious from a reading of the statute, chapter 208, Acts 1887, that it only includes and applies to corporations created and organized under the laws of Tennessee, and foreign corporations doing business in this state under its laws, and the officers and agents of such corporations. The terms "joint-stock company" and "association" are used as synonymous with the word "corporation," and are surplusage. There are no such corporate bodies as a "joint-stock company" or "association" known to the laws of this state, and it is clear from the whole act that it was the intention of the Legislature to include corporations only, whether domestic or foreign. This is shown by the punishment provided for a corporation violating the act, and that for an officer or agent violating it. Joint-stock companies, associations, and corporations are only punished by fine, because they cannot be imprisoned, while the officer or agent is punished by both fine and imprisonment. If unincorporated bodies were meant by "joint-stock company" and "association," there would not have been this discrimination; but the individuals composing a joint-stock company or association would also have been punished as individuals who are merely officers or agents. Certainly a more severe punishment would not have been denounced against the agent than the principal.

There is no mention in the statute of firms and partnerships, which are composed of individuals associated together for business purposes, or of individuals, and in no view of the statute can it be made to apply to natural persons doing business as partners or individuals. We therefore have a statute which prohibits corporations and their agents from doing certain things under severe penalties, which does not apply to firms or individuals doing the same thing. The discriminatory effect of this statute is illustrated in brief of counsel for the defendant substantially in these words: There is a dry goods mercantile partnership or firm, dealing in dry goods, clothing, boots, shoes, notions, etc., and in the same city a corporation, engaged in precisely the same business and upon the same scale. ...