State v. Nathan, SC 92979.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 92979.,SC 92979. |
| Citation | 404 S.W.3d 253 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Cross–Appellant, v. Ledale NATHAN, Appellant/Cross–Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jessica M. Hathaway, Public Defender's Office, St. Louis, for Nathan.
Evan J. Buchheim, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for State.
Stephan Douglas Bonney, ACLU Foundation of Kansas and Western Missouri, Kansas City, Anthony E. Rothert, Grant R. Doty, ACLU of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis for The American Civil Liberties Union.
Mr. Nathan was found guilty of first-degree murder for the death of Gina Stallis that occurred during a robbery and home invasion. He was 16 years old at the time he committed those crimes. The jury found Nathan guilty of 12 counts of burglary, assault, robbery and kidnapping in addition to the first-degree murder charge, and found him guilty of 13 associated counts of armed criminal action. After the jury returned these verdicts, Nathan waived jury sentencing pursuant to section 557.036.4(1).1
The trial court sentenced Nathan to life in prison with no possibility of parole for first-degree murder. The trial court also sentenced Nathan to five life sentences (with parole) and five 15–year sentences for the non-homicide crimes, all of which were to be served consecutively to each other and to the sentence for first-degree murder. Finally, the trial court sentenced Nathan to eleven life sentences (with parole) for armed criminal action, with these sentences to be served concurrently with the other sentences and to each other. The circuit court dismissed the remaining four counts on which the jury had found Nathan guilty, finding that it had no jurisdiction over these charges because they were outside the scope of the juvenile court's 2 certification under section 211.071.
Nathan appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and the related armed criminal action, and the state cross-appeals the dismissal of the four charges. The court of appeals ordered this matter transferred to this Court because Nathan argues that section 565.020 is invalid under Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3, and the case is remanded for re-sentencing for first-degree murder and, if necessary, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Nathan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as it relates to the element of deliberation on the first-degree murder charge. Viewing the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the following facts.
Shortly after midnight on October 5, 2009, Nathan and his accomplice, Mario Coleman, emerged from a vehicle and approached off-duty police officer Isabella Lovadina and Nicholas Koenig, who were standing in front of the house where Koenig's grandmother Ida Rask lived. Nathan was carrying a “silver” pistol, and Coleman was armed with a “black” pistol. Both pointed their guns at Lovadina and Koenig, ordering them to turn over their belongings. Nathan and Coleman forced the two inside the Rasks' house. At the time, Rask, her two daughters Rosemary Whitrock and Susan Koenig (Nicholas' mother), Whitrock's daughter Gina Stallis, and Stallis' two young children all were sleeping in the house. Coleman held Lovadina and Koenig at gunpoint while Nathan rounded up the remaining victims on the second floor, including Gina Stallis.
Nathan and Coleman took jewelry from the dressers and jewelry boxes, removed jewelry from the victims, and took money from purses. Both Nathan and Coleman threatened to kill several victims, including specifically Stallis and Whitrock, and emphasized these threats by pointing their guns in the victims' faces. Nathan ordered Stallis, at gunpoint, to carry a large television down from the second floor. A short time later, he ordered Stallis to go to the basement. Stallis turned on a light as she walked toward the basement, but Nathan immediately told her to turn it off. Seeing that Nathan was herding the victims into the basement (where they might be executed or assaulted further), Officer Lovadina moved toward the hallway where the basement door was located and offered to go to the basement instead of Stallis. Coleman moved to stop Lovadina, bringing the two of them—and Koenig, Stallis and Nathan—together in close proximity to each other in or near the hallway near the basement door.
At this point, Officer Lovadina charged Coleman in an attempt to disarm him. Nathan moved to help Coleman ward off Lovadina but was attacked by Koenig. Seven gunshots were heard during this brief fight, which ended with the shooter firing the final shots directly into Lovadina as she lay on the floor. Nathan and Coleman fled, abandoning Lovadina and Koenig, who had been hit five and three times respectively, and Stallis, who lay dead from a single gunshot wound in her chest.3
Coleman took Nathan to the hospital because he had been shot in the hand during the melee. There, Nathan told the x-ray technician to get rid of the red “hoodie” that Nathan had been wearing during the robbery. Nathan lied to the police about his gunshot wound, giving incomplete and contradictory answers to their questions. Outside the hospital, the police approached Coleman, who attempted to throw away the black pistol and several items of jewelry taken from the victims. The police found Nathan's silver pistol, with an empty 7–shot clip, in Coleman's car. Nathan's DNA was found on the grip of this pistol, and Officer Lovadina's blood was found spattered on the outside and inside of the barrel. All of the bullets removed from Lovadina and Stallis, and the seven shell casings found in the hallway of the home, came from this silver pistol.
Shortly after these crimes occurred, the juvenile officer filed a petition in St. Louis City juvenile court alleging that Nathan was a juvenile, that he had been involved in the robbery and shooting described above, and that these acts constituted first-degree murder and other crimes The juvenile officer later moved to dismiss this petition pursuant to section 211.071 and sought a determination by the juvenile court whether Nathan should be dealt with under the juvenile code or whether the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction over Nathan should be relinquished so that he could be charged and tried in circuit court. After a hearing, the juvenile court determined that Nathan was not a proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code. Accordingly, the juvenile court dismissed the petition and relinquished jurisdiction over Nathan.
The state then charged Nathan with 13 crimes (and 13 counts of armed criminal action in connection with those crimes) arising out of the home invasion, robbery and murder. Nathan moved to dismiss the four counts based on harm to Stallis (i.e., first-degree murder and first-degree robbery, with two related counts of armed criminal action) and the four counts based on harm to Whitrock (i.e., first-degree robbery and kidnapping, with two related counts of armed criminal action). Nathan argued that none of these eight charges had been “certified” by the juvenile court and, therefore, none of them could be brought or tried in circuit court. The trial court overruled Nathan's motion, but noted that it would revisit its ruling regarding the four counts involving Whitrock after the trial.
Following the jury's determination that Nathan was guilty on all 26 counts, the trial court dismissed the four counts pertainingto Whitrock. The trial court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over any crimes Nathan may have committed against or involving Whitrock because she was not named in Nathan's juvenile petition. The state appeals the dismissal of these counts. Conversely, Nathan appeals the trial court's failure to dismiss the four counts relating to Stallis. These claims are addressed together.
The fundamental flaw in Nathan's argument—and in the trial court's order dismissing the four counts relating to Whitrock—is that the certification procedure created in section 211.071 pertains to individuals, not to specific conduct, crimes or charges. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
1. If a petition alleges that a child between the ages of twelve and seventeen has committed an offense which would be considered a felony if committed by an adult, the court may ..., in its discretion, dismiss the petition and transfer the child to a court of general jurisdiction for prosecution under the general law.
* * *
9. When a petition has been dismissed thereby permitting a child to be prosecuted under the general law, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over that child is forever terminated, except as provided in subsection 10 of this section, for an act that would be a violation of a state law or municipal ordinance.
10. If a petition has been dismissed thereby permitting a child to be prosecuted under the general law and the child is found not guilty by a court of general jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over any later offense committed by that child which would be considered a misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult, subject to the certification provisions of this section.
§ 211.071 (emphasis added).
The plain language of these sections demonstrates that the focus in a certification proceeding is on the juvenile, not the conduct alleged in the petition. A petition pursuant to sections 211.031.1(3) and 211.091 serves only to invoke the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction by identifying the individual as being younger than 17 years old and alleging that the child has engaged in conduct that would be a crime if committed by an adult. Under the procedure set forth in section 211.071, the juvenile court may...
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